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  • 家园 【讨论】【整理】阎学通《纽约时报》:中国如何击败美国

    http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/opinion/how-china-can-defeat-america.html?pagewanted=all

    WITH China’s growing influence over the global economy, and its increasing ability to project military power, competition between the United States and China is inevitable. Leaders of both countries assert optimistically that the competition can be managed without clashes that threaten the global order.

    Most academic analysts are not so sanguine. If history is any guide, China’s rise does indeed pose a challenge to America. Rising powers seek to gain more authority in the global system, and declining powers rarely go down without a fight. And given the differences between the Chinese and American political systems, pessimists might believe that there is an even higher likelihood of war.

    I am a political realist. Western analysts have labeled my political views “hawkish,” and the truth is that I have never overvalued the importance of morality in international relations. But realism does not mean that politicians should be concerned only with military and economic might. In fact, morality can play a key role in shaping international competition between political powers — and separating the winners from the losers.

    I came to this conclusion from studying ancient Chinese political theorists like Guanzi, Confucius, Xunzi and Mencius. They were writing in the pre-Qin period, before China was unified as an empire more than 2,000 years ago — a world in which small countries were competing ruthlessly for territorial advantage.

    It was perhaps the greatest period for Chinese thought, and several schools competed for ideological supremacy and political influence. They converged on one crucial insight: The key to international influence was political power, and the central attribute of political power was morally informed leadership. Rulers who acted in accordance with moral norms whenever possible tended to win the race for leadership over the long term.

    China was unified by the ruthless king of Qin in 221 B.C., but his short-lived rule was not nearly as successful as that of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, who drew on a mixture of legalistic realism and Confucian “soft power” to rule the country for over 50 years, from 140 B.C. until 86 B.C.

    According to the ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi, there were three types of leadership: humane authority, hegemony and tyranny. Humane authority won the hearts and minds of the people at home and abroad. Tyranny — based on military force — inevitably created enemies. Hegemonic powers lay in between: they did not cheat the people at home or cheat allies abroad. But they were frequently indifferent to moral concerns and often used violence against non-allies. The philosophers generally agreed that humane authority would win in any competition with hegemony or tyranny.

    Such theories may seem far removed from our own day, but there are striking parallels. Indeed, Henry Kissinger once told me that he believed that ancient Chinese thought was more likely than any foreign ideology to become the dominant intellectual force behind Chinese foreign policy.

    The fragmentation of the pre-Qin era resembles the global divisions of our times, and the prescriptions provided by political theorists from that era are directly relevant today — namely that states relying on military or economic power without concern for morally informed leadership are bound to fail.

    Unfortunately, such views are not so influential in this age of economic determinism, even if governments often pay lip service to them. The Chinese government claims that the political leadership of the Communist Party is the basis of China’s economic miracle, but it often acts as though competition with the United States will be played out on the economic field alone. And in America, politicians regularly attribute progress, but never failure, to their own leadership.

    Both governments must understand that political leadership, rather than throwing money at problems, will determine who wins the race for global supremacy.

    Many people wrongly believe that China can improve its foreign relations only by significantly increasing economic aid. But it’s hard to buy affection; such “friendship” does not stand the test of difficult times.

    How, then, can China win people’s hearts across the world? According to ancient Chinese philosophers, it must start at home. Humane authority begins by creating a desirable model at home that inspires people abroad.

    This means China must shift its priorities away from economic development to establishing a harmonious society free of today’s huge gaps between rich and poor. It needs to replace money worship with traditional morality and weed out political corruption in favor of social justice and fairness.

    In other countries, China must display humane authority in order to compete with the United States, which remains the world’s pre-eminent hegemonic power. Military strength underpins hegemony and helps to explain why the United States has so many allies. President Obama has made strategic mistakes in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, but his actions also demonstrate that Washington is capable of leading three foreign wars simultaneously. By contrast, China’s army has not been involved in any war since 1984, with Vietnam, and very few of its high-ranking officers, let alone its soldiers, have any battlefield experience.

    America enjoys much better relations with the rest of the world than China in terms of both quantity and quality. America has more than 50 formal military allies, while China has none. North Korea and Pakistan are only quasi-allies of China. The former established a formal alliance with China in 1961, but there have been no joint military maneuvers and no arms sales for decades. China and Pakistan have substantial military cooperation, but they have no formal military alliance binding them together.

    To shape a friendly international environment for its rise, Beijing needs to develop more high-quality diplomatic and military relationships than Washington. No leading power is able to have friendly relations with every country in the world, thus the core of competition between China and the United States will be to see who has more high-quality friends. And in order to achieve that goal, China has to provide higher-quality moral leadership than the United States.

    China must also recognize that it is a rising power and assume the responsibilities that come with that status. For example, when it comes to providing protection for weaker powers, as the United States has done in Europe and the Persian Gulf, China needs to create additional regional security arrangements with surrounding countries according to the model of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — a regional forum that includes China, Russia and several central Asian countries.

    And politically, China should draw on its tradition of meritocracy. Top government officials should be chosen according to their virtue and wisdom, and not simply technical and administrative ability. China should also open up and choose officials from across the world who meet its standards, so as to improve its governance.

    The Tang dynasty — which lasted from the 7th century to the 10th and was perhaps China’s most glorious period — employed a great number of foreigners as high-ranking officials. China should do the same today and compete with America to attract talented immigrants.

    OVER the next decade, China’s new leaders will be drawn from a generation that experienced the hardships of the Cultural Revolution. They are resolute and will most likely value political principles more than material benefits. These leaders must play a larger role on the world stage and offer more security protection and economic support to less powerful countries.

    This will mean competing with the United States politically, economically and technologically. Such competition may cause diplomatic tensions, but there is little danger of military clashes.

    That’s because future Chinese-American competition will differ from that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. Neither China nor America needs proxy wars to protect its strategic interests or to gain access to natural resources and technology.

    China’s quest to enhance its world leadership status and America’s effort to maintain its present position is a zero-sum game. It is the battle for people’s hearts and minds that will determine who eventually prevails. And, as China’s ancient philosophers predicted, the country that displays more humane authority will win.

    Yan Xuetong, the author of “Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power,” is a professor of political science and dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University. This essay was translated by Zhaowen Wu and David Liu from the Chinese.

    随着中国对全球经济不断增长的影响力,以及其不断增强的军事投射能力,在中美之间的竞争是不可避免的。两国领导人都乐观地声称,这种竞争不会导致威胁世界秩序的碰撞。

    大部分学院分析人士却并不乐观。如果以史为鉴,那么中国的崛起确实对美国提出了挑战。崛起中的力量寻求在全球体系中获得更多的权威,而衰落的力量则很少不战而退。并且由于中美政治体系之间的分歧,悲观主义者也许相信会有更大的战争可能性。

    我是一个政治现实主义者。西方分析家们给我的政治观点贴上了“鹰派”的标签,而事实却是我从不高估道德在国际关系中的重要性。然而现实主义并非意味着政治家应当仅仅关注于经济和军事力量。事实上,道德可以在国际竞争中的政治力量之间起到关键作用——并且区分胜者和败者。

    我是从对古代政治理论家如管子、孔子、荀子和孟子那里得出这样的结论的。他们在先秦时期著书立说,在2000多年以前,中国尚未统一为一个帝国的时候——一个如此这般的世界,在其中各个小国为了地区优势而展开残酷的竞争。

    那或许是中国思想最辉煌的年代,并且不少学派为了意识形态的统治权和政治的影响力展开竞争。他们融会到一个重要的洞见:国际影响的关键是政治权力,政治权力的中心属性是王道。那些行事与道德规范相一致的统治者,无论是如何可能的,就长远来看都倾向于在领导地位的竞赛中获得优胜。

    中国在公元前221年由残暴的秦王所统一,但是他短命的统治却无法与汉武帝的功业相比。汉武帝以施行了一套外法内儒的混合制度的方式,在位超过50年,从公元前140年至公元前86年。

    根据古代中国哲学家荀子,有三种类型的统治方式:仁政、霸道和暴政(故用国者,义立而王,信立而霸,权谋立而亡)。仁政得内外民心。暴政——建立在军事力量的基础上——不可避免会树敌。霸道则居间:他们不欺瞒内部的人民也不欺瞒外部的盟友。但是他们时常对道德关注不关心并且经常针对非盟友使用暴力。哲学家们总体上同意,仁政会在与霸道或者暴政的任何竞争中胜利。

    这样的理论似乎与我们自己的时代相距甚远了,然而仍然存在惊人的类比。实际上,亨利基辛格曾经向我透露,他相信古代中国思想比起任何外来意识形态来才是中国外交政策背后主导性的精神力量。

    先秦时代的破碎化与我们当今时代分裂状况有着相似之处,并且由那个时代的政治理论家所提供的药方恰恰直接与今天相关——即依赖军事或者经济力量而不行王道的国家必将失败。

    不幸地是,如此这般的观点在当今经济决定论的时代并没有多少影响力,即便政府们总是口头上承认他们。中国政府声称共产党的政治领导中国经济奇迹的根基,然而它似乎表现得如此,好像与美国的竞争只会在经济领域内展开那样。而在美国,政治家们定期地把他们的领导归诸于进展,而却从未归诸于失败。

    双方的政府都必须明白是政治领导力而不是向问题当中砸钱,才决定谁是赢得世界主导权之竞赛的一方。

    许多人错误地相信中国可以通过显著地提升其经济援助就可以改善其对外关系。但是爱是很难被收买到的;这样的“友谊”并不能经受困境的检验。

    那么中国如何能够在世界上赢得民心?根据中国古代先贤,这必须首先在国内实现。仁政开始于在国内创建一个值得追随的模范,这一模范可以进一步激励国外的人民。

    这就意味着中国必须把其主要目标从经济发展转换为建立一种消灭当今如此之大贫富差距的和谐社会。它需要把拜金主义转换为传统伦理价值并且剪除腐败而支持社会正义和社会公平。

    在其他的国家,中国为了与美国竞争则必须行仁政,而美国仍然是世界上主导性的霸权力量。军事力量支撑了霸权并且有助于解释美国为何有如此多的盟友。奥巴马总统在阿富汗、伊拉克和利比亚犯下了战略错误,然而他的行为也展现出了华盛顿有能力同时展开三场对外战争。相较而言,中国军队自1984(与越南)年以来就没有卷入过任何战争,并且很少的高级军官拥有实战经验,更不用提士兵了。

    与中国相比,美国享有着与世界其他国家更好的外交关系,无论是从数量上还是从质量上来看。美国有着超过50个正式的军事同盟国,而中国一个也没有。朝鲜与巴基斯坦仅仅是中国的准同盟。前者在1961年与中国建立了正式同盟关系,然而却几十年间没有军事联合演练和军售行为。中国和巴基斯坦有着实质性的军事合作,但是两者没有将他们联系在一起的正式军事同盟。

    为了塑造一个对其崛起来说友好的国际环境,北京比华盛顿更需要发展更多高质量的外交和军事关系。没有一个领导性力量可以和世界上每一个国家有着友好关系,因此中美竞争的核心还是在于谁拥有更多的优质伙伴。为了实现这一目标,中国必须比美国提供更优质的道德领导力。

    中国也必须意识到它是一个崛起中的力量并且认可随着其地位而来的责任。例如当需要为弱小力量提供保护的时候,正如美国在欧洲和波斯湾所做的那样,中国需要在上海合作组织的框架下和邻国建立额外的地区安全部署,上合组织则是一个包括了中俄以及一些中亚国家的地区性论坛。

    唐朝——这一朝代从7世纪延续到10世纪并且也许是中国史上最辉煌的时代——雇佣了大量外国人作为高级将领。中国在今天同样也需要为了吸引优质移民与美国展开竞争。

    在下一个十年,中国的新一代领导人将会从经历过文革那段困难时期的一代人中挑选出来。他们更为坚定并且极为可能比起物质利益来更为珍视政治原则。这些领导人需要在世界舞台上发挥更大作用,并且为弱国提供更多的安全保护和经济支持。

    这就意味着与美国政治上、经济上和科技上的竞争。如此这般的竞争会遭致外交关系上的紧张,但是却不会有太大军事冲突的风险。

    这是因为未来的中美竞争与冷战中的美苏争霸有所不同。不仅中国还有美国都无需代理人战争来保护其战略利益或者获得自然资源和科技。

    中国加强其世界领导地位的任务和美国维持其现有地位的努力是场零和游戏。一场争夺民心的战役才会决定谁能够最终获胜。并且,正如中国古代先贤所预言的那样,义立而王。

    阎学通,《古代中国思想与当代中国力量》的作者。清华大学政治学教授,清华大学现代国际关系研究所所长。这篇论文由Zhaowen Wu和David Liu由中文所转译

    PS:正版原文好像没在网上看到,我自己就随便翻译了一下

    关键词(Tags): #政治通宝推:sitan,本嘉明,
    • 家园 黑社会老二忽悠黑社会老大开展五讲四美三热爱竞赛

      可怜的小白兔啊,贵为黑社会老二,其最前台的‘鹰派’也只能跟黑社会老大倡议大家还是比比精神文明吧。。。。。。

      实事求是的说,这恰当的反映了双方的实力对比。当年苏联曾经在硬实力上接近过美国,可惜没有在7,80年代抓住机会。如果当时寻机把欧洲的一大半打下来,结果会很不同。拖久了是死路一条。

      中国是看清了苏联的教训,毅然转身,无耻地拜老大不动摇,吃老大不松口。

      现在,我们一天天好起来,敌人一天天烂下去,MD是很纠结的,再不打来不及了。哎。可是要真打,怎么下手呢?当年是可以让欧洲人顶一阵子,现在愣是找不到一个体量大点的代理人!现在明显在考虑自己直接上,前天在美国网站上看了一篇文章,说是某大学师生‘揭秘’了小白兔的地下万里长城,兔子的核弹头数量不是原来西媒一直宣传的80-400,而是3000!,(文章里说了老美5000,俄国8000.)神马意思啊?激发斗志?不灭不行?还是未战先怯?

      这篇文章有点戏弄老美,人家能看不出来吗?if you can not beat them, confuse them. 也许有部分纯洁的美国小资和愚民会中毒: 干活比不过要不就跟TG比精神文明?美国肯定赢啊...... ^_^

      • 家园 没错!听阎的演讲就是这个感觉

        不知道他是真天真还是装纯。反正底下的听众基本都没听懂到底要怎么实施

        经历过冷战的那帮美国教授就问说怎么防止热战。阎的答案是在五讲四美三热爱的世界里怎么会有这么不和谐的事捏~——这个当然是我的演绎

        阎的意思似乎是中国人不想打,于是就不会打——对这个问题他从没有正面回应,只是说竞争会局限在科技和生产领域

        说到苏联,苏联的问题是资本不足,维持不了庞大的经济体伴随的资本需要——从二战后就没有哪个国家有资格可以和美国谈论充足的资本:苏联人也得从美国进口东西,反过来就不一定。

        中国现在也是一样的情况。

      • 家园 你有核弹三千,我有天灵盖十五瞳孔三十

        看看我们美国年轻人多能干

      • 家园 美国老百姓确实是很可怜的顺民,比不上中国人的反抗精神

        不过这个价值观牌可能还得把国内思想阵地上的一些势力清洗掉才能真正打出来吧。清洗掉之后才能集中精力把新自由主义给彻底抹黑。

        要知道伪良心派,伪民意领袖迈克尔摩尔这类人虽然会揭露一些社会问题,可是心里关于美好社会的憧憬还是向着民主制下的自由主义经济,没有寡头,选民的权力制约游说集团的黑箱操作。这个是美国精神的根基,整个大众传媒的政治正确都在这里,所以把这个击败了才是彻底击败美国人。

        不过目前中国还有不少人还信那个呢,所以不把这些人先清理掉,边缘化,价值观牌还是打不出来。

    • 家园 华尔街日报:中国有计划经济 美国也应该有

      外链出处

      去年,英特尔(Intel)创始人、董事长格鲁夫(Andy Grove)曾在《商业周刊》(Businessweek)上挑衅地写道:我们的基本经济信条,是在观察一个确凿公理的基础上形成信念然后升华而来的,即自由市场是所有经济制度中最好的,越自由越好。我们这一代人曾目睹自由市场原则对计划经济取得决定性胜利。所以我们坚持这种信条,而且对一些不断出现的新证据视而不见。这些证据表明,自由市场虽然战胜了计划经济,让它本身还存在改进的余地。

      一些美国人正在从中汲取经验。上个月《中国日报》(China Daily)发表的一篇文章援引亚洲协会(Asia Society)美中关系中心(Center on U.S.-China Relations)主任夏伟(Orville Schell)的话说,我想我们已经认识到,规划能力正是美国所缺少的。文章还提到,2003年诺贝尔经济学奖得主恩格尔(Robert Engle)曾说,在中国为下一代制定五年规划的时候,美国人却只在规划下一次选举。

      偏向保守主义、奉行自由市场原教旨主义、股东至上的模式在20世纪取得了极大成功。而到了21世纪,这一模式却逐渐被扔进历史的垃圾堆。在每一个国家都需要成为“经济运动队”的年代里,美国队的成绩惨不忍睹:10年间失业高企;30年间中位数工资停滞不前;贸易逆差;中产阶级萎缩;只有最顶层的那1%的人的财富大量增加。

      这应该触动领导人进行反思,而不是在经验上已经失败的自由市场极端主义上增加赌注。尽管痛苦且羞耻,美国还是需要像昔日占据霸主地位的企业和运动队在形势逆转时所做的那样,研究竞争对手取得成功的原因。

      在我们争执不休的时候,中国队却继续前进。我们驻中国的代表目睹了中国重庆以人为本的发展模式。重庆是中国西部一座人口3,200万的城市,市委书记是有雄心、受欢迎的共产党领导人薄熙来。地平线上一排排的启重机,每天建成建筑面积达150万平方英尺的房屋。人家还告诉我们的代表,其中包括每年70万套保障性住房。

      评论里的一条回复是: 2011.12.02 13:31:19

      熙来不简单呢, 评论员队伍都发展到国外高层了

      • 家园 文化基础不一样,美国人搞得来吗?

        美国人的野性+犹太人的算计 => 酿成了美国酒。

        不说传统文化了,(美国也没有什么传统!)中国的 founding father 们跟美国的 founding father 们也都不是一个路数。

      • 家园 看看原文底下的口水

        China's Superior Economic Model

        铺天盖地的肾上腺素,帽子和口水,没有能被称之为理性评论或反思的东西。

        墙街日报早就被右派红脖子占领了,旧日美国的实干精英已经踪影不见。让他们尽情发泄毁灭之前的疯狂吧!

        • 家园 美国现在仍处在宁要资本主义的草的阶段

          政府主导的规划=社会主义=共产主义=坏东西,没救了

          • 家园 卡尔波普尔写《开放社会》,反对乌托邦工程

            其实市场原教旨主义同样是个反向乌托邦,这个东西从来没有实现过。

            社会主义缘何在美国成为政治不正确,其实他们的学者在理论上根本就没有击倒马列理论,大多是外部批判,站定了一个立场去批另一个立场,到最后就变神棍了,根本上就变成了个信仰问题了。他们在此问题上的成就实际上却是在传媒传播和国家恐怖主义层面上实现的。

            • 家园 这个中国要感谢老祖宗和毛

              中国真正的民族主义者通常不搞非此即彼的东西,所以不会搞什么原教旨

              但是呢,所谓的“有信仰”者却很容易被信仰绑架

            • 家园 关键是马克思同学要搞无神论

              对于这样一个怀有浓烈宗教情怀的国家,是没办法妥协的

              • 家园 你是说美国嘛?呵呵,资本主义从根本上来说

                就和基督教意识形态不相容。韦伯写《新教伦理》就是在试图调和这个矛盾。美国是越繁华的大城市越多人宗教意识淡薄。越是偏远地区,宗教势力越强大。发达国家的宗教保守势力总体上是处于衰退状态,并且很多所谓的信徒更多是获得一个身份认同而已(很多方面入教也有现实的好处,教会是个势力强大的产业链,如教会提供的医疗服务有可能是信徒入教的一个动机)。真正基督教强势的地区,在南美,天主教势力无比强韧。

                共产主义理论不和基督教调和不意味着不能和任何关于神圣之物的学说调和。马克思的无神论有着具体的内容,这个内容主要针对的是基督教的耶稣及其变种(见《德意志意识形态批判》,个人以为历史唯物主义在一定程度上仍然是“基督教”式的)。很多时候把神仅仅当作基督教的神是中非常狭隘的认识。关于神圣性本身在几乎所有的意识形态中都有所体现。

                • 家园 也对,但是书生之见

                  普通美国佬是无法理解的。宣扬无神论跟孙中山小时砸他村庙里的神像一样,是动到他们的命根子。他们的所有道德,信仰体系都是立足于这个十字架,这本经书上的。前一阵子不是有帖子讲跟美国朋友交流的事吗?美国人理解不了中国人的道德观:不信神不是就无法无天了吗?

                  同一本经也要看谁在念。中国人毕竟是外人,不在他们体系里面。老毛子可是拿着传教士热火朝天的干劲在搞国际共产主义的,这就戳到欧美的痛处了。一神教内部的斗争一向都是比对外更加残酷无情的。基督教如此,回教如此,基督教和回教之间也是如此。伪善和稀泥的事大家都干,睁一只眼闭一只眼还好说。你来抢我的神主牌那我非跟你拼了。所以资本家JY可以忽悠保守P民,可以一边骂中国佬一边跟他们作生意,可对绿教徒他们就同仇敌忾了。不是这样的话,即使九一一之后老美也不会那么容易放过中国。

                  一个小细节:现在美国保守派资本家和草根南方福音教徒的强大联盟,还是那个拥抱老毛的阴谋家尼克松搞出来的,所谓“The Southern Strategy”:Moral issues 让那些P民去喊到爽,真金白银我背后拿,各取所需。这个不知道老本可不可以说说。

                  • 家园 基督教的命根就是在于把对最高的主宰力量的崇拜

                    万千宠爱一身于基督这个凡人身上。他们所能理解的信仰形式似乎就只有这种一神崇拜的方式了。说中国人没信仰,那是没有他们的那种信仰。要说对最高力量的崇敬,有传统的天道观,并且儒家还把这种天道观糅合在伦理生活之中,不像基督徒们总体上就是被恐惧到死,启示录中关于世界终结,基督最终审判罪人就是一种持久绑在基督徒上的枷锁。

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