主题：【文摘+翻译】麦克斯韦尔：中印领土争端是尼赫鲁犯傻的结果 -- 愚弟

How valid are China's claims - as articulated by its Ambassador to India recently - that the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory?

最近中国驻印度大使申明：整个阿鲁纳恰尔邦都是中国领土。中国的说法有根据吗？

It's been the Chinese position from Day One. They are simply restating their original position: which is that the territory of China was clearly marked on its maps and the fact that the British intruded upon it and changed their maps. China has always claimed the boundary lies at the foot of the hills bordering the Brahmaputra Valley. They are not going to change that without negotiations.

这是中国的一贯立场。他们只是重述他们原来的立场，中国的领土在地图上是明确地标明了的。事实上是英国入侵中国领土后，改变了他们的地图。中国一直表明：边界是位于与布拉马普特拉河流域接壤的山脚下。不经过谈判，他们不会改变（他们的立场）。

In the context of negotiations, everything is negotiable. If India would only come to the negotiating table, the two sides can feel each others' positions out. But until India is willing to negotiate, China will stand where it has always stood. It is not going to change that until India is ready to negotiate.

在谈判中，一切都可以磋商。只有当印度坐到谈判桌边来，双方才可以了解对方的立场了。但是在印度愿意谈判之前，中国的立场将一直不变。除非印度愿意谈判，中国的边界立场不会变。

But was a public articulation of that view by the Ambassador the best way to address it? 

那么，这种让大使来公开强调这一观点是解决问题的好办法吗？

Ambassadors, when pushed, can sometimes be a little tactless. An ambassador pushed on the ropes by aggressive questioning might well respond, 'Well, the whole of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory.' He is simply restating the basic pre-negotiation position of every Chinese government.

大使，有时会被逼的说话有点不客气。一个大使，当他面对咄咄逼人的提问时也许会说：‘当然，整个阿鲁纳恰尔邦是中国领土。’他也只是在重申每一个中国政府的在谈判前的基本立场。

Clearly, the Chinese Ambassador made the obvious and correct reply. The Chinese are saying: 'So far as we are concerned, that's our territory. The fact that you call it Arunachal Pradesh may be good for you, but we don't acknowledge that. We're not going to take it back, because we are a pacific neighbour. But don't kid yourself that the matter is forgotten. It's got to be negotiated.'

显然，中国大使做了清楚而且正确的答复。中国人说：至今为止，这是我们的领土。事实上，你叫阿鲁纳恰尔邦可能对你有好处，但我们不承认这一点。我们没有要马上收回她，因为我们是一个和平的邻居。但是，你不要自欺欺人，以为这件事被忘记了。一定要谈判才行。

How about the denial of China visas to officials from Arunachal Pradesh? 

中国不给阿鲁纳恰尔邦的官员办签证是怎么回事？

It's part of the same thing. The Chinese view is: 'If you call yourself the Chief Minister or an official of Arunachal Pradesh, don't present your passport to us for a visa. You don't exist as far as we are concerned.'

同理，这只是一个插曲。中国人的观点是：如果你称你自己是阿鲁纳恰尔邦的首席部长或官员，你不必拿你的护照来让我们办签证，因为对我们而言，所谓阿鲁纳恰尔邦官员是不存在的。

It's all quite logical when you realise that the Indian refusal to negotiate is the A to Z of this problem. While that lasts, things will just get worse… It can never be resolved.

当你意识到印度拒绝谈判是这个问题的根本（A to Z），这一切都很清楚。越耗下去，事情会变得越糟糕。这可能导致（这个问题）永远解决不了。 "

China had in the past informally proposed an east-west 'package deal' under which if India made territorial concessions in Aksai Chin (in the western sector), China would reciprocate and renounce its claims in the eastern sector (the area corresponding to Arunachal Pradesh)…

中国过去曾非正式地提出了一个东西段'互换（一揽子）交易'。在这个提议下，如果印度在阿克赛钦（在西区）让步，中国可以放弃东段（即阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区）作为交换。

If India had acted on those indications, could the Sino-Indian boundary dispute have been solved?

如果印度这样做了的话，可能中印的边界争端已经得到解决？

Yes, I do believe that but for Nehru's folly of saying that India's boundary is non-negotiable, had India in the late 1950s acted as Burma (current-day Myanmar) and every other neighbour of China in due course was to act, and said ' Okay, let's sit down and negotiate', the boundary dispute could have been settled.

对，如果不是因为尼赫鲁的愚蠢说法－印度的边界是不可谈判的，我相信是中印的边界争端已经得到解决。如果印度在1950 年代象缅甸（Burma， 现在称为 Myanmar) 和其他中国的邻国一样说，‘好吧，让我们坐下来谈判，’中印边界争端会已经解决了。

China would, I believe, have confirmed the McMahon alignment - not the McMohan Line - as more or less the boundary and then the joint boundary commission would have ironed out the minor differences on the ground. At that stage, I do not believe China would have demanded the retrocession of the Tawang monastery because there was no illwill towards India.

我相信，中国会承认麦克马洪的走向－不是麦克马洪线-作为大致的边界调整线。然后联合边界委员会将会在地面上确定微小次要的偏差。在那种情况下，我相信中国不会要求交还塔旺的寺院，因为其时对印度没有怨恨。

I believe that had India acted rationally, there would have been a Sino-Indian boundary settlement in 1959 or 1960 with mutual acclaim I[ELwFt{W

— and a major alteration in world history.

我认为，如果印度采取了合理的行动，在1959年或1960年就会有令双方都满意的中印边界的解决。而且那会是在世界历史上一个重大的时代变更。

Do you believe China will revert to that stage where it was willing to make those concessions?

你是否认为中国将会回到愿意作出这些让步的那种姿态？ 

If India were to say it will negotiate from the start and if the Chinese believed that it was being honest, the process will still be fairly protracted; it might take years. And it would be not easy because a lot of mutual mistrust has been built up now.

如果印度表示，它愿意从头开始谈判，而中国相信他们是有诚信的，谈判的进程将仍然是相当持久的，它可能需要几年的时间。 这将是不容易，因为有很多相互猜疑、互不信任已经堆积的太久。

So, what's the way forward?

那么，下一步何去何从？

The answer remains what it has always been: India must reverse Nehru's position and say 'Let's sit down and negotiate'. The Chinese will be sceptical at first, but once they believe that India means business, the two sides could begin by inviting the Myanmar government in to fix that trijunction so that they have a starting point on which to anchor the McMahon alignment, and they could then proceed westward.

这个答案实际上一直没有变，那就是：印度必须扭转尼赫鲁的立场，并说'让我们坐下来谈判' 。一开始中国将会是疑虑重重，但是一旦他们相信印度是认真、想要解决问题的，双方可以从邀请缅甸政府介入来解决三国的交界作为起始点，然后他们就可以沿着麦克马洪的走向调整线开始向西进行划界。

When they come up against a point of dispute that appears to be beyond compromise - that might be over Tawang, for example - they could put it aside for settlement at some future date and not let that deadlock disrupt the negotiations. That diplomatic was the key to settling the Sino-Soviet dispute.

当他们遇到了看起来是不可妥协的纠纷，比如－达旺，他们可以把它放在一边，留给今后适当的时机去解决，而不是让这种僵局来阻碍和搅乱谈判。外交手段曾是解决中苏争端的关键。

If I were to advice the Indian government, I would say: 'See if you can agree on confirming a Line of Actual Control.' That means a broad-brush agreement, not nitpicking. Get a cordon sanitaire that neither side will intrude upon. Then they can go on quietly talking.

如果我来给印度政府提出一些忠告的话，我会说：'看看你们是否能够在实际控制线上达成共识。’这意味达成粗线条的协议，而不是一个斤斤计较的细致活。确定一条双方都不可侵犯的警戒线，然后，他们就可以平静地讨论。

But it's important to agree on a Line of Actual Control because otherwise there will be constant little clashes, with the military wondering why the other side sent a patrol onto that hilltop. And then the opposition will pick that up and say, 'We've been invaded again.'

在实际控制线上达成共识是很重要的，否则将有不断的小型军事冲突发生，诸如，奇怪！为什么对方派出巡逻上了山？ 然后，对方就会因此而大喊：‘我们又被侵犯了。’

Given goodwill on both sides, a settlement can be found. But the problem is that no Indian government is likely to be secure and committed for long enough to pursue this matter for several years of hard negotiations….

如果双方都有良好的愿望，就可以找到解决的办法。但问题是，没有一个印度政府可以确保有足够长的时间来办这件事，进行连续几年的艰苦谈判。

If an Indian government agrees to negotiate with China, the outcry would be clamorous. The opposition would say, 'You're selling out sacred Indian soil.'

如果一个印度政府同意与中国进行谈判，将会引起乱哄哄的抗议，反对派将会说，‘你在出卖印度神圣的土地。’

In 1986, (Mikhail) Gorbachev reversed that position and said 'We will negotiate'. That was a brilliant act of statesmanship. India awaits its Gorbachev! "

在1986年，（俄）戈尔巴乔夫扭转这一立场，并说：‘我们将进行谈判。’这才是一个政治家的精彩出手。印度正在等待它的戈尔巴乔夫！

（完）