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主题:【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战(三) -- 思炎

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家园 【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战(三)

【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战(一)

【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战(二)

美方的宣传,包括许多认为美国没有在朝鲜战争中使用细菌武器的人,往往用这个理由质疑:如果中国和朝鲜没有“撒谎”,为何多次拒绝国红十字会世界卫生组织国际委员会前往朝鲜调查的请求?

而《The United States and Biological Warfare-Secrets from the Early Cold War and Korea 》(美国和生物武器:来自冷战早期和朝鲜的秘密)的作者历史学家Stephen Endicott 和 Edward Hagerman作了解释: 由于这些组织都被西方主导的,美国国务院认为中国的周恩来和朝鲜的金日成不会同意这一挑战,但为了以防他们接受红十字前往调查的请求。而新公布的文件显示:美国国防部秘密授权其在东京总部远东司令部,总司令Matthew Rideway(李奇微)拒绝给红十字会调查人员“获取接触任何特定的信息来源“。

美国驻华大使Benjamin Cohen(科恩)前往联合国前宣布,美国奉行的政策是公开的,我们不打算隐瞒任何东西等。科恩一边说这是共产党的诽谤,一边拒绝让中国和朝鲜的代表比美国早一步到联合国申诉。

美国国防部告诉科恩的声明是,美国未打算使用细菌战,即使在朝鲜-是不可能的(The United States did not intend to use bacteriological warfare -even in Korea- was impossible)。而这些话,科恩大使并没有在联合国提起。种种情形说明了,美国杜鲁门政府对于嘴上说的,开放接受国际监督检查的诚意是如何了。

来源: United States Biological Warfare during the Korean War: rhetoric and reality

特别当时美国政府正奉行杜勒斯的实力地位政策,麦卡锡主义肆无忌惮。美国的一些盟国虽有自己独立自主的立场,但在很多事情上仍不得不遵从美国的旨意。在此种情况下,特别是中国对美方的伎俩心里有数,这也可以理解中朝方面为何不信任让红十字会世界卫生组织国际委员来朝鲜进行调查。第二贴里也讲到:那些国际科学调查委员会的成员包括向西方报道细菌战真相的记者都受到了美国的报复,和他们国家政府(美国盟国)的威胁和惩罚。

而美方包括有些人又说国际科学委员会的“黑皮书”没有没有权威性。但在本系列的第一帖和第二贴里已经讲过的,国际科学委员会的报告结论:“朝鲜及中国东北的人民,确已成为细菌武器的攻击目标;美国军队以许多不同的方法使用了这些细菌武器,其中有一些方法,看起来是把日军在第二次世界大战期间进行细菌战所使用的方法加以发展而成的”。 那么说明当时他们包括很多正义的西方人士对美军的指责不是什么“谎言”,而是正确的。

有些学者认为,直到今天中国还没有解密相关档案的原因,是中朝方面不愿让美方通过这些很具体的材料来判断细菌武器的效果。在上贴中提到的,国际科学委员会的观察员和顾问、意大利微生物学家佛朗哥 格雷齐奥西(中文名葛法蓝),也是如今惟一健在的成员。他回国后护照被意大利警方剥夺。在后来的岁月里,葛法蓝接受过很多西方国家媒体的采访,他也一直坚持国际科学委员声明中的观点。(*如今80多岁的葛法蓝刚从罗马大学巴斯德研究所所长的位置上退休下来)

对于美方和一些“北明们”推崇的,所谓的来自苏联的“新证据”来否认美国没有在朝鲜战争进行细菌战,葛法蓝以微生物学家和当年细菌战调查的见证人的身份作出了批驳,指出了这些“文件”中的医学漏洞,葛法蓝说,“……看过这些‘新证据’后,我有时有这样的感想,那些批评黑皮书的人或者是对委员会所做工作有保留意见的人没有认真读过黑皮书”。“我非常惊讶专业的历史学家怎么会没有注意到这些证据的前后矛盾”。

格雷齐奥西(葛法蓝)回忆说:“……中国当局立即从委员会收回了有关沈阳附近的脑炎疫情的部分文件。我当时意识到从其中的图表和表格中有可能推断出人口中的实际发病数,这对敌方是很重要的信息。” 在葛法蓝提供的另一个案例里,担负投放受感染动物任务的飞机被追踪,很显然飞机来自美国方面。应委员会的要求,中国军方提供了详细的雷达图。“但这些雷达跟踪资料归还给中方了,因为中方不同意把雷达站的位置透露给敌人。”

2003年2月,葛法蓝把自己保存的有关朝鲜战争期间细菌战的大部分资料交给了伦敦的“皇家战争博物馆”,李约瑟博士的相关档案资料也存放在那里。如果说朝鲜战争中美方使用细菌战纯粹是中、朝、苏的“政治谎言”,如果中朝的指控是一个骗局的话,那么这些著名科学家何必把资料档案交给皇家战争博物馆,而如果真是谎言,那么他们为何又不怕自己的声望英名受损呢?

跟中朝的证据相比,美方呢?除了对所有的人证物证一概否认,却根本拿不出有效有力的资料来证明自己的清白。

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外链图片需谨慎,可能会被源头改

Endicott 和 Hagerman在写《美国和细菌战:来自冷战早期和朝鲜的秘密》(1998年出版)一书过程中,了解到美国官方的档案部门有许多与美军在朝鲜实施细菌战有关的档案没有解密,有些被销毁。

比如,美国国家档案馆得到过美军化学武器部的各种记载。但是,1949年至1951年的档案资料目录的序言中说:“这些目录是(美国)军方在1956年把档案资料交到档案中心时准备的。目录是全部卷宗的一部分,反映了1956年当时的档案内容。1956年到1969年期间,一些档案被军方收回,另一些被销毁。现存记载是1969年由国家档案馆整理永久保存的。”

Not content to leave the matter in the hands of the civilians, the army recalled the Chemical Corps records from the National Archives in 1956. According to Washington archivists a number of documents were then culled and destroyed before the army returned the files to the archives thirteen years later. An example of these missing files is the Far East Command dossier on biological warfare. In the spring of 1952 that dossier originally had 25 items in it; after the cull there were 6 left, all of them dealing with defensive aspects of biological warfare, the use of gas masks etc.(8) One inference from this cleansing could clearly be that the Far East Command documents on the subject of offensive use of biological warfare were removed as ordered.

Public relations efforts to distract public attention from the true scope and intent of the US governments biological weapons program during the Korean War advanced further when army representatives appeared before a US Senate sub-committee hearing in 1977. The subject of the hearing, which was chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy, was US biological warfare programs. In his report to the committee Lt.Col. George A. Carruth misled the Congress and the American people by understating the funds spent on biological warfare during the Korean War and by claiming that the US had no offensive biological warfare program or capability and that BW weapons would only be used in retaliation, (9) subjects which we will turn to presently.

Endicott说,美国许多严肃的学者在读了他们的书以后要求美国政府向公众开放关于朝鲜战争期间细菌战活动的档案资料。但美国政府对该要求至今保持沉默。在这个问题上,就是《自由信息法案》也无能为力,这表明美国政府确实是在试图掩盖什么。

All the while the US government and its Central Intelligence Agency were operating under the guidance of a doctrine known as plausible deniability. dopted by the National Security Council in 1948, this doctrine, in the words of CIA chief William E. Colby, meant that if the United States could deny something and not be clearly demonstrated as having said something falsely, then the United States could do so. In other words certain United States government personnel and institutions could lie and cheat, do unpalatable, illegal or immoral things provided they could deny them successfully and not have the government tagged for them. Given these official guidelines is there any reason to be surprised that a secret offensive biological warfare project would, if necessary, become part of a carefully constructed and tangled web of disinformation and deceits?

Endicott 和 Hagerman在文章中揭露了加拿大1996年解密的文件,显示:这些文件的“失踪”是人为的,其中包括三位著名加拿大科学家1952年写的调查报告,他们在美国政府唆使下被解雇。三人都不任职政府生物战小组。另在90年代中期解密的文件表明,加拿大对外事务部也提交中方的证据给Prof. Guilford B. Reed,加拿大女王大学的生物战实验室负责人,也是领导加拿大和美国昆虫媒介计划的专家。Reed认为中国在1952年的证据是完全可行的,但建议对外事务部长Lester B. Pearson不要做公开讨论。

Western scholarship has tended to dismiss the Chinese and North Korean medical evidence. Recently declassified documents indicate that these dismissals were contrived. One of the most widely circulated of these dismissals was a 1952 report by three distinguished Canadian scientists instigated by the U.S. government. None of the three was on the governments biological warfare panel. On the other hand, documents declassified in the mid-1990s indicate that the Canadian Department of External Affairs also sent the evidence to Prof. Guilford B. Reed, head of the Canadian biological warfare laboratories at Queens University and perhaps the leading expert on insect vectors in the coordinated Canadian and U.S. programs. Reed concluded in 1952 that the Chinese evidence was entirely feasible, and recommended that Minister of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson avoid public discussion of the scientific aspects of the charges. (42) This document was kept secret until 1996.

而不象某些人认为,中国和朝鲜方面现在不提细菌战的事。朝鲜在2000年指控美国在朝鲜战争期间犯有“反人类罪”,要求成立“联合国战争罪特别调查团”进行调查,在给联合国的一份备忘录中,朝鲜抨击美国军队犯下酷刑,屠杀,狂轰滥炸平民和生物战。

来源:外链出处

不令人吃惊,美国照样抵赖。即便美国媒体普遍忽视Endicott 和 Hagerman的调查结论:美国的确在朝鲜战争中使用了细菌战,他们的研究得到了关于“战争罪”的知名专家的承认。“对于合理的人,” Endicott说,“我们认为,我们文件已经是无可置疑的。”

While the US media has generally ignored Endicott's and Hagerman's findings and the Clinton administration continues to stubbornly dismiss the evidence, their research has won critical recognition from reputable experts on war crimes. "For reasonable people," argues Endicott, "we think we've established documentation beyond a reasonable doubt."

外链出处

我在上一帖里提到,除了国际科学委员会的调查报告,人证物证,中朝方掌握了其他一些确凿的证据。曾参与对中朝两国进行细菌战、超过25名美军被俘虏的美国飞行员供认曾经使用过细菌武器的供词。其中包括一些高级军官,3名上校军衔的战俘分别详细供述了美国官方关于进行细菌战的决策情况,甚至谈到过美国参谋长联席会议决策在朝鲜实施细菌战的过程。这些军官包括美国空军第4战斗截击机飞行大队大队长瓦克马胡林上校、美国空军第49战斗轰炸机联队副联队长安德鲁埃文斯上校、美国海军陆战队第一航空兵联队参谋长弗兰克许威布尔(Colonel Frank H. Schwable)上校。

*Colonel Frank H. Schwable上校, 04429, 弗兰克于1952年7月8日被俘。 1953年2月,弗兰克在朝鲜广播供认美国在朝鲜实施细菌战的战略计划和行动的全部细节(下面链接里有完整的供词),在供词中,供认他驾驶飞机在朝鲜战区投掷过细菌弹,并且详细供述了美国官方关于进行细菌战的决策情况。 )

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Colonel Schwable说他来朝鲜之后,担任海军陆战队第一空军联队参谋长的职务,Colonel Arthur A. Binney将任务转交给他,包括一份美军在朝鲜实施生物战的总体规划纲要和海军陆战队航空部执行的详细时间表。在朝鲜的细菌战的总计划,是由美国参谋长联席会议在一九五一年十月指示的。在那一月,参谋长联席会议特派专人送给远东司令部总司令(当时是李奇微将军)一个指示,命令在朝鲜开始细菌战,最初是在一个小的、试验性的阶段,但逐渐扩大规模。

该指令传递到总指挥,远东空军,在东京的General Weyland。Weyland将军于是亲自召集了在朝鲜的第五航空队司令埃弗雷斯特将军,以及在远东空军直接指挥下作战的、驻在冲绳岛直属FEAF的的第十九轰炸机联队司令官,举行会议。

那一计划(我现在即将加以概述的)经过了研究,对于问题的大的方面取得了协议;而下述情报则由埃弗雷斯特将军亲自并口头地带回朝鲜,因为为了保密的目的,决定在朝鲜关于此事不得有可能被俘获的任何书面东西。

计划的主要目标是从一开始的测试到使用,根据现场条件下,各种要素的细菌战,并可能扩大范围测试,在稍后,根据在朝鲜获得的结果,成为常规作战武器。不同病菌的有效性,特别是它们的传播和疫情质量在各种不同的情况下都被进行测试,看是否每一种疾病对敌方行动造成了严重干扰破坏,还是只是造成轻微不便,或者是完全被控制,没有造成任何问题。

各种不同的武器装备或容器在不同条件下被测试,包括测试不同类型的飞机用来其作为细菌炸弹运载物的适应性。地形类型也要进行测试,包括高的地区,海岸地带,空旷地区,山谷地区,边远地区,相对毗邻地区。大小市镇、聚集在一起的城市以及相当分散的城市。各种可能的地区或是地区的各种可能的组合,都要加以试验。

这些试验的时期长短虽然不明确,但是要足以包括朝鲜任何极端的温度。(那么认为美军没有进行细菌战,并质疑在冬天放置苍蝇是愚蠢的方法,说是实在想象不出一个思维正常的指挥官会在不考虑这些作战条件下就采用这些手段的,现在应该明白为什么美军要如此做了)

一切可能的投放方法都被测试,包括从战术发展至包括最初夜间攻击,然后延伸至白天用特别中队轰炸炸弹袭击,以及各种组合的轰炸飞机从单一直至飞机编队,都进行了测试,美军为了混淆中朝方面采用管用的炸弹和细菌炸弹混在一起投放。特别是敌人的反应也被测试或以任何手段加以观察,以确定他有什么反措施,他将采取的什么样的宣传的步骤,以及在何种程度的军事行动会被这种战争(细菌战)的影响。

弗兰克在招供中还说,安全措施将被彻底的测试,我方和敌方。在我方,要采取一切可能的步骤来限制关于使用这种武器的消息并控制关于这个问题的情报。对敌方面,要千方百计的迷惑敌人,防止他们找到美军使用生物武器的证据。最后,如果情况有此需要,在继续在细菌战实验阶段,根据美国参谋长联席会议的指令,它可能扩大成为在朝鲜的军事或战术活动的一部分。

The B-29s from Okinawa began using bacteriological bombs in November, 1951, covering targets all over North Korea in what might be called

random bombing.

Orders were issued that bacteriological bombs were only to be dropped in conjunction with ordinary bombs or napalm, to give the attack the appearance of a normal attack against enemy supply lines. For added security over enemy territory, a napalm bomb was to remain on the aircraft until after the release of the bacteriological bombs so that if the aircraft crashed it would almost certainly burn and destroy the evidence.

命令被下达,细菌炸弹只能和普通的炸弹或者凝固汽油弹一起投掷,造成一种看上去象普通攻击敌人补给线的假象。为了在敌人领土上增加安全性,燃烧弹是放在飞机上,直到细菌炸弹投掷完后才释放,这样如果这架飞机坠毁,那几乎肯定会燃烧和毁灭证据。

*Colonel Frank H. Schwable在供词上的签名

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下面的链接里是Frank的供词的全文:

来源:外链出处

由于供词很长,我把它帖在主贴下面,可以查看链接:

Colonel Schwable供词part1

Colonel Schwable供词part2

弗兰克的供词里对美军细菌战的决策、目标、各个阶段的行动安排、包括参与行动的各飞行部队,等等等等叙述得详详细细。如果说美国的细菌战只是中朝的谎言,美俘招供是因为中朝方的逼供的话,那么一个真的完全不知真相的美军俘虏可能会因为逼供而瞎编,但无论如何也不能想象出这么完全的详情。稍微有点逻辑的,都不该怀疑!而美国面对人证,硬是抵赖。

而且,其他美俘的证词,也说明了美军的细菌战是有计划的,美国的确是和日本731合作!而当时美国不承认的,现在已经被证实了(见第一帖)

约翰·奎恩,美国空军中尉,军号是17993A的供词:

来源:美俘供词:我被迫参加美国华尔街发动的非人道的细菌战的经过

在一九五一年十二月十七日我到第八中队的传令室报到,我看见布告牌上有我的名字,叫我第二天九点钟去听课。。。室内有二十个人,都是驾驶员和领航员,除我和拉荪之外,还有罗伯兹少尉,史瓦兹中尉,罗吉士中尉,华生中尉,郎恩上尉,达费上尉,这些人都是领航员;何瓦斯上尉,兰德上尉,史密德中尉,皮生上尉,罗伯逊上尉,麦克阿立斯特中尉,他们都是驾驶员。

。。。。。。。。

讲课的人是从日本来的,是一个专家。接着他就介绍那位讲课的人,他是一个非军职人员,名叫阿西福克先生。

  他讲课时首先告诉我们他讲的是生物战争。

首先他告诉我们传播细菌的方法非常之多。细菌可以在任何地方,任何时候撒布,撒布的设备也已准备好了。他告诉我们,不能单独空投细菌,因为在阳光的直接照射之下,细菌在六十秒钟之内就会死亡。然而,细菌可以借多种不同的昆虫和啮齿类的动物而传播。这些昆虫和啮齿类动物已在实验室的条件下培养了好几代,所以选择它们是因为它们在任何时候任何地点,即使在最不利的条件下都能够生存

他举出几种传播细菌的方法,如利用灰尘像烟幕一样的放出去。细菌可以利用船只驶近海岸,在海风吹向岸上时同样地予以传播。细菌也可以利用低飞的喷气式飞机散布。他的意思是指任何类型的喷气式飞机。他又说,细菌可以利用附着在衣服上的虫子、跳蚤、苍蝇、虱子和蚊子而传播。这些虫子可以利用很多方法投下,如用盒子,盒子在阳光下变得很容易破碎,可让虫子爬出来,也可以用炸弹投下。他说,既然我们是驾驶B—26型飞机的,他愿详细地谈一谈用炸弹传播细菌的方法。接着他就拿一张绘有喷气式飞机(F—84)的图片让我们看,那飞机正在用翼尖上的油箱喷射出带有细菌的灰尘。他拿出一张有虫子的旧衣服的照片给我们看,那些虫子看起来像苍蝇和虱子,在衣服内爬着。这些虫子在衣服内可以保持得很温暖,虽然他又说,这些虫子也可以是经过挑选而培养的,以便它们可以耐寒,并且不吃东西也能活得很长久。

  

然后他拿一些可以用来投掷细菌的炸弹照片给我们看。这些炸弹除了没有信管之外,与我们平常所携载的五百磅普通炸弹极相像。他说炸弹的大小和形状是不重要的,重要的是里面所装的东西。他说炸弹是封了口的,自飞机上丢下后才打开,所以用此法携带细菌是很安全的。他给我们看的是一个五百磅炸弹的照片,弹壳很薄,不到四分之一英寸厚。他说,这些炸弹仍在实验的阶段,有好几种。他给我们看过一张照片,这上面的炸弹触地时便分裂为两半。另外一个炸弹在背后(靠近尾部转弯处)有门,炸弹触地时便会打开。这些门是由一个很小的电动马达打开的,这个电动马达和一个电池相连,电池在炸弹着地时才起作用。在炸弹触地以前,电池的金属板是用一片薄薄的塑胶片与液体隔开的。炸弹撞地的力量足以使液体冲塑胶片,这样液体便涂满了电池的金属板,马达于是便将炸弹的门都打开。。。

。。。所有他给我们看的图片中的炸弹,看起来都做得像普通的五百磅炸弹一样,但没有一个是绘有信管的。他告诉我们,他们也有些炸弹可在天空中裂开,装在盒子内的虫子可以在落地之前散布在面积较大的土地上。他告诉我们,这些盒子在阳光下会变得很易于破裂,虫子(苍蝇、跳蚤、蚊子)可以爬出来。他给我们看的三个炸弹的构造都是一样的,都像五百磅炸弹,弹壳很薄。给我们看的第一个炸弹是裂成两半的;第二个在背后近尾部有门;第三个的尾部已离开了炸弹体

美国指责说美俘招供是因为诱逼,但志愿军优待俘虏如今已是举世闻名的,并且大多数西方俘虏即使被释以后,也都否认在战俘营里被体罚或者被逼、强加供词等。反而美国送到联合国的八个战俘翻供声明却是在面对军事法庭审判等威胁下作出的。

美籍俘虏凯尼斯·罗埃德·伊纳克(空军中尉)在审询过程中坦白并讲了美军是用什么方法实施细菌的,为了保密称细菌弹为“不爆炸的炸弹”,并且交代了美方撒布细菌的具体方法,

来源:

美俘供词:美国帝国主义如何发动细菌战争的真相

威尔逊先生的授课内容如下:

  撒布细菌本身的方法是:

  

1、投掷装满了混有尘埃与细菌的炸弹,这种炸弹将在半空中即打开来,并借风力散播带有细菌的尘埃。

  2、利用喷雾器装置,由飞机直接散布尘埃,因此在散布尘埃的地方,空气中即有细菌。

  3、或者投掷装满细菌尘埃的容器或炸弹,这一类容器会在水中开启,也可以用会被水渗湿后启开的硬纸盒,把它投到贮水池或湖沼中,这些地方的水是人和动物都要饮用的,并且这些地方的昆虫会染上细菌并传播它们。

  投掷昆虫的方法是:

  

1、投掷外形和普通炸弹一样的细菌弹,但这种炸弹中,装满了带有细菌的昆虫,这种炸弹触地后即开启并放散出这些昆虫来。

  2、投掷盛有昆虫的硬纸制容器,这种容器触地后即行裂开,昆虫就会带着细菌逸散出来。

  3、或以动物散播昆虫。

  以动物散播细菌的方法是:

  1、以装有降落伞的容器投放老鼠、兔子或其他小野物,这种容器触地后即放出这类动物,这些动物遍身沾满带有细菌的虱子和跳蚤。

  2、或用船只把这类动物从敌人后方海岸放到陆上。

  亦有其他撒布细菌方法:

  

1、投掷带有细菌的传单,大便纸,信封及其他纸制物品。

  2、投掷混有细菌之肥皂或衣服。

  3、投掷装有细菌的墨水的自来水笔。

  4、或给敌军部队投掷沾染细菌之食物。

  也可以从榴弹炮或迫击炮的炮弹中放射细菌,但因距前线太近,这一做法不安全。

据我所知,B——26型飞机是唯一用来投掷普通细菌弹的,这种细菌弹看上去与平常炸弹一样。究竟B——26并不适合用以投掷其他种类的武器。传单是由B——29型及C——46与C——47型运输机投掷,但主要是用B——29投掷。运输机最适合于投掷所有其他类型的细菌武器。例如硬纸盒,带降落伞的容器及衣服、食物、肥皂、纸张和自来水笔。B——29也能投掷这些武器。

至于说到我们甚么时候开始使用细菌弹,大约在年初,即约于一九五二年一月一日,因为这是我们所有的人接到注意“不爆炸的炸弹”的通知的日子。大概在其他单位,如第四百五十二轰炸联队,也是在同一时间开始进行细菌战。

还有其他美俘虏的供词,这里就不一一贴出来。面对这么多的供词,美方相当的震惊,后来即便把翻供送到联合国,美国政府的心理战委员会也认为这样简单‘翻供’不太可信,只能大量制造所谓那些美俘是被brainwash的舆论和用各种方法cover up。。。

【整理原创】朝鲜战争中的细菌战四(系列终结篇)

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本帖一共被 5 帖 引用 (帖内工具实现)
家园 Colonel Schwable供词part1

I am Colonel Frank H. Schwable, 04429, and was

Chief of Staff of the First Marine Aircraft Wing until shot down and captured on July 8, 1952.

My service with the Marine Corps began in 1929 and I was designated an aviator in 1931, seeing duty in many parts of the world. Just before I came to Korea, I completed a tour of duty in the Division of Aviation at Marine Corps Headquarters.

DIRECTIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I arrived in Korea on April 10, 1952, to take over

my duties as Chief of Staff of the First Marine Air-

craft Wing. All my instructions and decisions were

subject to confirmation by the Assistant Commanding

General, Lamson-Scribner. Just before I assumed fullresponsibility for the duties of Chief of Staff, General Lamson-Scribner called me into his office to talk over various problems of the Wing. During this conversation he said: "Has Binney given you all the background on the special missions run by VMF-513?" I asked him if he meant "suprop" (our code name for bac- teriological bombs) and he confirmed this. I told him I had been given all the background by Colonel Binney.

Colonel Arthur A. Binney, the officer I relieved as

Chief of Staff, had given me, as his duties required

that he should, an outline of the general plan of bac- teriological warfare in Korea and the details of the part played up to that time by the First Marine Air- craft Wing.

The general plan for bacteriological warfare in Korea was directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in October, 1951. In that month the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a directive by hand to the Commanding General, Far East Command (at that time General Ridgway), directing the initiation of bac- teriological warfare in Korea on an initially small, experimental stage but in expanding proportions.

This directive was passed to the Commanding General, Far East Air Force, General Weyland, in Tokyo.General Weyland then called into personal conference General Everest, Commanding General of the Fifth Air Force in Korea, and also the Commander of the Nineteenth Bomb Wing at Okinawa, which unit operates directly under FEAF.

The plan that I shall now outline was gone over, the

broad aspects of the problem were agreed upon and

the following information was brought back to Korea

by General Everest, personally and verbally, since for security purposes it was decided not to have anything in writing on this matter in Korea and subject to possible capture.

OBJECTIVES

The basic objective was at that time to test, under

field conditions, the various elements of bacteriological warfare, and to possibly expand the field tests, at a later date, into an element of the regular combat operations, depending on the results obtained and the situation in Korea.

The effectiveness of the different diseases available was to be tested, especially for their spreading or epidemic qualities under various circumstances, and to test whether each disease caused a serious disrup tion to enemy operations arid civilian routine or just minor inconveniences, or was contained completely, causing no difficulties.

Various types of armament or containers were to

be tried out under field conditions and various types of aircraft were to be used to test their suitability as bacteriological bomb vehicles.

Terrain types to be tested included high areas,seacoast areas, open spaces, areas enclosed by mountains, isolated areas, areas relatively adjacent to one another, large and small towns and cities, congested it's and those relatively spread out. These tests were to be extended over an unstated period of time but sufficient to cover all extremes of temperature found in Korea.

All possible methods of delivery were to be tested

as well as tactics developed to include initially night attack and then expanding into day attack by specialized Squadrons Various types of bombing were to be tried out, and various combinations of bombing, from single planes up to and including formations of planes, were to be tried out, with bacteriological bombs used in conjunction with conventional bombs. Enemy reactions were particularly to be tested or observed by any means available to ascertain what his counter-measures would be, what propaganda steps he would take, and to what extent his military operations would be affected by this type of warfare.

Security measures were to be thoroughly tested

both friendly and enemy. On the friendly ride, all possible steps were to be taken to confine knowledge of the use of this weapon and to control information on the subject. On the enemy side, every possible means was to be used to deceive the enemy and prevent his actual proof that the weapon was being used. Finally, if the situation warranted, while continuing the experimental phase of bacteriological warfare according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive, it might be expanded to become a part of the military or tactical effort in Korea.

INITIAL STAGE

The B-29s from Okinawa began using bacteriolog-

ical bombs in November, 1951, covering targets

all over North Korea in what might be called

random bombing. One night the target might be in Northeast Korea and the next night in Northwest Korea. Their bacteriological bomb operations were conducted in combination with normal night armed reconnaissance as a measure of economy and security.

Early in January 1952, General Schilt, then Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing,was called to Fifth Air Force Headquarters in Seoul, where General Everest told him of the directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ordered him to have VMF-513-Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513 of Marine Aircraft Group 33 of the First Marine Air-craft Wing-participate in the bacteriological warfare program. VMF-513 was based on K8, the AirForce base at Kunsan of the Third Bomb Wing, whoseB-26s had already begun bacteriological operations.VMF-513 was to be serviced by the Third Bomb Wing.

While all marine aircraft (combat types) shore based

in Korea operate directly under the Fifth Air Force,

with the First Marine Aircraft Wing being kept in-

formed of their activities, when a new or continuing

program is being initiated, the Fifth Air Force normally has initially informed the Wing as a matter of courtesy.

Towards the end of January 1952, Marine night fighters of Squadron 513, operating as single

planes on night armed reconnaissance, and carrying

bacteriological bombs, shared targets with the B-26s

covering the lower half of North Korea with the

greatest emphasis on the western portion. Squadron

513 coordinated with the Third Bomb Wing on all

these missions, using F7F aircraft (Tiger Cats) because of their twin engine safety.

K8 (Kunsan) offered the advantage of take-off

directly over the water, in the event of engine failure, and both the safety and security of over-water flights to enemy territory.

For security reasons, no information on the types

of bacteria being used was given to the First Marine

Aircraft Wing. In March 1952, General Schilt was again called to Fifth Air Force Headquarters and verbally directed by General Everest to prepare Marine Photographic Squadron I (VMJ-1 Squadron) of Marine Aircraft Group 33, to enter the program. VMJ-1 based on K3, Marine Aircraft Group 33's base at Pohang, Korea,was to use F2H-2P photographic reconnaissance aircraft (Banshees).

The missions would be intermittent and combined

with normal photographic missions and would be

scheduled by the Fifth Air Force in separate, top-secret orders.

The Banshees were brought into the program because

of their specialized operations, equipment, facilities and isolated area of operations at K3. They could penetrate further into North Korea as far as enemy counteraction is concerned and worked in two-plane sections involving a minimum of crews and disturbance of normal missions. They could also try out bombing from high altitudes in horizontal flight in conjunction with photographic runs.

During March 1952, the Banshees of Marine Photo-

graphic Squadron 1 commenced bacteriological opera-

tions, continuing and expanding the bacteriological

bombing of North Korean towns, always combining

these operations with normal photographic missions.

Only a minimum of bomb supplies were kept on hand

to reduce storage problems, and the Fifth Air Force

sent a team of two officers and several men to Y\3

(Pohang) to instruct the marine specialists in handling the bombs.

The Navy's part in the program was with the F9Fs(Panthers), ADs (Skyraiders) and standard F2Hs

(Banshees), which as distinct from the photographi--

configuration, used carriers off the east coast of Korea.The Air Force had also expanded its own operations to include squadrons of different type aircraft, with different methods and tactics of employing bacterio-logical warfare.

This was the situation up to my arrival in Korea.

Subsequent thereto, the following main events took

place.

OPERATIONAL STAGE

During the latter part of May 1952, the new Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing,General Jerome, was called to Fifth Air Force

Headquarters and given a directive for expanding bacteriological operations. The directive was given personally and verbally by the new Commanding General of the Fifth Air Force, General Barcus.

On the following day, May 25, General Jerome out-

lined the new stage of bacteriological operations to

the Wing staff at a meeting in his office at which I was present in my capacity as Chief of Staff.

The other staff members of the First Marine Air-

craft Wing present were: General Lamson-Scribner,

Assistant Commanding General;, Colonel Stage, Inter-

ligence Officer (G2); Colonel Wendt, Operations Officer (G3) and Colonel Clark, Logistics Officer (G4). The directive from General Barcus, transmitted to and discussed by us that morning, was as follows:

A contamination bell was to be established across

Korea in an effort to make the interdiction program

effective in stopping enemy supplies from reaching the front lines. The Marines would take the left flank of this belt, to include the two cities of Sinanju and Kunuri and the area between and around them. The remainder of the belt would be handled by the Air Force in the centre and the Navy in the east or right flank.

Marine Squadron 513 would be diverted from its

random targets to this concentrated target, operating from K8 (Kunsan) stiff serviced by the Third Bomb Wing, using F7Fs (Tiger Cats) because of their twin engine safety. The Squadron was short of these aircraft but more were promised.

The responsibility for contaminating the left flank

and maintaining the contamination was assigned to

the Commander of Squadron 513, and the schedule of operations left to the Squadron's discretion, subject

to the limitations that:

The initial contamination of the area was to be

completed as soon as possible and the area must then be recontaminated or replenished at periods not to exceed ten days.

Aircraft engaged on these missions would be given

a standard night armed reconnaissance mission, usually in the Haeju Peninsula. On the way to the target, however, these lanes would go via Sinanju or Kunuri, drop their bacteriological bombs and then complete their normal missions. This would add to the security and interfere least with normal missions.

Reports on this program of maintaining the contamination belt would go direct to the Fifth Air Force,reporting normal mission numbers so-and-so had been completed "via Sinanju" or "via Kunuri" and stating how many "superpropaganda" bombs had been dropped. Squadron 513 was directed to make a more accurate "truck count" at night than had been customary in order to determine or defect any significant change in the flow off traffic through its operating area.

General Barcus also directed that Marine Aircraft

Group 12 of the First Marine Aircraft Wing was to

prepare to enter the bacteriological program. First the ADs (Skyraiders) and then the F4Us (Corsairs) were to take part in the expanded program, initially, however, only as substitute for the F7Fs....General Jerome further reported that the Fifth Air Force required Marine Photographic Squadron I to continue their current bacteriological operations, operating from K3 (Pohang). At the same time Marine Aircraft Group 33 at K3 was placed on a stand-by, last resort, basis. Owing to the distance of K3 from the target area, - large-scale participation in the, program by Marine Aircraft Group 33 was not desired. Because the F9Fs (Panthers) would only be used in an emergency, no special bomb supply would be established over and above that needed to supply the photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Bombs could be brought up from Ulsan in a few hours- if necessary. The plans and the ramifications thereof were discussed at General Jerome's conference and arrangements made to transmit the directive to the officers concerned with carrying out the new program.

It was decided that Colonel Wendt would initially

transmit this information to the commanders concerned and the details could be discussed by the cognizant staff officers as soon as they were worked out.


本帖一共被 1 帖 引用 (帖内工具实现)
家园 Colonel Schwable供词part2

FIRST MAW'S OPERATIONS

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513

Next day then, May 26, Colonel Wendt held a conference with the Commanding Officer of Squadron 513 and, I believe, the K8 Air Base Commander and the Commanding Officer of the Third Bomb Wing, and

discussed the various details.

The personnel of the Fifth Air Force were already

cognizant of the plan, having been directly informed

by Fifth, Air Force Headquarters.

Since the plan constituted for Squadron 513 merely

a change of target and additional responsibility to

maintain their own schedule of contamination of their area, there were no real problems to be solved.

During the first week of June, Squadron 513 started operations on the concentrated contamination belt,using cholera bombs. (The plan given to General Jerom indicated that at a later, unspecified date-depending on the results obtained, or lack of results-yellow fever and then typhus in that order would probably he tried out in the contamination belt.)

Squadron 513 operated in this manner throughout

June and during the first week in July that I was with the Wing, without any incidents of an unusual nature. An average of five aircraft a night normally covered the main supply routes along the western coast of Korea up to the Chong Chon River but with emphasis on the area from Phy6ngyang southward. They diverted as necessary to Sinanju or Kunuri and the area between in order to maintain the ten-day bacteriological replenishment cycle.

We estimated that if each airplane carried two bac-

teriological bombs, two good nights were ample to

cover both Sinanju and Kunuri and a third night would cover the area around and between these cities.

About the middle of June, as best I remember, the Squadron received a modification to the plan

from the U.S. Fifth Air Force via the Third Bomb Wing. This new directive included an area of about ten miles surrounding the two principal cities in the Squadron's schedule, with particular emphasis on towns or hamlets on the lines of supply and any by-pass roads.

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Colonel Wendt later held a conference at K6

(Pyongtaek) at which were present the Commanding

Officer, Colonel Gaylor, the Executive Officer and the Operations Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 12.

Colonel Wendt informed them that they were to make

preparations to take part in the bacteriological operations and to work out security problems which would become serious if they got into daylight operations and had to bomb up at their own base K6. They were to inform the squadron commanders concerned but only the absolute barest number of a additional personnel, and were to have a list of a limited number of hand-picked pilots ready to be used on short notice. Colonel Wendt informed them that an Air Force team would soon be provided to assist with logistic problems, this team actually arriving the last week in June.

Before my capture on July 8, both the ADs (Skyraid-

ers) and the F4Us (Corsairs) of Marine Aircraft

Group 12 had participated in very small numbers, once or twice, in daylight bacteriological operations as a part of regular scheduled, normal day missions, bombing up at K8 (Kunsan), rendezvousing with the rest of the formation on the way to the target.

These missions were directed at small towns in Western Korea along the main road leading south from Kunuri and were a part of the normal interdiction program.

Marine Aircraft Group 33

Colonel Wendt passed the plan for the Wing's participation in bacteriological operations to Colonel Condon, Commanding Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 33, on approximately May 27-28.

Since the Panthers (F9Fs) at the Group's base at

Pohang would only be used as 1ast resort aircraft, it was left to Colonel Condon's discretion as to just what personnel he would pass the information on to but it was to be an absolute minimum.

During the time I was with the Wing, none of these

aircraft had been scheduled for bacteriological mis-

sions, though the photographic reconnaissance planes

of the Group's VMJ-1 Squadron continued their mis-

sions from that base.

SCHEDULING AND SECURITY

Security was by far the most pressing problem affecting the First Marine Aircraft Wing, since the operational phase of bacteriological warfare, as well as other types of combat operations, is controlled by the Fifth Air Force.

Absolutely nothing could appear in writing on the

subject. The word "bacteria" was not to be mentioned in any circumstances in Korea, except initially to identify "superpropaganda" or "suprop."

Apart from the routine replenishment operations of

Squadron 513, which required no scheduling, bacteriological missions were scheduled by separate, top-secret, mission orders (or "FRAG" orders). These stated only to include "superpropaganda" or "suprop"

on mission number so-and-so of the routine secret

"FRAG" order for the day's operations. -Mission

reports went back the same way by separate, top-

secret dispatch, stating the number of "suprop" bombs dropped on a specifically numbered mission.

Other than this, Squadron 513 reported their bac-

teriological missions by adding "via Kunuri" or "via

Sinanju" to their normal mission reports.

Every means was taken to deceive the enemy and to deny knowledge of these operations to friendly personnel, the latter being most important since 300 to 400 men of the Wing are rotated back to the United States each month.

Orders were issued that bacteriological bombs were

only to be dropped in conjunction with ordinary bombs or napalm, to give the attack the appearance of a normal attack against enemy supply lines. For added security over enemy territory, a napalm bomb was to remain on the aircraft until after the release of the bacteriological bombs so that if the aircraft crashed it would almost certainly burn and destroy the evidence.

All officers were prohibited from discussing the subject except officially and behind closed doors. Every briefing was to emphasize that this was not only a military secret, but a matter of national policy.

I personally have never heard the subject mentioned

or even referred to outside of the office, and I ate all of my meals in the Commanding General's small private mess, where many classified matters were discussed.

ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS

In the Wing, our consensus of opinion was that

results of these bacteriological operations could not be accurately assessed. Routine methods of assessment are by (presumably) spies, by questioning prisoners of war, by watching the nightly truck count very carefully to observe deviations from the normal, and by observing public announcements of Korean and Chinese authorities upon which very heavy dependence was placed, since it was felt that no large epidemic could occur without news leaking out to the outside world and that these authorities would, therefore, announce it themselves.

Information from the above sources is correlated at the Commander-in-Chief, Far East level in Tokyo, but the over-all assessment of results is not passed down to the Wing level, hence the Wing was not completely aware of the results.

When I took over from Colonel Binney I asked him

for results or reactions up to date and he specifically said: "Not worth a damn."

No one that I know of has indicated that the results

are anywhere near commensurate with the effort, danger and dishonesty involved, although the Korean and Chinese authorities have made quite a public report of early bacteriological bomb efforts. The sum total of results known to me are that they are disappointing and no good.

PERSONAL REACTIONS

I do not say the following in defence of anyone,

myself included, I merely report as an absolutely direct observation that every officer when first informed that the United States is using bacteriological warfare in Korea is both shocked and ashamed.

I believe, without exception, we come to Korea as

officers loyal to our people and government and believing what we have always been told about bacteriological warfare that it is being developed only for use in retaliation in a third world war.

For these officers to come to Korea and find that

their own government has so completely deceived them

by still proclaiming to the world that it is not using bacteriological warfare, makes them question mentally all the other things that the government proclaims about warfare in general and in Korea specifically.

None of us believes that bacteriological warfare has

any place in war since of all the weapons devised bacteriological bombs alone have as their primary objective casualties among masses of civilians-and that is utterly wrong in anybody's conscience. The spreading of disease is unpredictable and there may be no limits to a fully developed epidemic.

Additionally, there is the awfully sneaky, unfair sort of feeling of dealing with a weapon used surreptitiously against an unarmed and

unwarned people.

I remember specifically asking Colonel Wendt what

were Colonel Gaylor's reactions when he was first informed and he reported to me that Colonel Gaylor was both horrified and stupefied. Everyone felt like that when they first heard of it, and their reactions are what might well be expected from a fair-minded, self-respecting nation of people.

Tactically, this type of weapon is totally unwarranted-it is not even a Marine Corps weapon-morally it is damnation itself; administratively and logistically as planned for use, it is hopeless; and from the point of view of self-respect and loyalty, it is shameful.

F. H. Schwable, 04429

Colonel, U.S.M.C.

6 December, 1952


本帖一共被 1 帖 引用 (帖内工具实现)
家园 先花

等MM贴完了我再提出我的疑问

家园 供词和国际报告书在超星图书馆都有下载

  “……看过这些‘新证据’后,我有时有这样的感想,那些批评黑皮书的人或者是对委员会所做工作有保留意见的人没有认真读过黑皮书”。

  窃以为这话仍然很有针对性,而且这个针对性也包括西西河参与讨论的相关人士。

  调查在朝鲜和中国的细菌战事实 国际科学委员会报告书

  揭穿美帝国主义进行细菌战的真相 (美国战俘的供词)


本帖一共被 1 帖 引用 (帖内工具实现)
家园 已解决
家园 啊。。。你明白我的意思。。。谢谢指出,我改了:

并且大多数西方俘虏即使被释以后,也都否认在战俘营里被体罚或者被逼、强加供词等。

家园 关于战俘

"不否认在战俘营里被体罚或者被逼"?笔误吧

家园 给你送宝了。唉,如果你早说,我也不用这么累的找俘虏供词了

光找这些资料就花了我好多宝贵时间

谢谢:作者意外获得【通宝】一枚

鲜花已经成功送出,可通过工具取消

提示:此次送花为此次送花为【有效送花赞扬,涨乐善、声望】。

家园 看贴仔细,是笔误。。。谢谢,改好了

家园 呵呵,俺不知道,这儿还有一个口供……

彻底揭露美帝国主义的细菌战计划(书末附两位美空军校官的供词原文)

——也就是思炎MM提供的英文版供词的中文版。

家园 支持思炎的文章,那些为美国狡辩的任何人和文章,

不过是心虚的表现罢了。

家园 这句是怎么回事儿?——

……,“我们认为,我们已经文件是无可置疑的。”

是否应为“已有”?

家园 好了,现在我开始提出我的疑问了

第一次写这么正式的文字,这是我上网15年来头一次这么认真地查这么多资料,虽然是网络的。

要论证朝鲜战争期间,发生在我国和朝鲜范围内的鼠疫、霍乱是否是美军释放的细菌武器所致,就必须得到双方的第一手材料,但很明显,这是不太显示的。那么我们只能用一步步地推测,

尽量缩小各种可能性,以获得可能性最大的结果。

首先从我在网络上搜索到的物证来看。所有涉及到美军细菌炸弹的照片,请注意,是照片,基本都是有问题的。除了著名的宣传弹被当成细菌弹以外,在思MM贴的照片中,第二张照片里的那

个玩意,是不是跟下面这张图里的东西比较象?(友情提示,本图打开时会报毒)

http://dl.zhishi.sina.com.cn/upload/24/22/64/1240242264.8369471.jpg

这个东西,就是伞降照明弹。

除了细菌载具以外,我们没有看到任何细菌感染者的照片,没看到任何详细的疫情报告。基本所有公开的资料,都是很含糊地提到美军投放了细菌炸弹,炮弹等。

好吧,那我们先看看整个细菌战期间,发生了些什么事,以下内容来自中文wiki:

——————————————————————————————

1951年5月8日,朝鲜外交部长电告联合国安理会:从1950年12月至1951年1月,美国在朝鲜使用细菌武器并散播天花。

5月19日、24日和25日,中国政府发表声明说,美国正在准备使用细菌战,并且指责美国在朝鲜战场使用毒气,以便为细菌战做实验检查。

9月22日,中国政府再次发表声明,重申上述指责。

9月,共产主义外围组织民主律师国际协会(the International Association of Democratic Lawyers)决定派一个委员会赴朝鲜调查各类“违反国际法的行为”。

1952年1月28日,中国人民志愿军总部在一项报告中说:美国的飞机掌握北朝鲜制空权,并偶尔飞越中国领空散播天花病菌。报告认为这是导致当时爆发的霍乱、瘟疫以及其他传染病的原因。

中国政府旋即命令取证调查,并派传染病防治人员赴朝鲜。

2月18日中国人民解放军代总参谋长聂荣臻发电给毛泽东和周恩来,商讨取证调查事宜,并说:我们必须要求苏联细菌专家及设备的帮助。聂荣臻同时命令中国人民解放军总后勤部卫生部门开

始相应的准备工作。

2月19日,毛泽东将聂荣臻的来电转批周恩来:请注意这个问题并为此做出必要的准备。

1952年2月21日,毛泽东给史达林发电报,状告美帝国主义在中国东北使用细菌武器。

1952 年2月22日,朝鲜外交部长白汉永(Bak Hun Yung)再度发表官方声明,指称美国在朝鲜战场使用细菌战。声明说,美国飞机分别于1月18日、29日,2月11、13、15、16日在北朝鲜地区

空投了数种携带瘟疫、霍乱及其他细菌的昆虫。与此同时,北朝鲜的广播电台也报导说,在平壤北部发现了美国的细菌弹,里面装满了能够在寒冷气候下生存的带菌苍蝇。

同一日,在庆祝社会主义阵营“反殖民主义国际日”之后,苏联发表声明,指责美国使用细菌战。

2月24日,在调查取证没有任何结果的情况下,中国外交部长周恩来发表声明,支持北韩政府对美国的指控。与此同时,中国卫生组织公布:中国东北部等地也发现了带菌昆虫。

美军在韩战中使用细菌弹的消息立即通过官方控制媒体传遍社会主义阵营中的各国。事实上,早在半年前的1951年夏季,北朝鲜已经大面积流行过瘟疫。而几乎没有卫生设施和条件的中国人

民志愿军士兵中,各种传染病如斑疹伤寒、天花、霍乱等等,也开始大面积流行。由于几乎没有医药可以救治,众多的中国军人不是死于战斗,而是死于流行病。

2月28日,聂荣臻再度发电给毛、周二人,指称美国仍然在38度线一带和50军团上空散播带菌昆虫。并报告说,他已经动员44位中国昆虫学家、细菌学家、传染病学家、毒素学家、病理学家和

营养学家赴朝,次日抵达前线。

也是2月,苏联驻联合国代表拉科波·马利克(Lacob Malik),在联合国会议上指责美国在朝鲜战场使用化学武器。

3 月4日,沉默多日的美国终于开口。美国国务卿迪安·艾奇逊(Dean Acheson)发表声明说:“我想清晰、明确地指出,这些指责是完全错误的。联合国军过去没有,现在也没有使用任何种

类的细菌战。”艾奇逊在声明中同时要求指控美国使用细菌武器的国家,允许国际红十字会调查团前往调查。

3月4日,国际社会主义阵营的组织,民主律师国际协会派出的委员会进入北朝鲜,进行调查。

3月8日,中国官方新闻媒体开始大规模报道关于美国在朝鲜战场使用细菌战的消息。首先是外交部长周恩来发表声明,严重抗议美国政府用细菌武器屠杀中国人民。声明说:“美军侵略军自

1952年1月28日在朝鲜发动大规模的细菌战之后,又自2月29日起至3月5日止,先后以军用飞机68批、448架次侵入中国东北领空,并在抚顺、新民、安东、宽甸、临江等地散布大量传播细菌的

昆虫……。美国政府为了要达到其扩大朝鲜战争、破坏远东和世界和平的目的,不仅在朝对和平人民朝中人民武装力量使用了国际公约和人类道德所绝对禁止的细菌武器,甚至还扩大这种罪

行,对于中国东北的和平人民,也使用这一非法的细菌武器,来进行野蛮的挑舋。”声明接着说,“对于美国政府这种公然破坏国际公约,违反人道的残暴行为,中国人民是绝对不能容忍的

。”

周恩来还指责美国使用蛤蚧、纸包、衣物包装、各种陶器和金属制品作为容器,以蜘蛛等节肢类动物和小型啮齿类动物等18种带菌动物,散播家禽白血病等动、植物病菌[7]。官方报纸《人民

日报》发表社论,要求严惩撒布细菌的美国凶手。中国政协、中共和十二个民主党派、团体联合发表了《对于美帝国主义进行细菌战的抗议书》。

3月11号,在发表否认声明并要求指责国家允许国际社会进行调查的一个星期之后,美国国务卿艾奇逊直接向国际红十字会发出要求,希望在有关地区进行调查。

3月12日,国际红十字会对美国政府的请求做出反应:按照国际惯例接受这一请求,并立即向中国政府和北韩政府提出申请,希望调查行动得到中国和北韩的合作。并告知,印度政府将对调查

行动提供必要的帮助。国际红红十字会计划由一名巴基斯坦代表、两名印度代表和三名瑞士代表组成的小型调查团,赴事发地展开调查工作。

3月15日,中国政府组成“美帝国主义细菌战罪行调查团”开始就美国使用细菌武器一事,分赴朝鲜和中国东北进行调查。

3月19日,社会主义阵营的组织,民主律师国际协会派出的委员会结束在北朝鲜的调查。

3月中旬,联合国军总指挥马修·李奇微将军再度否认关于细菌战的指控,他并补充说:“设计出这些指控,明明是为了掩盖共产主义者在对付一年一度普遍发生在中国和北朝鲜的传染病的无

能和及时救助牺牲者工作方面的无能。”

3月20日,联合国秘书长特吕格韦·赖伊把世界卫生组织将就美国在北韩散布细菌的指控提供调查的议案,以电报形式发往平壤,征询意见。

3月26日以后,美国国务卿迪安·艾奇逊再度公开正式否认对美国的这项指控。

3月20日至27日,民主律师委员会在北京进行调查。

3月28日,国际红十字会就调查美国使用细菌武器一案,再度向中国、北韩发出请求合作的呼吁。

3月29日,联合国秘书长特吕格韦·赖伊再度将世界卫生组织就美国在北韩散播细菌提供调查的议案,以电报形式发往平壤政府,征询回答。

3月中旬至4月中旬,苏联新闻媒体以其四分之一的版面和内容,大力宣传“美国使用生物战”。

3月下旬,平壤官方公布:美军在朝鲜北部散布细菌达八百多次,散布范围达四十多个郡。但对联合国和国际红十字会的调查要求置之不理。

3月29日,联合国秘书长特吕格韦·赖伊三度将世界卫生组织将对在北韩战场散播传染病一事提供调查的议案发往平壤。

3月31日,国际红十字会第三度向中国、北韩发出请求合作调查的呼吁。

同日,民主律师国际协会委派的委员会的调查报告在北京发表,指责美国在1951年5月6日至1952年1月9日期间,使用化学武器。

4 月2日,民主律师国际协会委派的委员会在北京发表第二份报告。报告指控美国军队在中国领土使用细菌武器,违反1925年日内瓦关于禁止使用细菌武器的公约和1948年种族灭绝公约

[Genocide Convention of 1948]。这个委员会直接接受了指控者所提供的证据及其结论。报告结论说:“我们认为上述事实构成了美国的侵略行径、美国的种族灭绝特别是反人类的罪行。它

如同一个重大威胁胁迫著全世界,其限度和影响无法预知。”

4月6日,联合国秘书长特吕格韦·赖伊第四次向北韩政府发出请求,要求允许并配合世界卫生组织进入朝鲜有关地区进行调查。北韩对此事继续置之不理。

4月7号,中国政府自己的调查委员会发表报告,报告指出:美国政府对中华人民共和国采取野蛮的和卑劣侵略行经。不仅犯下了侵略罪行,而且犯下了反人类的罪行。

4月10日,国际红十字会第四次向中国政府、北韩政府发出呼吁,要求准许红十字会调查团进入北朝鲜和中国有关地区进行调查。并表示,如果在4月20日以前,北京政府、平壤政府仍然不做

出回应,红十字会将视为对这一请求的否决。

4月30日,由于中国政府和朝鲜政府都没有回答国际红十字会的多次请求,国际红十字会表示,决定停止有关这项调查的努力。

5月22日,联合国军指挥马修·李奇微将军在再度 声明否认这项指控。他说:“联合国军没有任何必要,在任何时间、以任何形式,使用细菌战和毒气战”。

6 月23日至8月31日,在苏联的建议和组织下,社会主义阵营的一个组织,世界和平会议(World Peace Council)”组成的一个“国际科学委员会(International Scientific Commission)

”,以李约瑟博士为首,进入北朝鲜和中国,进行调查。

9月,国际科学委员会在北京提交了调查报告。报告长达669页。报告在没有独立的实地考察和分析,没有独立确证任何呈交给他们的样品材料的情况下,就将他们收到的证词(其中包括美国

空军战俘的证词)直接列为事实。

——————————————————————————————

从里面的措辞能够看出,这些文字是偏向西方的。但也揭示了一些基本情况,即爆发了霍乱、鼠疫等疫情,我国自己的说法里还增加了脑炎。但是,这些疾病在我国并不是罕见疾病,其中鼠

疫甚至在当时正在我国爆发:

“从1884年鼠疫流行开始到1952年鼠疫终止流行, 此起彼伏不断流行了68年次,当时福建区划68个县市, 而染疫县市达57个, 占全省县市数的84%。12118个村街染疫(29358疫村次), 发病

825512人, 死亡712466人。

从1900-1951年, 每年染疫达20~40个县市, 流行时间最长,疫点最多的县为莆田, 累计达65年次, 染疫村占该县总村数的94%。”

http://www.ahage.net/shihai/4096_4.html

另据该文记载,1950年-1952年期间,在我国云南地区也在流行鼠疫。另外,江西在1949年以前,鼠疫一直是其地方病。福建的疫情一直到1954年才控制住(http://www.zhong-

yao.net/cr/shuyi/cs/200903/164186_2.html),而且该文还主要分析了鼠疫的爆发与流行原因,其中地方风俗是一个很重要的流行原因。甚至直到现在,我国的鼠疫疫情仍然时有发作。

以上资料表明,鼠疫完全有可能由某个地区造成自然性突发,而且我国至今对鼠疫的监控都比较薄弱。

霍乱也是这样,条件合适就有可以造成自然性突发。我注意到,霍乱的爆发并不受季节限制,其传染不仅通过苍蝇等生物媒介,饮用不干净的水源也可能导致霍乱的流行——类似原因的例子

则是1850年代英国伦敦的霍乱流行。

因此,以上两种传染病是具有一定自然突发可能的。当然我们也不能排除美军投放细菌炸弹的可能。那么我们现在开始分析美军投放细菌炸弹说法中的一些细节。

首先,声称炸弹的落点周围发现大量老鼠、跳蚤、苍蝇、蜘蛛等带菌生物。疑点一,蜘蛛不适合作为细菌载体。这说明现场报告人员很可能不具备基本的微生物或者昆虫学知识。二没有说明

这些生物的状态。尤其是苍蝇,虽然自然环境下苍蝇可以在低温存活,但是有一个相当不利于进行生物战的状态:

“苍蝇的活动受温度影响很大。它在4~7℃时仅能爬行, 10~15℃时可以飞翔,20℃以上才能摄食、交配、产卵,30~ 35℃时尤其活跃,35~40 ℃因过热而停止活动,45 ~47 ℃时致死。

原文:http://www.yangzhihu.com/cangyingyangzhi/522.html

看出来没有?气温在7摄氏度以下,苍蝇就不能飞行了,4度以下连爬行都不可能了。很明显,在冬天的东北和朝鲜,气温经常在零下的条件下,苍蝇在野外根本无法移动,更不要说传播疾病

了。这些基本生物知识,美军不可能不知道。

那么美军是否可能培育出一种低温下也能活动的苍蝇呢?个人认为可能性不大,人工培育能改善生物的某种习性,但不能完全改变这种习性,而且就时间来说,也不够进行培育选择和淘汰,

这是一;二,如果真有低温下能动的苍蝇,炸弹落地后早就飞走了~```

而老鼠、跳蚤等本来就是野外大量活动的生物,而且如果真有不带菌的,那倒是希奇事了,别忘了上面一文中才说了那么多自然突发疫情的例子,因此这些生物身上带有鼠疫等病菌也不算太

奇怪的事情。

————————————————————————————————

既然在载体和病菌本身的来源上确定不了来自美军的唯一性,那我们继续来看细菌炸弹载体本身。

中朝方面拿出来的照片实在不能算是细菌炸弹的铁证。那我们根据战俘的口供来看,采用的炸弹是经过特殊设计的。但很奇怪,这些炸弹与731研制的,相对成熟的炸弹有太多明显不同:

731炸弹是陶瓷制造,以确保炸弹在落地后迅速碎裂,以方便带菌生物体跳蚤虱子等快速传播。经过多次残酷的人体实验,这种投放方式被证明是相当有效的。

这是731细菌炸弹的外形和结构图,是成熟的设计:

http://www.sinonet.net/news/tech/2009-08-05/35440.html

但战俘口供的这种炸弹却不是以碎裂的方式释放带菌生物,只给一个小口让带菌生物在落地后脱出——万一炸弹头部着土,那那些生物们不就跑不出去了吗?而且,既然使用了这种炸弹,我

们为什么没有看到任何一枚的残骸照片?

还有,空投老鼠、蜘蛛~````难道不怕老鼠和蜘蛛们在高速落地时的撞击中致死吗?要知道那种“很象普通500磅炸弹的不爆炸弹”是没有设计减速伞的。别说思MM那张照片,因为那张照片里

出现的“炸弹”明显跟战俘的口供不符,而且我认为那就是枚照明弹。

而且,事实证明美军不仅采用了日军731部队生物炸弹的设计,而且将其使用在了实战中:

“其中最突出的“成果”是石井炸弹,美军后来在越南使用的菠萝弹也是该弹的改进型。石井炸弹为陶瓷外壳,内装携细菌的跳瘙。”

原文地址:http://baike.baidu.com/view/59669.htm

我对美军在越南使用生物武器的疑问较小,因为此时从时间上说美军对生物武器的习性有了一定了解,而且越南战争的作战方式也使得美军具有使用生物武器的动机。

————————————————————————————————

现在我们再来看看流行地域。我参考的是我军公布的东北和朝鲜地区细菌散布略图。

在朝鲜图里,很明显美军散布细菌的地域已经接近了交战线,而wiki的时间表里更是有美军飞机在38线附近散布细菌的描述。这就给美军自己带来了问题,这个问题后面讲。

很明显图里的细菌是沿着铁路交通线分布的,考虑到SARS在还未采取有效措施时也是顺着交通工具流传到全世界,这就说明如果缺乏防疫,传染病基本都是沿着交通线流传的。这并不能说明

一定就是细菌武器导致的,由于这个图上没有标明各地区发现首个病例的时间,我们无法判断疫情是从中国进入朝鲜,还是从朝鲜进入中国,或者从某地到某地。

而东北的散布图就更加令人疑惑。假如说美军投放在朝鲜是不顾廉耻为了获得战争胜利的话,那么散布在东北又是为什么呢?而且最远的区域到了哈尔滨和海拉尔、锦州葫芦岛地区,就算是

要做实战实验,这么远的距离也不好检查效果啊。

但同样的,东北的疫情也是围绕铁路线分布的,同样也没有标明首例病例的时间。因此我们还是无法判断疫情是从哪个地区开始的。

——————————————————————————————————

在搜索以上材料的时候,我越来越倾向于可能是由于我国内地某地发生了疫情,通过支援志愿军的军列被传染到了东北和朝鲜。但这中间有个致命的问题,那就是我国内地发生了疫情,当地

防疫部门难道没有警觉吗?

事实证明,由于某些原因,建国初期的我国防疫工作做得确实不太理想:

“新中国成立之初,中央政府就提出了开展全国卫生防疫工作,并制定了“面向工农兵,预防为主,团结中西医”的卫生防疫原则,然而,群众没有动员起来,效果也很不理想。1951年9月7

日,当时任新中国卫生部党组书记兼副部长贺诚,写了一份给中共中央的《二十一个月来全国防疫工作的综合报告》,在肯定成绩的同时,着重指出“不少缺点”。其中关键在于:“不少省

县以下的党、政领导干部,只把不饿死人认为是政府的责任,对因不卫生而病死人,则重视不够,认为是难以避免 的‘天灾’天灾”。并且特别提到,“去年察哈尔阳高县(该县去年没有卫

生院)麻疹流行已四个月,死了一千多个小孩,道会门、特务便借此造谣活动,县及专署各级领导并未迅即上报,还是政法委员会派去的建政小组发现了群众灰心与恐慌的情绪,才反映到省

及中央来,虽经派防疫队去制止了疫情,群众认为:‘防疫队好,可惜来得太晚了’。””

原文见:http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/no01/1/412513.shtml

但是,当朝鲜战争上出现疫情后,我国极有可能在经过详细调查后认识到疫情的源头是来自我国内地(这句话是我推测的),于是出现了以下的变化:

“1952年2月19日,聂荣臻报告,在朝鲜前线发现敌人大面积空投带菌昆虫 。“美军细菌战”事件于是浮出水面。起初,毛泽东并未指出这个情况对公共卫生的政治意义,只是简洁地指示:

“请周总理注意此事,并予处理”。 但是,在接下来的几个月里,毛泽东在相关批示中,开始把“反对美军细菌战”与“开展全国卫生防疫运动”两个分别的概念逐渐结合起来。 到1952年

12月8日至13日,第二届全国卫生工作会议在北京召开,毛泽东为大会题词:“动员起来,讲究卫生,减少疾病,提高健康水平,粉碎敌人的细菌战争”。此时,卫生防疫运动与当时最大的政

治主题——抗美援朝和爱国主义——才真正结合起来。于是,“爱国卫生运动”的概念正式确立起来,并化为行动在全国展开。

  

  一旦与反对“美军细菌战”这个政治因素结合起来,命名为“爱国卫生运动”,新中国的卫生防疫运动就获得了强大的动力和空前的大发展。各级党政部门对待卫生防疫工作的消极态度

根本上得到改变,各地群众也被轰轰烈烈地被动员和组织起来。”

我个人认为,恰恰是在经过了详细的调查之后,我国政府终于明白了疫情的真正来源,所以才会加强国内的防疫工作,才会将其与“支援”抗美援朝等同起来。

—————————————————————————————————

关于国际调查,根据Wiki的说法(如果哪位觉得Wiki说的不是事实,可以提出补充),我个人觉得这个国际调查的结果确实有些不太过硬:

首先人员组成上基本都是左派人士,对共产主义理想抱有一定的好感(在当时崇尚共产主义思想在知识分子圈里是一种时髦),这就难免会使西方和其他国家对他们的立场有所怀疑;

另外由于我没有看到具体的人员名单,因此很自然地想到一个问题:“这其中有没有微生物学家和病理学家?”

最后,这个委员会的报告里没有拿出任何具体的事例和对病例的检查,也就是说,在技术上,这个委员会没有发挥任何作用。

当然了,国际调查本来就是包含了很多政治的东西,我只是在这里提出我的疑问。个人希望大家仍然把范围集中在技术方面,这样才能更多地排除主观因素,客观来看待这个事情。

最后,如果哪位朋友能搞到当年的疫情报告或者相关的病理报告的内容,本人感激不尽~````


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家园 是。。。“已有”,谢谢提醒
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