主题：【读书笔记】滞胀的年代（上） -- wqnsihs
家园 主流观点流歪了 不晓得何时西西河有了这个主流观点。我看美国没什么大问题，很多人就是先入为主的认为美国经济危机来了要嗝屁，再不断选择性收集证据，夸大问题，自我强化。绝大多数的人没有在美国真正生活和工作过，很容易就被误导，然后开始阿Q式的意淫。
家园 葡萄的判断 关键词之一，是先活下来，呵呵
互相讨论不算干预吧，不过葡萄大的逻辑太强悍了
家园 中美关系这也正是问题的焦点所在 葡兄，也是基于这点不好判断，所以不敢随便下结论。
但人民币国际化是已经在进行中，受到阻力是难免的，局部牺牲并不可怕，美国希望人民币到美国去投资，最好是中国富人移民到美国去，但中国算盘当然不会是这样，去美国真的是肉包子打狗，有去无回，连个声响都没有，当年日本不就去了一回，结果如何？资源是有限，你的人民币要出去，那么你保证美国国债同时，最好能按照美国的意志来进行投资，但这边厢显然也有自己的算盘。
房市环节，通过税收是集中到ZF的，这是可以接受的，最怕的就是税收的去处最后是到资本家，这才是最要防止的。这肉现在还在锅里，但美国现在是希望你锅里肉的去填了他的肚子。
家园 多谢葡萄 送花成功，可取消。有效送花赞扬。恭喜：你意外获得 4 铢钱。
参数变化，作者，声望:1；铢钱:0。你，乐善:1；铢钱:3。本帖花:1
- 复 关于2
家园 通透啊 资本干的事情，其实就是将资源如何变现，变现手法越快越大越好。将未来的现金提前之前到现在来用。本来提前支取的现金流确实能够促进经济建设，能够满足资金需求，但由于分配环节问题，造成资源的消耗和过度集中，造成了不可持续，只好再找新的资源来提取现金流，人家美国好歹靠帝国之鞭让自己的国债就能做到寅吃卯粮，其他的你就只能自己挖潜了，自己的资源上动脑子了。分配环节上动？这个也就是一手和另一手的关系，当不得真的。
大家看到了外汇占款的通胀之源，更要看到房市土地操作的流动性根源。
通宝推：双羽四足, - 复 关于2
家园 我给葡萄大一个信息。 选取一家省分行为例。其在剥离前的不良资产占总资产的比例为43.45%。，现不良资产占比为0.77%。总资产额产生了巨大的变化，因此金融系统安全多了。而所谓不良总额超过剥离前的说法，我觉得十分不确，以我开会时得到的数据看，四大商业银行的不良总额都是明显的下降了，因此，四大资产公司存在的必要已属可疑。要么已并入其子公司，要么面临无事可做的境况。
家园 对于不良资产管理来讲 其实最终考验的是宏观经济的质量。
退一步讲，如果将信贷资产按照与宏观、行业、企业关联度划分，吃宏观景气、吃行业景气、吃个体竞争优势的比例又各是多少？
在顺周期的阶段里，做规模是第一位的，但是如果周期向下呢？
家园 since you are a banker I just want to point out that domestic chinese bankers are too confident in residential real estate loans (both individual and commercial development ones, what we call CRE here).
I saw several pieces where bankers trashed industrial loans, but were overconfident in residential loans.
China has not experienced a serious business downturn yet. Chinese bankers perceive real estate loas much safer than industrial loans--that could be a serious misperception.
For long time in the English-speaking world, individual residential loans and CRE loans are perceived as one of the most dangerous type of loans. The history can date back to 1920s. The reason that FDR even established Fannie was because bankers refused to lend to individuals over LONG TERM for residential mortgage loans.
that's a lesson learned over 150 years of banking in the North America: I think it is a well-tested lesson for China, who was just 30 years into its capitalistic experiment.
家园 预测总是预测，但分析现状我们需要的还是目前的数据。 毕竟，按当时的口径看，无论怎么审慎，雷曼的债券也不是不良资产。
家园 wrong First, CDS market warns the financial market long time ago. CDS players are Lehman's lending commercial bank. Info was leaked out long time ago.
Second, Lehman's auditor is too loose. There is accounting problem.
third, Lehman mini-bond sold to Asian investors are unnecessarily complicated with remote trusts to separate legal trouble from the parent firms. that mini-bonds were marketed by asshole Asian bankers (e.g., HSBC private banking, DBS private banking...) aggressively to innocent and stupid retail investors.
Most investors did not even read the prospectus when they committed millions of dollar into Lehman mini-bonds.
Fourth, Lehman, even without including its off-balance sheet liabilities, had very high leverage ratios (at least higher than several investment bank peers. And unlike JPMorgan Chase, it has no stable retail deposit base to support its liquidity needs in times of turmoil.
Fifth, Lehman was killed by its heavy exposure to commercial real estate MBS. There was an active commercial real estate MBS market and you could see distress earlier.