主题：【原创】石油―――太平洋战争中日本致命的软肋 -- 忘情

沒有好好利用其潛艇艦隊來封鎖夏威夷。如果山本知道補給是戰爭成敗關鍵的話，當天雖然沒有炸毀美方油庫，但只要以後以其潛艇強力封鎖夏威夷的運輸，夏威夷的存油還有用罄的一天。

就讓我們回到當年，看看那時的情況。

太平洋艦隊夏威夷基地的最大作用是美國艦隊到亞洲間的唯一加油及補給站。沒有夏威夷這補給站（被日軍佔領）或補給站設施被破壞至不能使用，對太平洋艦隊來說，維持作戰及保存實力，只有返回美國西岸。想向亞洲出發的話，就首先要收復及確保這個補給站的安全。那樣的話，大戰就會在夏威夷附近。但龐大艦隊迢迢千里從聖迭戈出發。其困難度可想而知。美國能產多少石油及造艦能力多高，對解決這困難，短期來說，幫助都不大。尤其是戰爭初起那關鍵的一兩年。

下面的是美方對這的評估：

In the years from 1925 to 1940, the quantity of most surface combatants in the Navy had doubled in size; the size of the auxiliary force had not. Although there had been an increase in the number of fleet oilers, they were all kept busy ferrying fuel between bases. (95) On 7 December, the Pacific Fleet had two oilers in Pearl Harbor and three at sea and six others in ports on the west coast; only four of these were capable of at-sea refueling. (96) This shortage of tankers effectively limited the radius of the Pacific Fleet. (97) It was also a key reason so many ships were located in Pearl Harbor on 7 December. Kimmel was unable to keep less than half his fleet at sea without starting to deplete the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor; his limited supply of oilers could not keep up with the deficit. (98)

Because of this lack of oilers, the fleet could not have even exercised its primary war plan (even if most of its battle line was not at the bottom of Pearl Harbor). The total capacity of the Pacific Fleet's oilers was 760,000 barrels of oil. In the first 9 days after Pearl Harbor, the fleet had expended 750,000 barrels of this sum. Thus, the fleet was tied to its oil supply at Pearl Harbor, (99) and if the Japanese had attacked the oil storage and the associated oilers at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, they would have driven the Pacific Fleet back to the west coast. (100)

If the Pacific Fleet had been forced back to the west coast, would it have been effective in opposing the Japanese? The short answer is no, especially if the Japanese began targeting oilers. To give an example, the USS Lexington was dispatched from California to assist in the search for Amelia Earhart in July 1937. First, the Lexington had to top off its bunkers on the west coast. (101) It then proceeded on a high-speed run of about 30 knots to the Hawaiian Islands. Here, it had to refuel again from the fleet oiler USS Ramapo off Lahaina Roads, Maui. The result was that the Lexington did not arrive in the search area off Howland Island until 11 days after its departure from the west coast and could not even have done that without the support of the Ramapo. (102)

Ships sortieing from the west coast would be adding 2,000 nautical miles to their patrols into the Pacific just to get to Hawaii. (103) This number would have to be doubled, obviously, because these same ships would have to get back to the west coast if no oiler support were available and the oil storage at Pearl Harbor no longer existed.

The cruising ranges of the Pacific Fleet simply could not meet this necessity. The best range of the Yorktown-class carriers was 12,000 nautical miles at 15 knots, while older carriers had even less endurance. (104) Battleships had much less endurance and were slower. They averaged out at 8,000 nautical miles at 10 knots. (105) Cruisers were a little better off than the carriers; they averaged 14,000-14,500 nautical miles at approximately 15 knots. Destroyers, depending on their class, could go 6,000-9,000 plus nautical miles at 15 knots. (106) Looking at the carders' and cruisers' endurance capabilities, the situation does not seem so bad. However, there are other factors that need to be thrown into the equation.

First, ranges needed to be decreased by a minimum of 15 percent whenever antisubmarine steering measures were taken. (107) Also, a prudent commander might want to avoid a suspected submarine-operating area altogether, if time and circumstances permitted such a detour. This too, would decrease overall endurance. Another factor was ship speeds. Higher speed means more fuel burned. Task force operations require much high-speed steaming for the launch and recovery of aircraft, search tasks, antisubmarine patrol, and so forth. This process, as can be seen by the previous Lexington example, burns a prodigious amount of fuel. (108)

The equation all boils down to the availability of oil and sufficient tankers to transport this precious commodity. Kimmel summed up this essential truth when he testified:

A destroyer at full power exhausts its fuel supply in 30 to 40 hours, at medium speed in 4 to 6 days. War experience has proven the necessity of fueling destroyers every third day, and heavy ships about every fifth day to keep a fighting reserve on board. To have kept the entire fleet at sea for long periods would not have required 11 tankers but approximately 75, with at least one-third of them equipped for underway delivery. (109)

有朋友認為，這難度對日本來說是同樣的。因為從距離來說，日本至夏威夷是遠於美國至夏威夷的。但這些朋友忽略了一點。日方艦隊是不需要從本土直至夏威夷的。

自一戰後日方取得了德國在太平洋諸群島的托管權。Carolines, Marianas, Paulas 及Marshall諸島已經在日本統治下二十多年了。而日本亦利用了這些群島作為其艦隊的前進補給站。此所以珍珠港被襲前，美方情報機關千方百計地意圖瞭解這些被日本封閉了的群島的情況。而在珍珠港被襲後，太平洋艦隊第一想到的就是日艦隊是從這裏出發，所以將那兩個空母戰鬥群，調往珍珠港東南方，意圖找出日方艦隊所在來報仇。但當然是撲空了。事實上12月7日那天，那兩個空母戰鬥群不在珍珠港的原因，就是負責運送飛機至威克島及中途島，意圖加強美國這兩個前進基地的空防及攻擊能力。

算來算去，日方的優勢是明顯地大大優於美方。只不過是他們沒有好好利用，坐失良機。當然這是亞洲及中國人的福氣了。

如果據你的假設，日本嚴重破壞了珍珠港美方的存油及好好利用其不錯的潛艇艦隊來封鎖美國至夏威夷之間的運輸的話，美國在亞洲都是無計可施。而日方可有充足的時間來經營新佔領的土地。一出一入之間，鹿死誰手，實未可知。