淘客熙熙

主题:【原创】这次疫情中的星星之火 -- Ace

共:💬121 🌺1120 🌵54
全看树展主题 · 分页首页 上页
/ 9
下页 末页
家园 美国CDC自己的数据

2009年H1N1流感大流行美國情況

截至2010年三月中旬,據美國疾病控制與預防中心 (CDC) 統計,共有5600萬美國人感染了此次H1N1病毒,265,000人住院治療,有12,000人死於此次疫情。

家园 河里的左派也是带路党吗?

我还还以为河里的左派是毛派呢,是对资本主义和修正了不满,但坚定支持回到公有主体和人民群众路线的改开前路线呢。本来我觉得这也没什么好争的,只是不该这么激烈啊。原来如此啊。

话说,帝国主义不是左派最大的敌人吗?主席在时,反帝反修是第一原则啊,现在改成联帝反修,这方向变得太大了吧,联帝了还能反修吗?是修得不够大,不够快吧?

左派的目标是什么?是修正地产党当道的路线,还是要把中国变成伊拉克?

谁能给我说说啊,中间有好几年没来河里,断档了

家园 疫苗起了很大作用

2009 flu pandemic in the United State

On December 10, 2009, the CDC reported an estimated 50 million Americans or 1 in 6 people had been infected with the 2009 A H1N1 Virus and 10,000 American had died, by which time the vaccine was beginning to be widely distributed to the general public by several states.[126] On December 23, 2009 the CDC reported a reduction of the disease by 59% percent and the disease was expected to end in the United States in January 2010.

"2009年12月10日,美国疾病控制与预防中心(CDC)报告称,估计有5000万美国人或每6人中就有1人感染了2009年甲型H1N1病毒,1万名美国人死亡,到那时,几个州开始向公众广泛分发疫苗。2009年12月23日,疾病控制与预防中心报告称,疾病减少了59%,预计疾病将于2010年1月在美国结束。"

美国那次有点走运,因为病毒是在春夏之交发现的,所以科技人员有半年时间研发疫苗。不过代价依然十分惨重。

2009年H1N1流感大流行美國情況

截至2010年三月中旬,據美國疾病控制與預防中心 (CDC) 統計,共有5600萬美國人感染了此次H1N1病毒,265,000人住院治療,有12,000人死於此次疫情。

家园 富士康都开始造口罩了

日产200万的生产线已经到位,现在一边试产,一边办牌照。

家园 有的人如今的态度就是联帝反修

“你修正主义怎么可能战胜帝国主义呢?”

大体就是这种态度。

家园 恐怕砸烂几个都够了

家园 美国人真皮实,同时盼着中国人别这么皮实

那会儿我在纽约。一般公众没人隔离、没人戴口罩。没有航班停飞、没有城市被封。全社会淡定得很。更没有任何国家禁止美国公民入境。轮到中国出现类似疫情,美国政府和媒体怎么就如临大敌了?What gives?

幸灾乐祸、煽风点火、推波助澜、落井下石有木有?华尔街日报刚刊登了标题耸人听闻的文章《中国才是真正的亚洲病夫》,借题发挥又把中国崩溃论拎出来贩卖一遍,预言中国垮了世界就会返回美国一超独霸。透着屏幕都能听出那兴奋的奸笑声、看出那渴望的邪恶眼神。当然,这都是题中应有之义,本性使然嘛。

其实,中国人民根本不用恐慌。100年前美国在崛起之中不也在大萧条中挣扎了多年,后来还打了世界大战。中国即便发生除瘟疫之外的大危机,也止不住上升的势头。老美各种明里暗里拦阻打压,能使中国局面更加困难,但对大趋势是无可奈何的,倒使中国人民更快抛弃对他们的幻想,自立自强。

奇文共赏(节选):

China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia

--Its financial markets may be even more dangerous than its wildlife markets.

By Walter Russell Mead

Feb. 3, 2020

......Epidemics also lead us to think about geopolitical and economic hypotheticals. We have seen financial markets shudder and commodity prices fall in the face of what hopefully will be a short-lived disturbance in China’s economic growth. What would happen if—perhaps in response to an epidemic, but more likely following a massive financial collapse—China’s economy were to suffer a long period of even slower growth? What would be the impact of such developments on China’s political stability, on its attitude toward the rest of the world, and to the global balance of power?

China’s financial markets are probably more dangerous in the long run than China’s wildlife markets. Given the accumulated costs of decades of state-driven lending, massive malfeasance by local officials in cahoots with local banks, a towering property bubble, and vast industrial overcapacity, China is as ripe as a country can be for a massive economic correction. Even a small initial shock could lead to a massive bonfire of the vanities as all the false values, inflated expectations and misallocated assets implode. If that comes, it is far from clear that China’s regulators and decision makers have the technical skills or the political authority to minimize the damage—especially since that would involve enormous losses to the wealth of the politically connected.

We cannot know when or even if a catastrophe of this scale will take place, but students of geopolitics and international affairs—not to mention business leaders and investors—need to bear in mind that China’s power, impressive as it is, remains brittle. A deadlier virus or a financial-market contagion could transform China’s economic and political outlook at any time.

Many now fear the coronavirus will become a global pandemic. The consequences of a Chinese economic meltdown would travel with the same sweeping inexorability. Commodity prices around the world would slump, supply chains would break down, and few financial institutions anywhere could escape the knock-on consequences. Recovery in China and elsewhere could be slow, and the social and political effects could be dramatic.

If Beijing’s geopolitical footprint shrank as a result, the global consequences might also be surprising. Some would expect a return of unipolarity if the only possible great-power rival to the U.S. were to withdraw from the game. Yet in the world of American politics, isolation rather than engagement might surge to the fore. If the China challenge fades, many Americans are likely to assume that the U.S. can safely reduce its global commitments.

So far, the 21st century has been an age of black swans. From 9/11 to President Trump’s election and Brexit, low-probability, high-impact events have reshaped the world order. That age isn’t over, and of the black swans still to arrive, the coronavirus epidemic is unlikely to be the last to materialize in China.

家园 依靠共产国际算不算带路党啊?

常凯申会怎么向民国大众描述这个?

家园 陈王,关于整体烂还是部分烂,其实人的位置不同

得出的结论也不同,大家都承认中华民国烂,对于黄世仁来说只是部分烂,主流还是好的,对于喜儿呢

家园 笑话,不把别人当代价,难道当祖宗? 供起来?

除了你的至亲好友,在别人眼里,你是什么? 猜猜看?

其实呢,即使是你的父母妻儿眼里,你也就是个有用的物件,他们会各取所需。

也就是你自己,才把自己当回事。

家园 这个网传消息是断章取义的。

重点解释要点:

第一,爆发时,美国统计是死亡2800人,感染者10万人。(当年中国感染者12万,死亡650人左右。)第二年才是网上的数据,这个应该既有补充修正,也有夸大。

第二,那时候的“湖北省”是墨西哥,死亡率2%。

第三,传到美国和全世界,实际效果是强流感。死亡率0.1%。

数据互相矛盾。

与现在比,非常像。

家园 社会自动取大多数人的共识

这就是天意。

个人判断错了,耗费一生的精力一无所成,大家上论坛扯淡,互相砸砖的目的在于通过不同观点的碰撞,形成共识,认清共识。

我的判断现在和1926年毛润之独立湘江看橘子洲头的时候要乐观得多,好得多。

家园 李永乐老师:所有人都知道和所有人知道所有人都知道是不同的
全看树展主题 · 分页首页 上页
/ 9
下页 末页


有趣有益,互惠互利;开阔视野,博采众长。
虚拟的网络,真实的人。天南地北客,相逢皆朋友

Copyright © cchere 西西河