主题：【原创】阿根廷比索，请不要为我哭泣 -- 须弥一芥

These currency swaps can be viewed as a credit line that both sides can draw upon at a pre-determined exchange rate. They are different from the liquidity swap lines that the Federal Reserve established with several central banks during the Global Financial Crisis, which are essentially repo transactions based on prevailing exchange rates. In contrast, China’s bilateral currency swap agreements are designed to facilitate settlement in renminbi. China’s agreement with Pakistan, for instance, specified that the use of currency swap agreement should be based on either bilateral trade or direct investment transactions.

In practice, however, China’s currency swap agreements have also been activated as a source of liquidity for reasons not directly linked to trade. Again using Pakistan as an example, the country reportedly tapped an equivalent of US$ 600 million (out of a total of RMB 10 billion, or US$ 1.6 billion) under the swap agreement in 2013 to shore up its reserves and averted an imminent currency crisis. Granted, tapping the swap line only had cosmetic effects on the country’s balance of payment statistics, and did not improve the fundamentals of the country’s external positions, but it did provide a way for Pakistan to obtain liquidity at a time of emergency without further adverse impacts on its currency value. (Pakistan eventually got a US$6.6 billion loan from the IMF that helped stabilize its economy.) In a similar move, Argentina reportedly drew upon its swap line with China to combat a shortage of USD funding in 2014.

China does not provide USD liquidity under bilateral currency swap agreements, but both Pakistan and Argentina were able to convert RMB to USD in the offshore RMB market. In other words, swap agreements have made it possible for China’s counterparts to navigate troubled times on the back of China’s vast foreign exchange reserves and its strong currency.

At the moment, the total size of such swaps is still small when compared with China’s foreign exchange reserves, but further expansion of these programs could pose new challenges for managing RMB exchange rates. In a scenario where foreign exchange reserves are declining and RMB depreciation expectations are rising, the use of these swap agreements for liquidity purpose can add to downward pressure on the Chinese currency to the extent that the other side sells a large amount of RMB to obtain USD funding.

These concerns can dissipate with further internationalization of the RMB, if the RMB becomes a widely used reserve currency and RMB denominated securities are to gain significance in international capital markets. The upcoming review of the Chinese currency’s inclusion in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights basket in November is an important step in this direction.

The objective of the swap is to 1) promote bilateral trade, 2) finance direct investment

between the two countries in the respective local currencies of the two countries and 3) any

other ‘purpose’ as mutually agreed between the two central banks.