主题：中国的政治风险 -- 风烟滚滚来天半

小资产阶级永远在资产者和无产者之间摇摆：一方面希望跻身于资产阶级的行列，一方面惧怕堕入无产者的境地；一方面希望参加一份对公共事物的领导以保障自己的利益，一方面唯恐不合时宜的对抗行为会触怒政府。小资产阶级内部从经济地位看，有上、中、下三个阶层，其对待革命的态度也相应地取右、中、左三种立场。

他们的思想不能越出小资产者的生活所越不出的界限，因此他们在理论上得出的任务和作出的决定，也就是他们的物质利益和社会地位在实际生活上引导他们得出的任务和作出的决定。一般说来，一个阶级的政治代表和著作方面的代表人物同他们的阶级间的关系，都是这样。”（同上）

　　马克思曾经为小资产阶级社会主义的代表人物蒲鲁东先生描绘了一幅维妙维肖的画像：他“极其无聊地胡扯‘科学’和错误地以‘科学’自夸”，“甚至把他仅仅重复旧东西的地方也看做独立的发现；他说的东西，对他自己说来都是新东西而且是被他当做新东西看待的。”他的所有著作都“暴露出矛盾的、双重的性质”（马克思：《论蒲鲁东》，《马恩选集》第2卷第145、141、147页）。

蒲鲁东认为，资本主义社会的每一种经济关系都有其好的方面和坏的方面。“好的方面由［资产阶级］经济学家来揭示，坏的方面由社会主义者来揭发。他从经济学家那里借用了永恒经济关系的必然性这一看法；从社会主义者那里借用了使他们在贫困中只看到贫困的那种幻想。他对两者都表示赞成，…蒲鲁东先生自以为他既批判了政治经济学，也批判了共产主义；其实他远在这两者之下。说他在经济学家之下，因为他作为一个哲学家，自以为有了神秘的公式就用不着深入纯经济的细节；说他在社会主义者之下，因为他既缺乏勇气，也没有远见，不能超出（哪怕是思辩地也好）资产者的眼界。他希望成为一个合题，结果只不过是一种总和的错误。他希望充当科学泰斗，凌驾于资产者和无产者之上，结果是一个小资产者，经常在资本和劳动、政治经济学和共产主义之间摇来摆去。”（马克思：《哲学的贫困》，《马恩选集》第1卷第122页）

“蒲鲁东是天生地倾向于辩证法的。但是他从来也不懂得真正科学的辩证法，所以他陷入了诡辩的泥坑。实际上这是和他的小资产阶级观点有联系的。小资产者象历史学家劳麦一样，是由‘一方面’和‘另一方面’构成的。”（《马恩选集》第2卷第147页）

老百姓都是想过好日子的。谁也不愿意折腾。

有些治理上的问题其实可以通过技术性手段加以解决。

经济问题,全是扯淡,就算是玩到最糟糕,无可挽回了,TG还有大杀器---计划经济,委长员的烂滩子都能搞定,何况今非昔比.转型后,穷人不管是计划,还是市场,都还是那点社会资源,穷人稳定了,难道指望书生去造反?还有党指挥枪呢

西方说中国经济衰退就动乱,完全是站在自身的社会立场上说的,这对市场经济国家有普遍意义,可他们不知道,TG的起家理论就是为解决市场问题而诞生的.顶多重头再来.

中国唯一的政治风险,就是TG上层变色,不过这个风险越来越小,老胡退下来后,TG就有两套前任政府存着,就算是中南海突然落下个原子弹,TG也能在短时间内组成一个有治国经验的临时内阁,老胳膊老腿的,临时顶顶还是靠谱的.就算当朝国柱不想玩了,TG也不一定变得了色.除非大家都不想玩,这个可能性相对比较低.

石首,瓮安,起因中国大地上天天发生的事,有人选择拦火车,有人选择去ZF门口,这不都挺正常的嘛,两者唯一的不同,就是石首,瓮安背后,忽隐忽现的宗族势力,这也是为什么这样的事会出现在中国人很少听过的城市,而且很多人都忽略了一个平时被压着的群体---流氓无产者,你们真觉得仅仅是"人民"因为愤怒和ZF的对抗,岂不是太想当然了?

有人说,这是对ZF缺乏信任,我就奇怪了,中国人什么时候信任过政府?是衙门八字朝南开,有理无钱莫进来的,时候信任ZF,还是砸烂公检法的时候,信任政府?中国人有信包青天,孔夫子这样的圣人历史,好像从来没信过ZF的历史.

Military is part of society, no matter how much "patriotic education" one receives, each and every individual soldier/sailor/airman all has their own brain and their own perspective, they see everything you see in the society and like you, they probably feel hopeful every time they see the good side of China, disillusioned every time they see the dark side of the China. Don't think they are mindless droids who only know to follow orders.

As for the whole political risk thing, I honestly don't even know how to form my own opinion, the government can bash all of its critics as pawns of western imperialists all they want, but we all know the problem China has and how greedy some of the special interest groups are. The fact that over the past decade, the government has become much more aggressive in term of doing whatever it can, no matter how ridiculous it sounds, to stamp out even the faintest hint of criticism, proves that the government itself is far from being as optimistic about the future as many HKCs are. (frankly speaking, every time I see the government launches yet another campaign to "purify" the interest,

I feel like being kicked on my crotch, I can and did defend China on a lot of issues, but I can't honestly tell anybody that such spineless policies ain't something that only a government seriously scared of its own people can come up with. I don't like Western media's grotesque campaign of misinformation when it comes to China, but on this particular matter, I can't help but agreeing with their assessment: this is not an sign of strength, this is an sign of weakness, and an sign of lack of confidence on doing what's needed to be done to rectify the situation.)

I don't know what China would be like 50 years from now, I don't know if the current China would survive as opposed to crumbling into pieces like Soviet Union did 50 years from now. I hope not, but I can't force myself to share the optimism, after all, I'm not even sure the current crop of leadership gets what it takes to do what Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng did back in 89, the military can be as loyal as it can, but unless somebody has the authority and the ball to do, you know, what's necessary when faced with massive social unrest, all the shiny tanks, missiles, rifles won't mean squat. The Red Army of 1991, even today, is still years ahead of PLA of 2009 as far as I know, and as far as I know, the military itself was still quite supportive of the preservation of Soviet Union. But does it matter? Obviously not much. In an system in which the military is firmly under the leadership of civilian government, The military is only as useful as the civilian government wants it to be. As evidenced by the events of 91, it's entirely possible that even the biggest beneficiaries (the coup plotters include vice president, head of KGB, defense minister, you can't say they weren't part of the system, you can't say they had no incentive to defend the system, yet they still flinched.)of status quo could hesitate in the face of massive social opposition. In 89, Deng Xiaoping got it, I don't think government of 09 got it.

One popular explanation to the seemly inexplicable question regarding how a country as powerful as Soviet Union could collapse overnight is "if nobody were willing to kill for the system, it means the system is a goner". I don't think China can repeat what happened in 89, I sincerely hope China would not be forced to make similar choice in the future, but when pushed to the brink, only "decisive" action, you all know what "decisive" here means, could restore order. Judging by what happened in Sinjiang (against a bunch of cold-blooded killers who were armed with the most rudimentary weapon and who were overwhelmingly hated by the vast majority of the population, yet the reaction from this seemly "authoritarian" government was tepid, even shy, do you think the reaction would be really that different if Beijing were filled with another million, you know...?), I'm not optimistic. Now I only hope that the increasing professionalism of the bureaucracy and the momentum of Chinese industrialization could compensate the lack of political will, in another word, I hope the government could be smart enough to not push the public off the brink at the very least, and competent enough to actually increase the stake average people have in the system so that they don't have to go to the extreme.

To sum it up, there is hope, there is risk, I don't think anybody can make a convincing case either for or against the possibility of social unrest large enough to derail the whole process of industrialization. Nobody has crystal ball. However, IF China were really unfortunate to have to relive the whole 89 experience again, personally, I'd not bet my money on China emerging out of it unscathed....