主题：让印度帮助阿富汗:太有才了！偶欣赏 -- 种植园土

这是英国卫报发表的一篇印度精英署名文章。

太有才了。典型的志大才疏、自我陶醉型阿三。俺是真心希望他的观点被美帝采用，只要采用了，中国就又多几年安稳日子了。

美帝在阿富汗是打不赢滴。真正可担心的是美帝把巴基斯坦巴尔干化，削弱中国盟友，自然会增强印度制衡中国能力。巴基斯坦内部不团结，一些官僚和将领受了美帝威逼利诱就手软了。要是印度一参与，这一切担心立即一扫而空。印度到阿富汗没有陆路出口，可能部队撤都撤不出来。

俺太赞赏这篇文章了。一个是文中吹嘘印度有60年反叛乱经验：看来印度60年都没打垮几个毛派及伊斯兰分离主义分子,依然在平叛呀。再一个是跳跃性思维的判断：“阿富汗-宝莱坞电影广受欢迎。这意味着印度士兵将不太可能被视作占领军。”太欣赏这种大无畏的乐观主义了。最后是把阿富汗称作民主政体。如果卡尔扎伊政权也配称作民主，那民主的确是个很滥的东东了。

看来塔利班还真是有点道理禁播电影呢。

俺把这篇文章全文翻译成了中文，英文附后。以飨读者。

印度与阿富汗的密切关系意味着它非常适合在西方世界撤出最后一名士兵时踏入喀布尔。

在19世纪，印度军队两次越过兴都库什山脉，希望把英国主人各地块的政治威权整合到一起。过去一个世纪后，印度再次以主权共和国的身份恢复了在这个充当沙俄及苏联缓冲山国地区的存在。

一年前，印度人完成了对阿富汗的新议会大厦的建设，作为综合象征，同时向议员提供了法律培训。过去援助和投资的10多亿美元，设立的多个领事馆，和一个极少曝光的1000人小部队证明了两个民主政体之间的蓬勃发展关系。

印度是阿富汗第5大捐助国，自2001年以来认捐12亿美元，并提供涵盖教育、卫生和基础设施的援助项目。其中最引人注目的项目，连接伊朗边境阿富汗的215公里干线公路，使印度得以从一个正在开发的伊朗港口，运输货物抵达阿富汗。这绕过巴基斯坦控制的陆路。结果2007-20088以印度阿富汗贸易增加到5.38亿美元。哈米德.卡尔扎伊曾在印度接受教育并获得印度军方支持。他上任的第一年就四访印度。美军组建的阿富汗军队在印度各地接受过培训。

不是每个人都满意印度扩大影响。巴基斯坦一直把阿富汗当做战略纵深，非常忧惧被包围以及印度支持分裂主义。这滋生了大量的阴谋论，‘所有的巴基斯坦问题都被作为美国，印度，以色列和阿富汗制造的阴谋’， 一位著名的巴基斯坦记者艾哈迈德拉希德说。

2008年7月喀布尔印度使馆的汽车炸弹炸死了41人。据纽约时报报道，美国官员很快提供了“截获的巴基斯坦情报官员和武装分子之间的通讯”，显示了巴基斯坦罪责。印度的ISI此次并没有吃闲饭。

2009年9月，国际安全援助部队司令McChrystal，曾在会议上披露：“虽然印度出面有利于阿富汗人民，并提高印度在阿富汗的影响，却可能加剧地区紧张局势和鼓励阿富汗或巴基斯坦采取反印度措施”。（巴基斯坦）毫不掩饰地威胁再制造一次孟买式恐怖事件也激怒了印度媒体。

印度反应谨慎。印度国防部长安东尼“断然不存在印度在阿富汗的军事参与问题...现在没有，将来也不会”。对印度对外情报局前局长说“派出部队不是一种选择”。

保持缄默可能有必要且令人信服的理由。印度维和部队在斯里兰卡阵亡1200人仍是痛苦回忆。虽然印度安全部队已经有60年反叛乱经验了，它在面临多重国内游击战争如毛派和伊斯兰分离主义分子，仍是手忙脚乱。此外，印度的政党联盟政治具有各扫国内门前雪的特点，很难维持雄心勃勃的外交政策。

不过毕竟有1000多名准军事成员即印藏边境警察部署在阿富汗。奥巴马承诺到2011年撤出美国军队，此话一出已制造了准真空，诱使巴基斯坦重申其对塔利班的支持。这有助于加大印度增派军队的声势，尽管目前仍很微弱。

阿米尔塔赫里在泰晤士报上声称，向阿富汗提供军事承诺是“在印度令人惊讶地受欢迎”。一名前外交官则指出“印度舆论广泛严正要求，毋须等待美国邀请函”印度就应当断然干预阿富汗事务。

“现实主义”杂志编辑Pragati称“军事介入...将战场转移远离克什米尔和印度大陆”。一个有关 “武力可替代性”的所属博客则认为，“因为印度军队直接攻击圣战者不现实，印度应提供在阿富汗西部和北部提供战斗值勤，确保美军能够腾出手对付塔利班”

其他人建议“最好的贡献是向阿富汗国家军队提供作战训练，物流和通信支持”。

在西方国家首都战争支持率正在下滑，部分原因是公民不理解这跟加强国土安全有何关系。对印度恐怖袭击的频繁程度和规模意味着印度已经没有这样的麻烦。法国，意大利和德国阻碍了北约部队的有效性，但印度伤亡敏感度肯定低于譬如英国。

印度和阿富汗建立长期文化关系。阿富汗-宝莱坞电影广受欢迎。这意味着印度士兵将不太可能被视作占领军。73％的阿富汗人对印度友好， 91％对巴基斯坦持相反观点。

印度拥有丰富的平叛经验，与区域大国如伊朗和俄罗斯保持了良好关系，保留位于塔吉克斯坦的军事基地，且可调用大量储备部队。印度在联合国有近9000人部队，另有30000人刚从从查谟和克什米尔撤出。

阻碍印度参与的是巴基斯坦。然而，很少有人静思 “当今最活跃的恐怖主义赞助者”成为“打击恐怖分子前线盟友”的荒诞性。2009年12月，纽约时报报道巴基斯坦的拒绝打击最强的阿富汗塔利班指挥官西拉杰哈卡尼，理由是他是“巴基斯坦间谍机构长期情报来源”。

在西方国家首都充分展示的真相是，印度是唯一真正有兴趣既参与阿富汗建设又在杜兰德线进行反恐战争的。如果对印度提供相应激励后，即便西方国家撤走，哪怕是惊慌失措地撤走，印度仍是愿意长期留在喀布尔的。

Let India help Afghanistan

India's close ties with Afghanistan mean it is well placed to step in when the west has flown its last soldier out of Kabul

In the 19th century, Indian armies twice crossed the Hindu Kush, hoping to stitch together the patchwork political authority of the territory in the service of their British masters. Over a century later, the sovereign republic of India once more has a renewed presence in what was once its mountainous buffer from the Tsarist, and then Soviet, giant to the north.

A year ago, Indians completed the construction of Afghanistan's new parliament building and, to compound the symbolism, provided training to the legislators who would make the country's laws. Over a billion dollars in aid and investment, multiple consulates, and a little-reported thousand-strong troop presence all testify to the flourishing ties between the two democracies.

India is Afghanistan's fifth-largest donor, pledging $1.2bn since 2001 and providing aid that spans education, health and infrastructure. The most eye-catching project, a 215km road connecting the Iranian border to Afghanistan's arterial highway, will eventually allow India to transport goods by sea to an Iranian port it is developing, and thence to Afghanistan and beyond. This circumvents the overland route, blocked by Pakistan, but also gives a fillip to Indo-Afghan trade ($538m during 2007-8). Hamid Karzai, himself educated in India and the beneficiary of Indian military support during the 1990s, visited India four times in the first five years of his tenure. The Afghan national army, the linchpin of the new American strategy to pacify the country, receives training across India.

Not everyone is happy with the widening Indian footprint. Pakistan, long reliant on Afghanistan as a source of "strategic depth" has invoked fears of encirclement and Indian-sponsored separatism. This is in addition to the panoply of wild "conspiracy theorists who insist that every one of Pakistan's ills are there because of interference by the US, India, Israel and Afghanistan", says Ahmed Rashid, a noted Pakistani journalist.

Among other attacks, a car bomb at the Indian embassy in Kabul killed 41 in July 2008. According to the New York Times, American officials quickly presented "intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack" to demonstrate Pakistani culpability and "the ISI officers had not been renegades".

Then in September 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force, suggested in a leaked assessment of the war that "while Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India". The scarcely veiled threat of further bloodbaths such as Mumbai prompted renewed anger in the Indian media.

India has responded cautiously. Indian defence minister AK Antony insisted "categorically … there is no question of Indian military involvement in Afghanistan … not now, not in the future". A former head of India's foreign intelligence service has said that "sending troops … is not an option".

There are sound and perhaps compelling reasons for this reticence. There remain bitter memories of the 1,200 deaths suffered by an Indian peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka, and although Indian security forces have six decades of counterinsurgency experience, they face multiple intensifying guerilla wars at home from Maoists and separatists. Moreover, India's coalition politics, featuring local parties with parochial interests, is hardly suited to sustaining ambitious foreign policies.

Yet more than 1,000 members of the paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Border Police are deployed in Afghanistan. President Obama's affirmation to withdraw US forces by 2011 has generated a prospective vacuum, inducing Pakistan to renew its support for the Taliban. This has produced loudening, though still marginal, Indian voices in favour of more boots on the ground.

Amir Taheri, writing in The Times, suggests that a military commitment is "surprisingly popular in India". One former diplomat argues that "influential sections of Indian opinion are stridently calling for an outright Indian intervention in Afghanistan without awaiting the niceties of an American invitation letter".

The editor of the "realist" journal Pragati writes that "military involvement … will shift the battleground away from Kashmir and the Indian mainland". An affiliated blog draws on the idea of "force fungibility" to argue that "since it is not feasible for Indian troops to directly attack Pakistan's military-jihadi complex, India should ensure that US troops do so" by "reliev[ing them] of duties in areas where they are not actually fighting the Taliban – especially in western and northern Afghanistan".

Others have suggested that "the best contribution … might be in the areas of combat training and creating capacities in logistics and communications", still sorely lacking in the embryonic Afghan national army.

Support for the war is faltering in western capitals, partly because citizens cannot see how it furthers homeland security. The frequency and scale of attacks on India mean that Indians have no such trouble. National caveats on force employment – particularly from France, Italy, and Germany – hinder the efficacy of Nato troops, but Indian casualty sensitivity is almost certainly less than that in, say, Britain.

India's longstanding cultural ties to Afghanistan – Bollywood movies are wildly popular there, for instance – mean that Indian soldiers would be less likely to be stigmatised as occupiers, with 73% of Afghans professing a favourable view of India (and 91% holding the opposite view of Pakistan).

India is also experienced at counterinsurgency, enjoys good relations with regional powers such as Iran and Russia (including bases in Tajikistan), and the large reserves of available forces. India has nearly 9,000 troops with the UN, and just withdrew 30,000 from Jammu and Kashmir.

The obstacle to India's involvement is Pakistan. Yet few stop to evaluate the absurdity of having "today's most active sponsor of terrorism" as a frontline ally against terrorists. In December 2009, the New York Times reported Pakistan's refusal to crack down on Siraj Haqqani, the strongest Taliban commander in Afghanistan, on the basis that he was a "longtime asset of Pakistan's spy agency".

The truth downplayed in western capitals is that India is one of the only interested parties, the US included, that has an interest in both state-building and counterterrorism on the Afghan side of the Durand line. Creating incentives for it to expand its provision of security could lay the groundwork for a commitment that will last long after the last western soldier is flown – or desperately airlifted – out of Kabul.

顺便贴两个塔利班伏击公路运输车队图。

• 去年10月以后关于帮助印度基建的讨论，老广在河里盖起了