主题：【文摘+翻译】麦克斯韦尔：中印领土争端是尼赫鲁犯傻的结果 -- 愚弟

China, India and the fruits of Nehru’s folly

Venkatesan Vembu

Wednesday, June 06, 2007

http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1101845

（英文原文是用 google 自动翻译机先过堂，但是 google 的翻译太高深莫测了，我用大白话重新整理了一下。因为我对这种外交、政治英语拿不准，大家可以中英文一段一段对照地看，欢迎纠错，有则改之，无则加免。）

India's refusal to enter into a negotiation with China to address the boundary dispute is at the root of the current crisis between the two emerging giants of Asia, says journalist and writer Neville Maxwell, author of India's China War.In an exclusive interview to DNA in the context of the recent escalations in tensions between the two countries over developments relating to Arunachal Pradesh, Maxwell noted that "the Indian refusal to negotiate (with China) is the A to Z of this problem. While that lasts, things will just get worse…"

《中印 战争》一书的作者，记者兼作家，麦克斯韦尔说：两个新兴亚洲巨人之间之所以出现这种紧张局面，根源是因为印度不愿意跟中国进行解决边界争端的谈判。近来由于阿鲁纳恰尔邦的开发和发展而引起的中印两国之间的关系紧张逐步扩大。在DNA对麦克斯韦尔的有关专访中，他指出，“印度的拒绝谈判是这个问题的根本所在（A to Z），越耗下去，事情会变得越糟糕。”

Drawing on decades of research and writings, which have made an important contribution to the historiography of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, Maxwell said that the Indian side "is still impaled on Nehru's folly of declaring India's boundaries fixed, final and non-negotiable. No successor Indian government has dared - and many have not been inclined - to challenge that assertion."

麦克斯韦尔对1962年中印战争的历史研究作出了重要的贡献。根据他几十年来的研究和写作，麦克斯韦尔说：印度一方仍然僵化地坚守尼赫鲁所说的‘中印边界已经是确定的，无须再谈判。即使是有些领导人并不同意这种观点，没有一个后继的印度领导人敢于挑战这种说法。

Excerpts:

摘要：

India's refusal to enter into a negotiation with China to address the boundary dispute is at the root of the current crisis between the two emerging giants of Asia, says journalist and writer Neville Maxwell, author of India's China War. In an exclusive interview to DNA in the context of the recent escalations in tensions between the two countries over developments relating to Arunachal Pradesh, Maxwell noted that "the Indian refusal to negotiate (with China) is the A to Z of this problem. While that lasts, things will just get worse…"

《中印战争》一书的作者，记者兼作家，麦克斯韦尔说：两个新兴亚洲巨人之间之所以出现这种紧张局面，根源是因为印度不愿意跟中国进行解决边界争端的谈判。近来由于阿鲁纳恰尔邦的开发和发展而引起的中印两国之间的关系紧张逐步扩大。在DNA对麦克斯韦尔的有关专访中，他指出，“印度的拒绝谈判是这个问题的根本所在（A to Z），越耗下去，事情会变得越糟糕。”

Drawing on decades of research and writings, which have made an important contribution to the historiography of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, Maxwell said that the Indian side "is still impaled on Nehru's folly of declaring India's boundaries fixed, final and non-negotiable. No successor Indian government has dared - and many have not been inclined - to challenge that assertion." 

麦克斯韦尔对1962年中印战争的历史研究作出了重要的贡献。根据他几十年来的研究和写作，麦克斯韦尔说：印度一方仍然僵化地坚守尼赫鲁所说的‘中印边界已经是确定的，无须再谈判。’即使是有些领导人并不同意这种观点，没有一个后继的印度领导人敢于挑战这种说法。

Excerpts:

摘要：

What is your assessment of the current controversy over Arunachal Pradesh and the overall state of Sino-Indian relationship?

你如何评价当前对阿鲁纳恰尔邦的争议和中印关系现状？

The protracted talks between the governments of China and India are not negotiations proper. The Indian side is still impaled on (Jawaharlal) Nehru's folly of declaring India's boundaries fixed, final and non-negotiable. No successor Indian government has dared - and many have not been inclined - to challenge that assertion. A boundary dispute is soluble only in the context of negotiations. If one side or the other refuses to negotiate, a conflict is almost inevitable…

这个拖延已久的中印两国政府之间的对话不是真正合理的谈判。尼赫鲁做了一件蠢事，他宣布印度的边界已经最后固定，不容在谈判。没有一个后继的印度领导人，即使是有些领导人并不同意这种观点，也无人敢于挑战这种说法。边界矛盾只能在谈判中协商解决。如果有一方拒绝谈判，冲突几乎是不可避免的。 

The present position, as far as India is concerned, is the worst of all possible worlds. Since these are not 'negotiations', neither side can move from its originally stated position.

就印度而言，他们目前所处的立场是一切可能情况下最糟糕的。既然不存在谈判的可能，没有一方能够从他们最初的的立场变动一点。 

Ever since the question arose in diplomatic exchanges in the 1950s and the prime ministerial correspondence between Zhou (Enlai) and Nehru, China's position has been: 'There is a dispute between us. It results from history, particularly Imperial history. But we will resolve it to mutual satisfaction once we open negotiations.'

在50年代，在中印之间的外交对话中和两国总理，周（周恩来）和尼赫鲁，的来往信函里中印边界问题就被提出来，从那时起，中国的立场一直是：我们之间的争端是历史上，尤其是帝国主义，遗留下来的。但是一旦我们开始进行谈判，我们应该可以找到是双方都满意的解决办法。 

Unfortunately, the Indian position from the beginning until today has been: 'We'll tell you where the Sino-Indian boundaries lie, and you'll have to respect the conclusion that we reach. And should you decline, we'll charge you with aggression, and public pressure will force us to take military action against you…'

不幸的是，印度的立场从一开始直到今天都不变：“我们将会告诉你们中印边界的划线在哪里，而你们必须尊重的我们的结论。如果你们不遵守我们的划线，我们就认为你们是‘侵略’，那么公众的压力将迫使我们采取军事行动。”

That's what happened in 1962. China, therefore, made use of a well-established principle in international law, and acted in pre-emptive self-defence. The Indian side had already been moving militarily against China for a couple of years, and the Indian government, in the voice of their Prime Minister Nehru, had publicly and internationally declared that it was going to attack China.

这正是1962 年发生的事。根据既定的国际法原则，中国于是采取了先发制人的自卫。印度已经对中国采取了好几年的军事行动，而印度总理尼赫鲁，代表印度政府，公开地在国际上宣称：印度将进攻中国。

Your view that India is to blame for the war with China in 1962 has been challenged by scholars like John Garver, who have argued that Mao Zedong committed a fundamental 'attribution error' by concluding that Nehru sought to seize Tibet from China. How do you respond to that?

你认为，在1962年是印度挑起了对中国的战争。而一些学者，象约翰·加弗，对你的观点提出质疑，他的论点是毛泽东犯了一个基本的‘结论性（归属）错误’，那就是他认为尼赫鲁是要把西藏从中国分出去。对此你如何回应？

It's utter nonsense… The facts on the ground were quite clear-cut. India was bent on military aggression against China to confirm its badly based territorial claims, and China reacted with an entirely legitimate act of pre-emptive self-defence. That is the legal position, and perceptions about Mao and Tibet don't come into it. That's just absurd.

这纯属无稽之谈。基本事实是很清楚的，印度一心想用军事进攻来迫使中国确认其无理的领土要求，而中国‘先发制人的自卫’的反应是完全合法的行为，这种关于毛和西藏的看法根本对不上号。他的说法太荒唐了。

（太长了，分两页.）

How valid are China's claims - as articulated by its Ambassador to India recently - that the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory?

最近中国驻印度大使申明：整个阿鲁纳恰尔邦都是中国领土。中国的说法有根据吗？

It's been the Chinese position from Day One. They are simply restating their original position: which is that the territory of China was clearly marked on its maps and the fact that the British intruded upon it and changed their maps. China has always claimed the boundary lies at the foot of the hills bordering the Brahmaputra Valley. They are not going to change that without negotiations.

这是中国的一贯立场。他们只是重述他们原来的立场，中国的领土在地图上是明确地标明了的。事实上是英国入侵中国领土后，改变了他们的地图。中国一直表明：边界是位于与布拉马普特拉河流域接壤的山脚下。不经过谈判，他们不会改变（他们的立场）。

In the context of negotiations, everything is negotiable. If India would only come to the negotiating table, the two sides can feel each others' positions out. But until India is willing to negotiate, China will stand where it has always stood. It is not going to change that until India is ready to negotiate.

在谈判中，一切都可以磋商。只有当印度坐到谈判桌边来，双方才可以了解对方的立场了。但是在印度愿意谈判之前，中国的立场将一直不变。除非印度愿意谈判，中国的边界立场不会变。

But was a public articulation of that view by the Ambassador the best way to address it? 

那么，这种让大使来公开强调这一观点是解决问题的好办法吗？

Ambassadors, when pushed, can sometimes be a little tactless. An ambassador pushed on the ropes by aggressive questioning might well respond, 'Well, the whole of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory.' He is simply restating the basic pre-negotiation position of every Chinese government.

大使，有时会被逼的说话有点不客气。一个大使，当他面对咄咄逼人的提问时也许会说：‘当然，整个阿鲁纳恰尔邦是中国领土。’他也只是在重申每一个中国政府的在谈判前的基本立场。

Clearly, the Chinese Ambassador made the obvious and correct reply. The Chinese are saying: 'So far as we are concerned, that's our territory. The fact that you call it Arunachal Pradesh may be good for you, but we don't acknowledge that. We're not going to take it back, because we are a pacific neighbour. But don't kid yourself that the matter is forgotten. It's got to be negotiated.'

显然，中国大使做了清楚而且正确的答复。中国人说：至今为止，这是我们的领土。事实上，你叫阿鲁纳恰尔邦可能对你有好处，但我们不承认这一点。我们没有要马上收回她，因为我们是一个和平的邻居。但是，你不要自欺欺人，以为这件事被忘记了。一定要谈判才行。

How about the denial of China visas to officials from Arunachal Pradesh? 

中国不给阿鲁纳恰尔邦的官员办签证是怎么回事？

It's part of the same thing. The Chinese view is: 'If you call yourself the Chief Minister or an official of Arunachal Pradesh, don't present your passport to us for a visa. You don't exist as far as we are concerned.'

同理，这只是一个插曲。中国人的观点是：如果你称你自己是阿鲁纳恰尔邦的首席部长或官员，你不必拿你的护照来让我们办签证，因为对我们而言，所谓阿鲁纳恰尔邦官员是不存在的。

It's all quite logical when you realise that the Indian refusal to negotiate is the A to Z of this problem. While that lasts, things will just get worse… It can never be resolved.

当你意识到印度拒绝谈判是这个问题的根本（A to Z），这一切都很清楚。越耗下去，事情会变得越糟糕。这可能导致（这个问题）永远解决不了。 "

China had in the past informally proposed an east-west 'package deal' under which if India made territorial concessions in Aksai Chin (in the western sector), China would reciprocate and renounce its claims in the eastern sector (the area corresponding to Arunachal Pradesh)…

中国过去曾非正式地提出了一个东西段'互换（一揽子）交易'。在这个提议下，如果印度在阿克赛钦（在西区）让步，中国可以放弃东段（即阿鲁纳恰尔邦地区）作为交换。

If India had acted on those indications, could the Sino-Indian boundary dispute have been solved?

如果印度这样做了的话，可能中印的边界争端已经得到解决？

Yes, I do believe that but for Nehru's folly of saying that India's boundary is non-negotiable, had India in the late 1950s acted as Burma (current-day Myanmar) and every other neighbour of China in due course was to act, and said ' Okay, let's sit down and negotiate', the boundary dispute could have been settled.

对，如果不是因为尼赫鲁的愚蠢说法－印度的边界是不可谈判的，我相信是中印的边界争端已经得到解决。如果印度在1950 年代象缅甸（Burma， 现在称为 Myanmar) 和其他中国的邻国一样说，‘好吧，让我们坐下来谈判，’中印边界争端会已经解决了。

China would, I believe, have confirmed the McMahon alignment - not the McMohan Line - as more or less the boundary and then the joint boundary commission would have ironed out the minor differences on the ground. At that stage, I do not believe China would have demanded the retrocession of the Tawang monastery because there was no illwill towards India.

我相信，中国会承认麦克马洪的走向－不是麦克马洪线-作为大致的边界调整线。然后联合边界委员会将会在地面上确定微小次要的偏差。在那种情况下，我相信中国不会要求交还塔旺的寺院，因为其时对印度没有怨恨。

I believe that had India acted rationally, there would have been a Sino-Indian boundary settlement in 1959 or 1960 with mutual acclaim I[ELwFt{W

— and a major alteration in world history.

我认为，如果印度采取了合理的行动，在1959年或1960年就会有令双方都满意的中印边界的解决。而且那会是在世界历史上一个重大的时代变更。

Do you believe China will revert to that stage where it was willing to make those concessions?

你是否认为中国将会回到愿意作出这些让步的那种姿态？ 

If India were to say it will negotiate from the start and if the Chinese believed that it was being honest, the process will still be fairly protracted; it might take years. And it would be not easy because a lot of mutual mistrust has been built up now.

如果印度表示，它愿意从头开始谈判，而中国相信他们是有诚信的，谈判的进程将仍然是相当持久的，它可能需要几年的时间。 这将是不容易，因为有很多相互猜疑、互不信任已经堆积的太久。

So, what's the way forward?

那么，下一步何去何从？

The answer remains what it has always been: India must reverse Nehru's position and say 'Let's sit down and negotiate'. The Chinese will be sceptical at first, but once they believe that India means business, the two sides could begin by inviting the Myanmar government in to fix that trijunction so that they have a starting point on which to anchor the McMahon alignment, and they could then proceed westward.

这个答案实际上一直没有变，那就是：印度必须扭转尼赫鲁的立场，并说'让我们坐下来谈判' 。一开始中国将会是疑虑重重，但是一旦他们相信印度是认真、想要解决问题的，双方可以从邀请缅甸政府介入来解决三国的交界作为起始点，然后他们就可以沿着麦克马洪的走向调整线开始向西进行划界。

When they come up against a point of dispute that appears to be beyond compromise - that might be over Tawang, for example - they could put it aside for settlement at some future date and not let that deadlock disrupt the negotiations. That diplomatic was the key to settling the Sino-Soviet dispute.

当他们遇到了看起来是不可妥协的纠纷，比如－达旺，他们可以把它放在一边，留给今后适当的时机去解决，而不是让这种僵局来阻碍和搅乱谈判。外交手段曾是解决中苏争端的关键。

If I were to advice the Indian government, I would say: 'See if you can agree on confirming a Line of Actual Control.' That means a broad-brush agreement, not nitpicking. Get a cordon sanitaire that neither side will intrude upon. Then they can go on quietly talking.

如果我来给印度政府提出一些忠告的话，我会说：'看看你们是否能够在实际控制线上达成共识。’这意味达成粗线条的协议，而不是一个斤斤计较的细致活。确定一条双方都不可侵犯的警戒线，然后，他们就可以平静地讨论。

But it's important to agree on a Line of Actual Control because otherwise there will be constant little clashes, with the military wondering why the other side sent a patrol onto that hilltop. And then the opposition will pick that up and say, 'We've been invaded again.'

在实际控制线上达成共识是很重要的，否则将有不断的小型军事冲突发生，诸如，奇怪！为什么对方派出巡逻上了山？ 然后，对方就会因此而大喊：‘我们又被侵犯了。’

Given goodwill on both sides, a settlement can be found. But the problem is that no Indian government is likely to be secure and committed for long enough to pursue this matter for several years of hard negotiations….

如果双方都有良好的愿望，就可以找到解决的办法。但问题是，没有一个印度政府可以确保有足够长的时间来办这件事，进行连续几年的艰苦谈判。

If an Indian government agrees to negotiate with China, the outcry would be clamorous. The opposition would say, 'You're selling out sacred Indian soil.'

如果一个印度政府同意与中国进行谈判，将会引起乱哄哄的抗议，反对派将会说，‘你在出卖印度神圣的土地。’

In 1986, (Mikhail) Gorbachev reversed that position and said 'We will negotiate'. That was a brilliant act of statesmanship. India awaits its Gorbachev! "

在1986年，（俄）戈尔巴乔夫扭转这一立场，并说：‘我们将进行谈判。’这才是一个政治家的精彩出手。印度正在等待它的戈尔巴乔夫！

（完）

有没有在4000米的高原上呆过啊？

背着重物呢？

背着重物行动呢？

背着重物做军事行动呢？

在60年代背着重物做军事行动呢？

6万平方公里不到100万人，人口密度和新疆差不多。

毛天纵英才，他从来就不在乎一时一地的得失。

延安都可以临时放弃，再打回来就是了。

毛在当时得到了最好的结果.

会守不住藏南?

其实毛想学"七擒孟获",学砸了而已.从古书上找不到现代国际关系的答案

不是由毛泽东和解放军决定的.喜马拉雅山每年有好几个月的大雪封山的时间.这是决定性的因素.中国军队当时之所以打了胜仗就撤了回来一个很重要的原因就是大雪封山的季节就要来了.

印度人现在也意识到中国是不愿意放弃藏南的，60年代里中国非正式提出的‘东西段互换（一揽子）交易’已经过时，而他们现在在东段，不论谈或打，都也处于劣势。

我不会再回你的贴，你在胡搅蛮缠！

劳民伤财还添一仇敌,就为了"尊严"?

中国那时已经和苏联,美国为敌,还怕多一个印度做敌人.这一仗决定了中国在世界上的地位比印度高,直到现在依然如此.国家资本主义就是比半资本主义半封建有体制优势.中印战争再次表明了这一点.如果不打这一仗,中国能否保有西藏是一个问题.打了这一仗后,大多数藏族人再也不怀疑毛泽东是天命所归的了.