主题：更社会主义 -- 本嘉明

(美国小知识分子就“美国特色的韬光养晦”进行公开辩论)

文章作者 Robert J. Samuelson。

译文如下：

2015年美国政府财政预算显示，未来五角大楼会大幅下降军费上的投资。从2013年直到2024年，以名义美元价格（未将通胀考虑在内）计算，美国国防看起来基本保持平稳：2013年为6260亿美元，2024年将为6300亿美元。而扣除通胀和人口增长因素，国防开支实际会下降近1/4：在联邦总预算中，2013年国防开支占比为18%，2024年会下降到11%。

与此同时，美国社保支出将继续大幅上升：到2024年，Social Security spending将会上涨85%（名义美元额度为1.5万亿）， Medicare将上涨75%（达到名义美元8630亿美元），当然这里面也有通胀的水分。

美国国防部长Chuck Hagel表示，未来美国地面部队会从57万人减少到45万人（甚至可能是42万人），该人数肯定二战以来的最低值；同时海军陆战队人数也会从顶峰的18.2万人减少10%。从装备看，空军将废弃所有的A-10“犹猪式”地面支援战斗机；海军也将减少滨海战斗舰的购买量（原计划购买52艘，现计划购买32艘）。

一直以来，美国军方存在的基本意义可以归为两类。

首先，强大的美军可以起到威慑作用。即使我们假设五角大楼进行的每项军费削减都是合理的，总体来看，各项削减的总和会大幅降低美军的威慑力。五角大楼向全球表明了态度：即美国已经对介入任何战争都变得非常谨慎，并且美国不太可能向它国派遣地面部队。另外，奥巴马总统极不愿动用军队更加证明了：华府在未来将尽可能远离各种战争。（此处有删节，请看原文）

第二，强大的美军可以起到保卫国家利益的作用。现在的战争已经不能用过去以往的地面战争来定义，现代战争的形式非常多样化：从网络黑客攻击，到非国家性的恐怖组织攻击，再到大规模杀伤性武器的威胁。美国前国防部长罗伯特.盖茨曾经这样说过：“说到对下一场战争的交战形式和交战地点的预测，自从越战以来，美国的记录是如此精彩，那就是他妈的没有一次到最后不是搞砸的！”

对于美国来说，现在全球可能发生的战争威胁是普遍存在的：如果美国对伊朗核设施进行轰炸，波斯湾国家可能立即会陷入暴力冲突状态；同样情况对于中国南海以及朝鲜半岛来说也是一样；对巴基斯坦来说，一旦其核武器被盗，后果将不堪设想；以最近乌克兰的情况来看，如果美国可以将地面部队派往波兰或其它波罗的海国家，当地局势可能会稳定许多。

对于美国民众来说，五角大楼已经放弃了以往的军备承诺------即美国可以同时介入两场大规模战争。另外，五角大楼也没有能力帮助它国稳定战乱。一份最近的国防报告显示，美国部队当下没有能力坚持长久且大规模的作战行动。从美国国策角度讲，只有在快速且稳赢的情况下，白宫才敢介入一场战争，因为美国军费是无法支持“持久战”的。

哈格尔说过，今天的军费削减就是一次大筹码的赌博，输掉赌局的后果就是(美军介入后)更多伤亡，也不容易打赢。他警告称：“继续削减军费会将美国军队变成真正的‘纸老虎’”。

对于美国民众来说，确实很多人已经厌倦了美国继续担任“世界警察”的位置，但很多战争和残酷的事实已经很明确的告诉我们：由于地缘和外交因素，其它国家和地区的利益实际上和美国利益紧密相连。美国民众不应该让两伊战争的阴影完全蒙蔽住自己的双眼。另外，对于奥巴马政府来说，通过削减军费来支持社保并非明智之举；对于共和党来说，不承认高军费开支需要高税收支持也是行不通的。

最近，美国国防部长助理福克斯这样表示：“世界已经变得十分和平，国际局势似乎也并不需要美国来引领，全球正在经历自冷战以后最稳定的时期”。我们P民就装着相信，然后继续疯狂消费吧。

The crisis in Ukraine reminds us that the future is unpredictable, that wars routinely involve miscalculation and that brute force — boots on the ground, bombs in the air — counts. None of these obvious lessons seems to have made much impression in Washington, where the Obama administration and Congress continue their policy of defunding defense and reducing the United States’ military power.

The administration’s new 2015 budget projections show how sharply the Pentagon shrinks. In nominal dollars (unadjusted for inflation), defense spending stays flat between 2013 and 2024. It’s $626 billion in 2013 and $630billion in 2024. Adjusted for inflation and population growth, it drops by a quarter. As a share of the federal budget, it falls from 18 percent in 2013 to 11percent in 2024. Meanwhile, Social Security spending in nominal dollars increases 85 percent to $1.5 trillion by 2024 and Medicare advances 75 percent to $863 billion. The inflation-adjusted gains are also large.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has outlined some program cuts behind the spending declines. The Army drops from a recent peak of 570,000 to 450,000 — the lowest since before World War II — and, possibly, 420,000. The Marine Corps falls 10 percent from its peak to 182,000. The Air Force retires all its A-10 “Warthog” ground-support fighters, as well as its U-2 spy planes. The Navy halts purchases of its Littoral Combat Ships at 32 instead of the planned 52.

The United States has a military for two reasons. One is to deter conflicts. Even if every Pentagon spending cut were desirable — manifestly untrue — their collective size symbolically undermines deterrence. It telegraphs that the United States is retreating, that it is war-weary and reluctant to deploy raw power as an instrument of national policy. President Obama’s undisguised distaste for using the military amplifies the message.

This may embolden potential adversaries and abet miscalculation. The United States’ military retrenchment won’t make China’s leaders less ambitious globally. (China plans a 12 percent increase in military spending for 2014; at that pace, spending would double in six years.) Nor will it dampen Iran’s aggressiveness and promote a negotiated settlement over its nuclear program. Probably the reverse. Diplomacy often fails unless backed by a credible threat of force.

The second reason for a military is to defend national interests — and prevail in conflict. Just what this requires is hard to say, because the nature of war is shifting to include cyberattacks, non-state adversaries and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. “When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements,” former defense secretary Robert Gates has noted, “our record [since Vietnam] has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right.”

There are many potential war theaters: Persian Gulf nations, including Iran if the United States bombed its nuclear facilities; the South China Sea; the Korean Peninsula; Pakistan, if theft of its nuclear weapons were threatened. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine raises the prospect that a sizable number of U.S. troops might be stationed in the Baltic nations or Poland. All belong to NATO; all must now feel more threatened by Russia.

The Pentagon has already downgraded its capabilities. It has abandoned its past assumption that it could fight two major wars simultaneously. It has also disavowed any long-lasting counterinsurgency. “Our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations,” says the latest Quadrennial Defense Review. The self-serving premise is that wars can be fought and won quickly, because otherwise budgets don’t work.

All this is a huge gamble. Hagel says that today’s reduced funding creates “added risk” (translation: higher combat deaths, lower odds of success). He warns that a return to “sequestration” (deeper congressionally mandated cuts) would create a “hollow force.”

Defense spending should reflect a strategic vision of the U.S. global role. This would balance Americans’ unwillingness to be the “world’s cop” with the observed truth that, given today’s interconnectedness, distant events can affect vital U.S. interests. In reality, strategy is driven by political expedience and a shortage of cash. It reflects popular disillusion with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It presumes that the world won’t punish the political preferences of America’s leaders. Obama and Democrats won’t sacrifice social spending for defense spending; Republicans won’t admit that higher defense spending requires higher taxes。

The inattention to these developments is stunning. The Post’s main story on the administration’s 2015 budget barely mentioned defense; the same was true of the comparable story in the New York Times. Christine H. Fox, the acting deputy secretary of defense, recently noted that “the world has gotten no less dangerous, turbulent or in need of American leadership. There is no obvious peace dividend as was the case at the end of the Cold War.” But we’re pretending there is — and spending it madly.

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