主题：【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战（系列终结篇） -- 思炎

当中朝公开美俘的供词时，美方相当震惊，为了掩盖真相，便在国际上和对美国民众大肆宣称：美国没有使用细菌武器，中朝方的指控是propaganda “政治谎言”，那些被俘的飞行员一定全部被“Red China”洗脑了（have been “brainwashed”）。私下里用军事法庭的惩罚和“叛国罪”威胁曾招供的军人军官，迫使他们再翻供，并让Col. Walker F. Mahurin做为“germ warfare confess”的代表出来讲话，说他们是被中朝威逼和洗脑才做“假招供”的。

When the prisoners of war who had made these confessions returned from Korea in the summer of 1953, they were interrogated by the Artichoke team, which had announced its eagerness to do so weeks in advance. In a memorandum to the top leadership of the CIA, the team said it wanted to use those “who have been exposed to and accepted in varying degrees Communist indoctrination ... as unique research material in the Artichoke work.”

Among other things, hypnosis, anaesthetics and LSD were to be used on the former POWs. In this way, Artichoke hoped to gain insight into the enemy’s interrogation methods and to make sure that the returned soldiers did not work for the other side.

人家那几个回来的美国战俘官司可是打到最高法院的哦？ 跟你讲。

好了，写了那么多废话有什么用啊？来正面回答我几个问题好了，不要问几个问题都不敢正面回应哦。

1、投掷装满了混有尘埃与细菌的炸弹，这种炸弹将在半空中即打开来，并借风力散播带有细菌的尘埃。

　　2、利用喷雾器装置，由飞机直接散布尘埃，因此在散布尘埃的地方，空气中即有细菌。

　　3、或者投掷装满细菌尘埃的容器或炸弹，这一类容器会在水中开启，也可以用会被水渗湿后启开的硬纸盒，把它投到贮水池或湖沼中，这些地方的水是人和动物都要饮用的，并且这些地方的昆虫会染上细菌并传播它们。

　　投掷昆虫的方法是：

　　

1、投掷外形和普通炸弹一样的细菌弹，但这种炸弹中，装满了带有细菌的昆虫，这种炸弹触地后即开启并放散出这些昆虫来。

　　2、投掷盛有昆虫的硬纸制容器，这种容器触地后即行裂开，昆虫就会带着细菌逸散出来。

　　3、或以动物散播昆虫。

　　以动物散播细菌的方法是：

　　1、以装有降落伞的容器投放老鼠、兔子或其他小野物，这种容器触地后即放出这类动物，这些动物遍身沾满带有细菌的虱子和跳蚤。

　　2、或用船只把这类动物从敌人后方海岸放到陆上。

　　亦有其他撒布细菌方法：

　　

1、投掷带有细菌的传单，大便纸，信封及其他纸制物品。

　　2、投掷混有细菌之肥皂或衣服。

　　3、投掷装有细菌的墨水的自来水笔。

　　4、或给敌军部队投掷沾染细菌之食物。

计划的主要目标是从一开始的测试到使用，根据现场条件下，各种要素的细菌战，并可能扩大范围测试，在稍后，根据在朝鲜获得的结果，成为常规作战武器。不同病菌的有效性，特别是它们的传播和疫情质量在各种不同的情况下都被进行测试，看是否每一种疾病对敌方行动造成了严重干扰破坏，还是只是造成轻微不便，或者是完全被控制，没有造成任何问题。

。。。。。。

这些试验的时期长短虽然不明确，但是要足以包括朝鲜任何极端的温度。（那么认为美军没有进行细菌战，并质疑在冬天放置苍蝇是愚蠢的方法，说是实在想象不出一个思维正常的指挥官会在不考虑这些作战条件下就采用这些手段的，现在应该明白为什么美军要如此做了）

Fort Detrick, Md., was created in the middle of World War II and became the center for America's biological warfare efforts. But that role shifted in 1969, the government says, to focus solely on defense against the threat of biological weapons.

Then called Detrick Air Field, the science and research facility housed four biological agent production plants.

Anthrax was considered the most important agent. Simulants were tested, and one bomb was readied for production in 1944. One million bombs were ordered, though the order was canceled when the war ended in 1945.

During the 1950s, the biological weapons program was among the most classified within the Pentagon. There was an emphasis on biological agents for use against enemy forces as well as plants and animals.

The Army says no biological weapons were used during the Korean War, though such allegations were made by the Chinese and the Koreans.

Growing Protests

One plan at Fort Detrick in the late 1950s was to use the yellow fever virus against an enemy by releasing infected mosquitoes by airplane or helicopter. Detrick's labs were capable of producing a half-million mosquitoes per month, with plans for up to 130 million per month.

In 1950 the U.S. government, concurrent with the growing tensions of the early Cold War, and especially the outbreak of the Korean War, secretly launched a heavily funded and far-ranging crash program in biological warfare. Gas warfare development expanded at an equal pace, especially work with nerve gas. Sarin was standardized in 1951, but emphasis shifted in 1953 to the more potent V-series

nerve gases first developed by the British. VX was standardized in 1957, though a standardized delivery system was not developed.

But biological warfare had a higher priority than chemical: indeed, the biological warfare crash program introduced in 1950 shared highest-level priority with atomic warfare. The primary objective for biological weapons was to acquire an early operational capability within the emergency war plan for general war against the Soviet

Union and China.

By the time of the Korean War, an agent and bomb were standardized both for anticrop and antipersonnel use while research and development went forward with a broad range of agents and delivery systems.

In the post–Korean War period many agents and several delivery systems were standardized, one of the more interesting being the standardization in 1959 of yellow fever carried by mosquito vectors. Further, the U.S. government secretly took over the Japanese biological warfare program, acquiring records of experiments with live subjects that killed at least 10,000 prisoners of war, some probably American. In exchange, the perpetrators of the Japanese program were spared prosecution as war criminals.

Another indication of the priority of biological warfare was the adoption in

early 1952 of a secret first-use strategy. U.S. military strategists and civilian policymakers took advantage of ambiguities in government policy to

allow the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to put a secret offensive strategy in place. Though the United States reaffirmed World War II retaliation-only policy for gas warfare in 1950, the JCS after some debate decided that it did not by implication apply to biological warfare. They concluded there was no government policy on such weapons, and the Defense Department concurred. Consequently the JCS sent directives to the services making first-use strategy operational doctrine, subject to presidential approval. During the Korean War, the United States also created a deeply buried infrastructure for covert biological warfare in the Far East.

Data from the Chinese archives for the Korean War, corroborated by evidence from the U.S. and Canadian archives, builds a strong case for the United States experimenting with biological weapons during the Korean War. The issue remains controversial in the face of U.S. government denial. In 1956 the United States brought policy into line with strategic doctrine by adopting an official first-use offensive policy for biological warfare subject to presidential approval.

A third crucial document – marked “Top Secret” – showed that in September 1951, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders to begin “large scale field tests… to determine the effectiveness of specific BW [bacteriological warfare] agents under operational conditions.”

If these “field tests” were indeed undertaken, then they may have drawn again on the expertise of the Japanese biological warfare team.