主题：【原创】我知道的老兵故事 -- 王外马甲
家园 【击节送花】向老兵致敬! 家园 顶！花！付阵前炮 无后座力武器
火炮和无后座力武器的用途
因为在针对敌军特定目标的军事行动中它们总是相互协同的，所以在此将两者一并考虑。
在朝鲜的炮兵军官经常抱怨步兵总是呼叫炮兵执行那些以步兵自己的武器可以更好完成的任务；在步兵对付其火力难以解决的大型目标时如果更频繁地呼叫炮兵，步兵的日子就能好过一点，也就能挽救更多的生命，这种故事我们听得也不少。
所有这一切形成了一个怪圈。
尽管在过去的战争中这两种意见通常针锋相对因此也就彼此抵消。但如何在联合行动中最好地平衡步兵和炮兵的火力，没有一方就这个问题提出令人满意的解决方案。问题在於，在朝鲜的步兵作战中，无论这双方相互抱怨中的哪一种，是不是到了经年累月的程度，而显示步兵军官对炮兵的潜力，局限，后勤问题缺乏了解呢？
因为步兵现在所拥有的远程重武器也具有巨大的破坏力，其效果与炮兵火力相差无几，所以，合理评估目标区域从而保证这两个兵种的火力整合就比以往更加紧迫了。步兵对无后座力武器的使用是在朝鲜的军事行动中战术的一项新发展；是否能平衡运用这些武器，仅能通过重新审视炮兵问题的某些方面来评估。
在我们对所研究的步兵行动中被召唤和实际实施的炮兵火力进行考察时，涉及了战场的形势、目标等方面的问题，这样的考察表明，步、炮两个兵种的火力配合保持了合理的平衡与协调。步兵并没有过分使用炮兵火力支援的倾向。
在冬季的军事行动中，步兵往往急迫地要求耗尽炮弹的炮击以保护夜间阵地。这种情况下可能消耗了超过形势所需的炮弹，因而造成了浪费。然而，把这种要求视作步兵对炮兵任务和困难的误判也不公允，因为这就忽略了非常人性化的考虑：步兵指挥官的首要职责是尽可能消除部下的焦虑感并保护他们的阵地而不是去担忧炮兵的后勤问题。当炮兵确信自己已准确了解局势时，他们就能强硬地面对这种倾向。根据为此项研究搜集的数据：我军步兵在朝鲜比在二战时更敢于冒一时之险，不呼叫炮兵就进行战斗。然而，一位在前线服役约一年的步兵营长发表了如下意见：“根据我的观察还有我从别的营长那里了解到的，我军大量的火炮和空中支援被不必要地消耗了。我们为求万无一失，在太多的场合使用了空军和炮兵。我曾经在率部攻打山头的时候呼叫空军和炮兵，而我当时并不肯定射程内是否存在任何敌人。在战斗中，我们为保证士兵的生命交纳了过高的“保险费。”有时，十个敌军步兵就可能挡住我军一个完整的团级纵队，直到一个营的火炮、坦克和所有支援武器准备完毕，能够协助少数步兵前进为止。”这是一位男子汉的观点。
RECOILLESS WEAPONS
USE OF ARTILLERY AND RECOILLESS WEAPONS
These two subjects are considered together at this point because they are conjoint in operations against certain major enemy targets.
Among artillery officers in Korea there is heard the usual plaint against infantry that it calls on the artillery for fire missions which could be better carried out by their own weapons; not less frequently is heard the story that the infantry would get along better, and save more lives, if it called on the artillery more frequently when operating against targets too big to be reduced by infantry fires.
All of this has a strangely familiar ring.
But since the two ideas, however general their circulation in past wars, are mutually exclusive and therefore cancel out each other, neither provides a satisfactory approach to the problem of how infantry and artillery fires are best balanced in combination.The question is whether either fault is chronic in such measure during infantry operations in Korea as to indicate that infantry officers are insufficiently trained in knowledge of the potential, limits, and logistical problem of the other arm.
Because of infantry’s present possession of heavy weapons capable of producing heavy blast effects at long range, similar to the explosion of artillery shells, the need to conserve fires by both arms in conformity with sound evaluation of target areas is more pressing than ever. Employment of the recoilless weapons by the infantry is one of the new developments in Korean operations; whether the weapons are being employed in balance can only be assessed by reviewing certain aspects of the artillery problem.
The check of artillery fires called for and delivered in the infantry actions which were taken under study, as to the situation, the target, etc., indicates that the equation is kept in reasonable balance. The infantry does not tend toward over-exploitation of its artillery support. In the main, its requests are reasonable.
In the winter operations, the infantry was inclined to press hard for interdictory artillery fires for protection of the night position, and perhaps more shell was wasted this way than the situation sometimes warranted. However, it would be immoderate to view this as a fault in infantry appreciation of the artillery role and problem, for to do so would exclude the very human consideration that the first obligation of the infantry commander is to do all possible to relieve the anxieties and protect the position of his men, rather than to worry about artillery logistics. It is up to artillerymen to harden against this tendency when convinced that they have read the situation correctly. According to the data gathered for this study, our infantry in Korea was more inclined to take the casual risks of combat without crying for artillery help than during World War II. However, one infantry battalion commander, who had served almost one year in line, made this comment : “From what I observed, and what I learned from other battalion commanders, much of our artillery and air support was needlessly expended. We used both air and artillery in too many instances for outright insurance. I have called for air and artillery on hills which we were attacking, not knowing positively that there was any enemy within range. In combat, we seem still to place too high a premium on the worth of one human life. Ten enemy riflemen may sometimes hold up an entire regimental column until a battalion of artillery, tanks, and every supporting weapon within the battalion are ready to aid the advance of a few riflemen. The practice can become unduly expensive.” This was one man’s point of view.
在朝鲜，敌军的许多主要目标经常是难以确知的，为了确定敌军目标，表面上看我军似乎是不遗余力，用尽了手段。而尽管成倍的努力和投入不过是敌军目标和敌军对常规火力抵抗力极端坚韧的必然结果，可我军的这种做法还是受到了质疑，人们怀疑这是否有用。
中共军队利用沿岩石山岭的岭脊布置堑壕阵地的办法不断挫败我军重武器和空军的精确射击。重武器和空军竭尽全力去摧毁敌军坚强的支撑点，但经常除了造成强烈震动和歼灭一些部署在浅层工事的敌军以外，并不能取得决定性的战果。步兵还得接近敌军阵地，最终以自己的武器杀敌，敌军的重型工事有时能坚持到所有的防御者都被手榴弹炸死。
传统上，摧毁“大型目标”是炮兵的任务，步兵也从来都承认这是炮兵的特权。在目标方面，“大型目标”在朝鲜的军事行动中特别难以捕捉。如果炮兵能够发现和直接瞄准这种目标，那么摧毁它便是一个不错的战果。但是，地形条件使得他们很少有这种机会。
当中共军队拥有4到10天时间组织棱线阵地时，他们习惯把机枪掩体修的几乎与地面持平。他们在正、反斜面都有可能部署迫击炮，这取决于射程和能否有效掩护。步兵配置在散兵坑，掩护接近主要工事的通道。他们极少浪费兵力去防御较低的斜坡。
掩体内壁通常是用被缆绳捆在一起的双层粗原木搭建的，而掩体顶部可能本身就是山体的一个突出部(而它由4到8英尺厚的泥土和岩石构成)，于是，掩体便能经得住除8英寸口径火炮以外所有武器的猛烈打击。除非是直接命中，否则轻型火炮根本就奈何不了这样的敌军工事。考虑到敌军工事的特点，要想直接命中，概率只有千分之一。枪炮眼通常高14到30英寸，而且通常凹进掩体壁。这些隐蔽部通常被设置在顺着山梁方向的地褶内，与主抵抗线垂直而与射击方向平行。他们被这样配置是要阻止我军步兵从侧翼迂回并沿棱线走向进攻。
这意味着从前方观察，他们通常是完全隐蔽的。在一条山脊上，无论哪一处都可能会暗藏着2到6个那样的掩体。而数小时内，从敌军所在的主要区域一直可以射出稳定的重机枪火力。 此外，在1500到2000码的距离，训练有素的观测员也不能识别出敌军的特定目标或任何重大活动。 在表面上，这看上去是个主要靠炮兵的干预来解决的问题。炮兵认为情况正是这样，步兵也从来不会提出异议。但是在通常的情形，我军步兵占领的高地往往挡在炮兵和其目标之间。这种高地可能是一条或一连串的山岭。此时就需要间瞄射击了。在这种形势下，以野战炮兵的常规射击压制这些掩体的机会确实微乎其微。如果有人要搞清为什么会这样，他只需绘制出一门火炮向这样一个目标射出的炮弹飞行曲线就可以了。如果这条线偏移几英寸，那么炮弹就完全打不中目标。
在我们所研究的各次行动中，尽管以密集炮火轰击中国人的掩体，但还没有一个火炮以直瞄射击打中它们的战例。它们也能经得起火箭弹和凝固汽油弹的空中打击；报告中有空军直接将凝固汽油弹投到掩体顶部的例子。那一发凝固汽油弹滚落到了嵌壁枪眼的前方。尽管如此，防御者仍未被杀死，而且在简短的间歇后又恢复了射击。
当步兵向对面高地的特定敌军目标进行火力打击时，无后坐力武器所能带来的好处几乎是不言自明的。在1000到1200码间的射程，75mm无后座力炮是唯一能实施直瞄射击以较高概率一发精确击中并摧毁目标的火炮。如果驮载炮能够运上来，那么它也有可能做到这一点。不过，在没有驮载炮的情况，无后座力武器就是（步兵）主要的指望了。它们一次次以这种使用方式地证明了自己的实力。当距离超过1000码时，57mm无后坐力炮的射程就不够了。而为了试图推翻这个结论，部队已经浪费了过多的该口径炮弹。75mm无后坐力炮过于沉重，当部队向更高的山岭移动时，往往把它们放在队伍的后面，而把57mm无后坐力炮置于前面作为替代，但这样的使用超出了这个替代品的有效射程。
这个问题的本质是，击中目标所需射程与目标的高程通常成正比。换句话说，当部队突越较低的山岭时，交战距离通常缩短。在运输重量不受太多限制的情况，即使所需射程较短，57mm无后座力炮能完成任务，带上75mm无后座力炮也是很合适的，因为它具有更强的冲击力。在这个意义上，有火力重叠的现象发生。
另一方面，当步兵近距离突击据守高地的敌军步兵群时，57mm无后座力炮可谓无价之宝。总有一些暗堡坚持抵抗，由于它们受到山岭的保护，所以在远程炮火之下仍几乎毫发无伤。敌军散兵放弃外围的散兵坑防线之后，在向这些防御工事撤退的过程中，很容易得到小洞穴和裸露岩层的保护。子弹对这些掩护完全无效，但用57mm无后座力炮就可以把敌兵轰出来。
In Korea, the baffling character of many of the main enemy targets has brought about use of a seeming excess of means in the effort to reduce them. But it is to be doubted that there is any help for it, duplication is the inevitable consequence of the extreme toughness of the targets and their resistance to normal fires. The use which CCF make of dug-in positions along the rocky ridge crests is frustrating of precision fire by the heavy weapons, including air power. Going their best to destroy the enemy strong points, frequently in the end they bring off nothing more decisive than a strong shock effect and the elimination of a certain number of the enemy who are disposed in the more shallow works; it then remains for the infantry to close and make the final kill with its own weapons, with the heavy works of the enemy sometimes holding out until the occupants are killed with grenades.
Traditionally, it is the task of artillery to knock out the “big stuff,” and the infantry is ever ready to concede it that privilege. But in terms of target area, the “big stuff” in Korean operations is peculiarly elusive. It would be a fair mark for the guns, if they could see it and lay directly on it, but, such is the nature of the ground that they rarely have that opportunity.
When the CCF have as many as four to ten days in which to organize a ridgeline position, they customarily hinge it upon machine-gun bunkers built close to the skyline. The mortars may operate from either the forward or reverse slope, depending on range and the availability of cover. The riflemen are disposed in foxholes covering the approaches in relatively close juxtaposition to the main works. They rarely waste force in an attempt to defend along the lower slopes.
The walls of the bunkers are frequently double tiers of thick logs bound together by cable. The roof may be an overhang of earth and rock between four and eight feet in thickness; so being, it is shellproof to a collapsing fire from anything except an 8-inch gun. Except for a direct hit, light artillery fire cannot neutralize it, and in the nature of the position, direct hits are a l-in-1000 accident. The embrasures are between 14 and 30 inches in height and are usually recessed. Frequently these nests are sited in a fold along the facing of the ridge, putting them at right angles to our MLR and parallel to the fire issuing from it. They are thus sited to block the infantry advance when it moves in from the flank, attacking down the length of the ridgeline.
This means that they are almost perfectly hidden to observation from the front. One ridgeline may hold anywhere between two to six such bunkers. Persistent machinegun fire may be received from the general area for hours. Still, at between 1500 and 2000 yards range, the trained observer cannot pick up a specific target or see any significant activity.
On the surface, this appears as a problem to be solved mainly by artillery intervention. The artillerymen accept it as such, and the infantry is never inclined to say no. But in the average situation, the high ground held by the friendly infantry intervenes between the artillery and its target. This may be one ridge or a series. Therefore indirect fire is required. The chance that the bunkers will be neutralized through a normal shoot by field artillery under these conditions becomes very small indeed. One need only plot the curve of an artillery shell moving against such an object to see why this is so. If the line is only a few inches off, the effect is a total miss.
During the operations taken under survey, there was not one instance of an artillery shell scoring a direct hit on a Chinese bunker, despite consistent fires against these objects. They were resistant also to air attack both with rockets and napalm; the record includes examples wherein the air scored direct hits with napalm atop the bunker. The napalm rolled over and down the front of the recessed embrasure. Still, the occupants were not killed, and, after a brief interlude, resumed their fire.
The advantage which the recoilless weapons give infantry in firing against targets of this character from the opposing heights scarcely requires description. At ranges between 1000 and 1200 yards, the 75 recoilless is the only piece which can take them under direct fire, with a relatively good chance of hitting dead on and destroying the object in one round; pack artillery might do it if it were available, but in its absence, the recoilless weapons are the main hope. In this type of usage, they have justified themselves time and again. The 57 is too light for such work at ranges exceeding 1000 yards, though troops have wasted an excess of 57 ammunition trying to prove otherwise; because of the weight problem with the 75, it is often left behind during movement into the higher ridges, and the attempt is made to substitute the 57 at prohibitive ranges.
In the nature of the problem, the range of fire that is needed is quite apt to be in proportion to the height of the ground which is to be surmounted. In other words, troops are fighting across low ridges, operating distances are apt to be foreshortened. Thus under conditions which are less prohibitive to weight carrying, when the ranges are shorter and the 57 would do the work, the 75 is still very apt to be taken along because it packs the extra wallop. To this extent, there is an overlapping.
On the other hand, the 57 becomes invaluable during the closing infantry assault on an enemy-held high hill mass. Always a few bunkers remain in operation; those which were protected from the long-range fires by the folding of the ridge are likely to be almost unscathed. Falling back toward these works, after quitting the outer line of foxholes, enemy skirmishers are apt to seek protection in small caves and behind rock outcroppings. The 57 can blast them out from cover which would provide immunity to bullet fire.
对武器的评价
士兵们在迫切需要无后座力武器的情形下使用它们的次数越多，对它们的评价就越高。无一例外。他们会被问到：“你觉得75mm无后座力炮怎么样？”他们的回答可能是否定的。经过调查，你会发现他们一次也没有使用过这种炮：他们不喜欢它，因为它太沉重。但是，在使用者中只有一种反应：热情赞扬。他们发现这种武器无可挑剔，并为它的能力感到惊奇。
在美国本土，军方人士对75mm无后座力炮尾端的火焰颇为关注，有一位将军觉得这使得它成了一种给步兵带来危险的武器。在战场上，这些疑虑并没有得到响应。士兵和指挥官们一致认为这种闪光在实战中并非一个问题。他们通常以这样的回答来解除疑虑：“为什么担心？他们（敌人）知道我们在哪。”有一位军士答道：“我部下的有些士兵担心火焰和反向冲击波，因为他们读过很多这方面的报道。但当我们开火时，他们就镇定下来了。”一般而言，这不是一个影响战斗组士气的关键因素。他们觉得如果可以在开火后转移一小段距离，这就足以提供充分的保护了。
反坦克
在我们所研究的军事行动中，没有使用这种武器打击敌军坦克的战例。在两个战例中，75mm无后坐力炮被用来打击敌军自行火炮；在这两个战例中，它都击毁了敌军火炮。然而，第7海军陆战团叙述它曾在早期军事行动中使用75mm无后坐力炮打击敌军坦克。
在一个战例中，我军以75mm无后坐力炮击毁了4辆隐蔽中的敌军坦克。荷马 利曾伯格上校及其属下军官提交的战后总结中提到：在反坦克行动中，75mm无后坐力炮“从没有令本团失望。”但这次经历证实了与坦克战斗时，“在目标非常接近前不开火很重要，否则75mm无后坐力炮便不能击毁它们。”作战参谋威廉 R 厄内上尉给出了对这种武器有效性的非常有启迪作用的评估：“我们不把75mm无后坐力炮当作单用途武器；杀伤敌军人员是它的巨大价值之一。因为它弹道扁平，在小山顶的战斗中可以用它对付碉堡，敌军集群，机枪，还有其他武器难以奏效的洞口。我们发现它实现以上这些全面用途的时候十分轻便。”
“在一个地势非常糟糕的地点，我军两个连为坚守一条300米高的棱线而艰苦备尝，我们需要能击毁峡谷对面1300码远的中国人的碉堡和机枪的武器。我前往反坦克组，找到了威廉 L 维克中士率领的小组，它们有一门炮和40发弹药。这两个连的退路已被切断，但是反坦克组还是成功地挤了进去。敌军再次从后方合围了我军，隔绝了这个阵地。这两个连一直坚守了整个晚上。
“破晓时分，维克主动地去查找敌军的炮位并向它们开火，打了15发弹药。此时，中国人开始搜寻他。他把这门炮转移到了一个隐蔽的位置，等到敌人来到距炮200码远的地方时，将10发高爆弹打进敌军的一个连队。这样，他便以一门炮粉碎了这次进攻，同样，战况也证实了这种武器的机动性。这次战斗发生在柳潭里的正南方。”
长津湖战役和三个月之后的“打桩机行动”提供了很多75mm无后坐力炮参战的战例。所有这些战例都证实了这种炮不同寻常的精确性以及它全面的战斗价值。
在敌军对下碣隅里的围攻中，我们发现75mm无后坐力炮对于击退夜袭特别有效。它被用于击毁从相当远的距离外向我军步兵队伍开火的机枪和迫击炮。我们发现75mm无后坐力炮发射的白磷弹最适合执行这项任务。
在这些夜战中，尽管阵地周围敌军火力很猛烈，75mm无后坐力炮也没有转移。士兵们在75mm无后坐力炮周围掘壕固守。
至少这些记录传达了一种印象：不熟悉75mm无后坐力炮的性能是妨碍士兵们在朝鲜的战斗中更广泛地应用这种武器的唯一因素。应当强调的是：山岭越高，武器重量对其应用的限制性就越大。在突越高于地面300米以上的山岭时，通常存在一个问题：75mm无后坐力炮可能发挥的作用能否证明运输它所需的人力是划算的？在狭窄的山路或光滑的地面上的任何移动肯定都存在风险。第2步兵师和第24步兵师都有士兵在试图前运75mm无后坐力炮时摔伤了脊背。
APPRECIATION OF WEAPON
Appreciation by troops of the recoilless weapons is exactly in proportion as they have been given employment in those situations for which they were intended. There was no exception to this. Troops would be asked: “What do you think of the 75 recoilless?”The answer would be negative. Inquiry would then develop that they had never once used the gun: they disliked it because it was heavy. But among the users, there was only one reaction - enthusiastic approval. They found no fault whatever in the weapon and were amazed at its capabilities.
In the ZI there has been considerable concern about the flash, and a general feeling that this made it a dangerous weapon for infantry. These doubtings have no echo in the field. Unanimously, troops and commanders said that flash was not a problem in actual operations. This feeling was usually resolved in some such answer as: “Why worry ? They know we’re there.” One sergeant replied: “Some of my men were concerned about flash and back-blast because they had read so much about it.But when we opened fire, they settled down.” In general, it is not a factor in the morale of operating crews. They feel that if they can displace a short distance after firing, that affords sufficient protection.
AGAINST ARMOR
In the operations studied, there were no examples of these weapons being used against enemy armor. In two instances, the 75 had been employed to fire on an SP gun; in both cases, it had knocked out the gun. The Seventh Marine Regiment did, however, recount its experience with the 75 in earlier operations against enemy armor.
In one case the gun had been used to knock out four nesting tanks, the closest being
15 yards and the farthest 75 yards. In the critique attended by the commander, Co1
Homer Litzenberg and his officers, it was stated that the 75 had “never once failed the
regiment” in action against armor, but that experience had proved that when fighting tanks “it is necessary to hold fire until the target is very close or the 75 will not knock them out.” A very revealing estimate of the weapon’s usefulness was given by Capt
William R. Earney, S3, in these words: “We do not regard the 75 as a single-purpose
weapon; one of its great values is in use against personnel. Because of its flat trajectory, in hilltop fighting it can be used against pillboxes, enemy groups, machine guns, and cave entrances when no other weapon will suffice. We have found it sufficiently portable for this general purpose.
“In a particularly bad spot, with two companies having a hard time holding a ridgeline about 300 meters high, we needed something that could knock out Chinese pillboxes and machine guns as far as 1300 yards away across the valley. Me went to the AT section, got a group under S/Sgt William L. Vick, one gun and 40 rounds of ammo. The two companies had been cut off, but the section managed to squeeze through. Then once again the enemy closed across the rear, isolating the position. The companies remained there through the night.
“At first light, on his own initiative, Vick located the enemy emplacements and
fired on them, using 15 rounds. Then the Chinese came looking for him. He moved
the gun to a concealed position, waited until they got within 200 yards of the gun, and
then fired 10 rounds of HE into about a company of the enemy. That one gun broke
up the attack; also, the circumstances speak for the mobility of the weapon. This action took place just to the south of Udam-ni.”
There are many more examples of the gun in action supplied from the Chosen Reservoir operation, and from Operation Punch, three months later. All bespeak the unusual accuracy of the gun and it’s all-around combat worthiness.
In the siege of Hagaru-ri, the 75mm recoilless was found to be especially useful in repelling the night attack. It was used to knock out machine guns and mortars firing on the infantry line from relatively long range. The 75’s WP shell was found to be most suitable for this work.
During these night actions, the gun did not displace, though there was heavy enemy fire around the position. The men dug in beside the gun and stayed there.
Lest these notes convey an impression that, unfamiliarity with the weapon is the only drag on greater use of the 75 by troops in the Korean fighting, it should be emphasized that the higher the ridge, the more prohibitive the weight factor becomes.In fighting across ridges in excess of 300 meters above the LD, it’ is always a question whether the possible use of the gun justifies the manpower required to move it. It is a positive danger in any movement along narrow trails or over slippery ground. Both in the 2nd and 24th Divisions men have had their backs broken in falls while trying to get the 75 forward.
家园 沙发，花
家园 好看！先送朵花 后面已经有这么多续集了，呵呵，有空来看。
家园 【原创】我知道的老兵故事(七） 上甘岭防御地带的主阵地是两个主峰，在主峰前端及两测，有一些大小不等的山包，一条从南至北的公路就穿绕于这些山坡之间，公路在这里要经过一个村庄，叫“上甘岭村”。因此，所谓上甘岭战役，实际上就是为了在“上甘岭村”截断这条公路而展开的一系列战斗。
老邓说，除了上甘岭两个主峰外，其他附近的山头我军和敌人差不多各控制一半，并且不断易手。老邓他们的阵地位于主峰的东南，公路经过他们所在山包的左侧，通往两个主峰之间的“上甘岭村”。也就是说，我军一旦彻底控制了这个山头，敌人的车辆及重型装备将无法到达主峰阵地前沿。
当时，志愿军并没有完全控制这个山包，前些天，24军进攻时，只是占领了山包右边以及中段的大部分，而最左侧，靠近公路边的两个堡垒，由于得到了山坡对面美军的强大支持，始终没有能够拿下来。端午节这天，美军就是从左侧发起进攻，在占领了大部分表面阵地之后，把志愿军压制到了右边角上。
形势对老邓他们很不利，敌人随时可以沿着山脊的表面阵地发动新一轮攻击，这时候，弃守阵地当然是绝不允许考虑的。虽然志愿军也可以退回到坑道里，倚据坑口工事进行防御，但那样一来，坑道很容易被敌人封锁，再要想进行有效反攻就困难了。“从一上阵地，连长指导员就讲了，我们的任务就是守住阵地，阻止敌军通过公路，以实际行动支援主峰”。因此，如果退回坑道，虽然名义上我军在这个山头还保存有力量，但在战略上，却已经没有多少实际意义了。
基于这个原因，师、团首长给老邓他们的任务是：不惜一切代价，坚守阵地直到天黑。“天黑了就好办，我们的大部队从坑道那边上来，马上就能把敌人再赶回去”。眼前的这一小块阵地，不仅是掩护坑道和后方交通线的屏障，也是实施下一步反击的跳板。
说到反击作战，马甲听老邓头和老王头介绍过美军的一个特点，很有意思。美国人的工兵很厉害，修工事麻利。他们的部队一旦在前边占领了阵地，后面工兵马上就拖来各种各样的材料，几个小时就能把大大小小的工事、堡垒和障碍物建好，把枪、炮火力点、铁丝网探照灯什么的，布置得规规矩矩。如果工事修好了，美国兵防守得就很认真，可如果没有工事，美国人可不愿意象志愿军那样硬着脖子干，一般马马乎乎顶一下就跑了。针对这种情况，上甘岭战役后期，志愿军在与美军进行阵地争夺时，就十分注重使用炮火对敌人运输线实施干扰，这样，美军即使占领了阵地，他们的军工物资一时也上不来，同时，我们马上利用敌人立足未稳，迅速展开夜间反击，争取夺回阵地。仗打到这份上，大家都精了。
反击是晚上的事，老邓他们现在的问题是怎么能把阵地给守住了。
从增援部队一上来，指导员和两个参谋就开会琢磨防守的事。志愿军目前所在的这个“右边角”的正面，坡很陡，敌人步兵不大可能从这里进攻，因此，防守的重点无疑是左侧的表面阵地。但是，在正面方向存在一个隐患，据指导员说，敌人在左侧公路边有两辆坦克，能对我军阵地进行直射，在刚才的战斗中，我们的重火力点都被它打掉了，而由于坦克位置太靠近山坡，我们的大炮又打不着它。如果等会敌人再进攻，这俩家伙肯定会顺着山沟开过来，那时候威胁就大了。那个年轻点的参谋说：“不要紧，我带人干了它”。这时，指导员转头问老邓：“山下面有两辆坦克，你敢去把他炸了么”？“敢啊，这有什么不敢的”。答应得很痛快。
年纪大一些的魏参谋（就是提醒吹联络号的那位）站起来喊：“高大炮，高大炮！”于是，高大炮跑过来了。这个高大炮老邓认识，他本来就是连里的兵。上甘岭阵地防御的方针是“前轻后重”，担任防守的一线连队，干部保持满员，但要抽出二三十个士兵补充到警卫连，扩充前指的预备队。高大炮就是从老邓他们连抽出去的。他是个老兵，姓高，可个子不高力气挺大，能把手榴弹扔得好远，就象开大炮一样，所以得了个外号叫“高大炮”，真名反而没多少人知道了。
向高大炮交代了任务，魏参谋又说“这次炸坦克得把它炸得不能用才行，要是光炸了履带，它修修还能朝我们开火，得先想清楚怎么弄”。老邓寻思，都知道坦克后面有油箱，扔准了能把坦克烧了，要不然掀开顶上盖子往里扔也行，可谁有那个把握啊。于是没敢吭声。“我有办法。” 高大炮说：“拿带子把两个手榴弹连着，扔到炮管上这么一搭，就能把坦克炮筒给毁了”。“能成么？”“能成”。高大炮力气大，自然也就信心足。
于是拿来苏联手榴弹（估计是反坦克手雷），解下腰带一头栓一个，弄了三组，挂在三个人脖子上，说好了由高大炮负责扔，年轻参谋和老邓配合掩护。爆破小组从侧面溜下去，到了坡底就沿着沟边往左侧公路方向爬。
老邓说，电影上的志愿军总爱弄个草帽子戴在头上当伪装，可他们没有搞这个。上甘岭上面连石头都打酥了，到哪里找草去。“山上光秃秃的全是土，只有些树桩子，被炸得横七竖八的”。“55年我们回下甘岭收容遗体（战役期间烈士遗体都临时埋在下甘岭村，后来分别移到了几个公墓），看到山上的树居然都活了，花也开了，红的绿的。可是人却烂得只剩下骨头了……心里那个难受啊”。
老邓他们三个下到坡底，每人披了一块阵地上装土的麻袋片，主要是为了遮住身上武器的反光。高大炮在前面爬，老邓跟着，参谋在最后。原本的计划是找个合适的地方设伏，等坦克来了再开炸。可爬着爬着，高大炮越爬越快，老邓都要跟不上了，参谋也连忙在后边小声喊“慢点慢点，别太远了”。可高大炮却仍旧不停地爬，还说“快快，我看见坦克了”。老邓急忙抬头张望，可不是么。
敌人的两辆坦克已经离开公路开进了山谷，可不知为什么，他们刚拐进来一半就不走了，一前一后斜斜地停在那里，象是在等人似的。三个人从侧面爬着接近坦克，距离还有四十米左右时，山上阵地突然开打了，坡上面的石头沙子被震得直往下滚。老邓正回头准备问参谋怎么办，前面高大炮就已经窜起来，拎着手榴弹冲上去了。“要说他胆子也真够大，就那么直着身子从坦克侧面跑到正对面，一扬手就把手榴弹往炮筒子上甩”。“可是，那带子没挂上炮管，手榴弹砸在炮塔上落到地下，咣地炸了，坦克没有什么事，倒把高大炮给震倒在地上了。当时我还以为他完了呢”。
高大炮一倒，老邓和年轻参谋就都冲上去了。老邓首先接近高大炮没炸成的第一辆坦克，可他没再乱甩手榴弹。“我想人家那么大力气都不行，我就更不成了”。他老老实实地爬上坦克，把两颗苏联手雷搭在炮管上，拉着火再跳下来跑开。“我看着炮管子炸塌了，行了。”老邓挺开心，回头看见高大炮不知什么时候已蹲在他身边，一付还在犯迷糊的样子，身上倒是一点伤也没有。
年轻参谋那边的任务完成得更容易，也许是由于天气热，美国兵把炮塔下面的盖子打开了，参谋顺手把手榴弹扔进去就是了（后来，在二战电影中，马甲看见美国坦克在驾驶员位置前面开窗，就会想起年轻参谋的战绩来。这种坦克一定是轻型的，只是不清楚是什么型号）。
炸完坦克，三个人赶紧往回跑。“感觉到身边子弹在飞，也顾不上看是从哪里打来的。反正任务完成了，猛跑，能跑回阵地就算拣了条命”。老邓跑前头，高大炮最后，刚跑到坡跟前，年轻参谋一个跟头栽倒了，“看不出子弹打在哪里了，身上没看见血，可人就是不行了”。老邓和高大炮架着他接着跑，没走几步，高大炮就说不用架了，人已经完了。“的确是完了。死人和活人扛着不一样，也说不清哪里不同，反正感觉得出来”。“可惜了啊，军政大学的学生，高个子，比我年纪还小……也不知道他家是哪里的”。
老邓他们跑回来时，阵地上正打得激烈，高大炮一声没吭就冲进硝烟里去了，老邓则去找领导报告情况。他先遇见魏参谋，问：我们指导员在哪呢？魏参谋指着前面回答：“他在组织反突击，你先在这里等等”。
老邓不干了。“我是通讯员啊，我得跟着我们指导员”。说着，端着枪就往最热闹的地方跑去。
关键词(Tags): #老兵故事(landlord)，家园 志愿军有好多个成功战例是步兵偷袭坦克的 其中有一个与此类似,是一个孤胆英雄干掉一队在山沟里的坦克.当时看了觉得不可信,现在看来完全有可能.美军对我军的步兵太大意了.
家园 不错 顶一下
家园 好文，花~ 越看越上瘾，可咋办呢？
家园 好文，我送上几张照片帮帮场子 1952年十月朝鲜战场态势图（按鼠标右键“查看照片”可以放大）
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改战线中部地区Kumhwa，Kumsong和Yongmi区域中标明Iron Triangle为上甘岭下甘岭地区。也可以看到战线北方志愿军15军，战线南端为美第7步兵师（7th U.S. Inf. Div.）韩国陆军第二师。
上甘岭地形图
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改图中标明的598高地为上甘岭。美军军史称上甘岭战役为三角地区战斗（Triangle conflict）或者598高地战斗（battle for Hill 598）
这是大家非常熟悉的一张照片
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改双方战士：
志愿军：
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改可以看看这颗大号手榴弹！
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改冲上阵地！
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改打坦克
美军战士，拍于上甘岭战斗时期
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改工事内 机枪手
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改转运伤员，图中几个美军疑似身着防弹背心。
外链图片需谨慎，可能会被源头改轻伤员
家园 送花送宝 谢谢：作者意外获得【通宝】一枚
鲜花已经成功送出。
此次送花为【有效送花赞扬，涨乐善、声望】
家园 美军坦克像个铁王八， 其笨如牛有十怕：
一怕手雷爆破筒，
炸断了履带不能爬
……
送花——
家园 送花!!!
家园 致敬！ 家园 花，有个疑问，美军的坦克战术中没有步兵保护的么？