主题：【整理】【讨论】回顾九兵团长津湖之役兼与诸友商榷(1) -- 虎王2006

http://www.cchere.com/article/3614048

http://www.cchere.com/article/3612396

光年兄此两帖非常好,对于此战的战略与战术层面的分析相当到位.特别是"有意思"一帖,宝推并花之.

出于对这个话题的关注,一直跟看翰海兄主题帖.应该说翰海兄除了在初稿的伤亡数字略有些粗心,对于基本史料与史实大致上属于切如实际的阐述.以后翰海兄提到一些文字源于其父亲,老26军作战参谋的手笔,于是恍然:老一辈踏实的作风可为我们学习的楷模.

读到结束语,翰海兄对于此我军战史上的著名战役的个人见解,觉得有可以认同的地方,但是颇有些不一致的看法.故为此回复:

http://www.cchere.com/topic/3611007/5#C3612225

写完了贴出来,又后悔.翰海兄大约与我哥年龄军龄均相仿佛,余生稍晚些,没有能够赶上参军的年代,而是随了我们那个年纪的大流:念书,读大学,出国.所以颇有些亲近的感觉.虽然觉得我们对此战的评价之差别,如鱼骨鲠在喉,不吐不快,但总是担心彼此话来话往,弄得如同二野四野子弟们彼此拍砖,徒增笑柄.

思量再三还是写出来,因为觉得此役是我们父辈流血牺牲的重要事件,是国家民族近百年来复兴过程中的大事件,其意义超越了个人,也超越了小团体,超越三野老兵,以及老兵们的后辈的个人荣辱,所以还是需要提出来.所有的历史都是现代史,到了21世纪,美军在澳大利亚的海军基地,海军陆战队基地高调开张的时机,我们回顾往事就有了现实的意义.

几天来又与一些河友比较随意的交流看法,因为回帖比较即兴,很多重要的观点,事件的评估未能充分展开,想了想还是再写一些.

在进一步讨论之前,首先感谢众位河友的盛情.很久没有写帖了,这几天,本人前帖居然获赠30余通宝,承蒙错爱,不胜惶恐!我想这里主要还是大家感觉到此话题的现实意义而给予的鼓励吧!

又,特别感谢翰海兄之持重,而网间常有老兵们后人之间情绪化的争执没有出现.

等着看呢！

虎王说好，俺愧不敢当啊。

翰海兄的胸襟和风度，也是极好的。认识上的差异，是可以通过交流找到大家能接受的共同点的。

没有那帖子中间你们两位也包括Parishg河友讨论得到的启发，我可能也不会停下来很认真的去想一想。

如何看待长津湖，如何看待双方得失，我想要是放大一些，对个人，不论是不是身在军旅，都会是有益的。

我不会贴图，提供个有关地图的连接（当然是中国视角的），希望能够有所帮助。

http://apps.hi.baidu.com/share/detail/19477472

从弟的帖俺看出来，痴长弟几岁，多活了几年，所以俺就托大了。谢谢弟的关心、鼓励。

写的时候，兼做其它事情，粗心的很，有些数据，用语不甚恰当，甚至还有不少错字白字，不好意思。

这让俺想起，当初刚做第26军坦克团作训参谋的时候，去参加济南军区参谋训练队，顺道回家看看老父。有如下对话：

怎么回家啦？父亲问。

看看你们呗。俺回答。

路过？

是。

准备干什么？

参加军区参谋训练队。

你？

是啊！作训参谋。

你行吗？

怎么不行。俺颇不服气。

我看还是搞专业技术好。父亲总结道。

知子莫如父。虽然俺在团里无论是作战文书，还是口述战斗标图，只要是相关参谋业务，还算是做的可以。但终是不如俺的专业，来的强，只要坦克一发动，听到耳机里各种口令下达，俺就有一种天生的兴奋。

从心底感谢如俺老父一般的老兵，解放军的气质，从红军、八路军新四军到志愿军，一代一代传承下来；诚如毛泽东所言：这支军队具有一往无前的精神，它要压倒一切敌人，而决不被敌人所屈服。

长津湖之战，正是体现了这支军队的精神。

原打算直接应光年兄的线索开始讨论战役前的战略态势，又见翰海兄的热情文字，惊喜之余，决定先把战役本身的讨论暂时推后一帖，先回顾一下与父辈有关此役的交流。

很小的时候，喜欢翻看老爸的勋章，旧军衔标识，朝鲜战场的老照片，1951年左右九兵团政治部所制作的战地图片集，对于冰天雪地里的志愿军及其当面敌军留下很深的印象。其中有杨根思连长带大盖帽的证件照，年轻而英气逼人--我小时所见的解放军还是五星领章的军服，军帽是软软的那种，没有杨连长看起来帅啊。还有一张照片印象比较深的，是被击毙的南朝鲜军“白骷髅团”士兵的大特写，那种战死者生命彻底丧失后的死亡气息，令小朋友看到了觉得慎得慌，翻过去不想看，又忍不住去偷偷再瞄一眼。以后年岁渐渐增长，跟老爸聊起来，就知道了水门桥。那个工程奇迹给他们留下的印象非常深刻。

。。。

最近回家看望父亲，常常劝他写点东西，特别是朝鲜战场的事儿。他总是不肯，因为一则写起来需要查对大量资料，地图，档案，实在没有这个力量，他离休已经很久，不指望得到单位在资源方面的协助。二则，他觉得个人写作，难免又以偏概全，盲人摸象，又稍不小心就会陷进个人自己的偏见定见里。他觉得自己的看法与公开出版的正史，颇有些有出入的看法。我说，那好啊，正应该说说呢!父亲不赞同，他认为正史所载所取的，有其原因，特别是对于战争整体的把握与评估，自有其道理，而自己个人的直接感知，未必就是正确的，即使是亲身参与战场的某一个具体的局部的人。其三，父亲觉得写东西难免就会自吹自擂，主观上就不肯客观的去看待当时的人与事，而尽吹自己怎么怎么牛的过关斩将，没甚么意思。所以怎么劝也不肯动笔。

我想还有个原因是他的组织观念保密意识已成习惯太久了，有关部队步署，运动，战斗战术动作的具体细节，在公开出版物以外的内容，他不愿述及。所以讲故事可以，摆战例他就不肯了。那一代人有个很强的“组织”的观念，个人随随便便的乱说他觉得无法忍受。

这次仔细拜读翰海兄帖子，有点体会到父亲的深意了：事情往往并不是非黑即白的，即使是史书上定性定论的事件实况，从各人不同的身份，立场，角度去看，往往有差异，甚至互相冲突。兄弟部队也会各持己见，互相难以认可彼此的看法。而谁对谁错，则又因为各自掌握资料情报的局限，看问题从战略全局到具体战役局部的角度不同而不同，不可一概而论哪个对哪个错。

对于这一点，我最近看有关粟司令的平反乌龙，看到居然谭老板跟粟司令也是有过不对付的地方：苏中七战七捷，军史所载，中央盛赞。但是，当时粟司令把淮南区的精兵抽走，参加苏中的会战。然后，两淮迅速在74师，五军，七军这些牛部队的猛攻下失陷。再然后，粟司令又问责两淮军政首长指挥不力，纯军事角度技术流的说。不用问，两淮的首长谭老板气得不行。

还有，华野精兵，是1，4，6三兄弟，3，8，10又一组牛纵队，九纵是后起之秀。那么2纵就总是比较弱。可是据说2纵的首长就一直憋气，觉得粟司令不肯栽培他们，总是不给优秀的任务，所以才捞不着好仗打。

粟司令在华野，一般说来得到广大指战员的热烈拥戴，而他本人也是纯军事技术流，无私无畏。即使如此，也难免有不同的看法。

留个记号，

好文预订了。

http://www.cchere.com/article/3614048

回归正题：光年兄在战略层面提出了一些很有意思的想法.麦大帅虽然爱做秀,但是他的仁川左勾拳是正打在老金的腰眼上,把他揍趴下的.之后元山登陆十军团又是一个右勾拳,准备圣诞节完成战役,解决朝鲜全境,孩儿们回家过年.阿尔蒙得已在11月飞到过先遣部队最前出的地域:鸭录江边.他们当时的态势,基本上倒没有东线迂回包抄的概念,因为麦大帅以下并不觉得会遭到有足够力量的中国军队的抵抗.他们基本上是一线平推,调度好各部间协调,补好战线空隙,看住彼此的侧翼,钢铁洪流推到江边,封闭朝鲜全境,再说.

但是他们在拥有压倒空地火力优势的条件下终于做不到,不仅做不到,还被推了回去.

我曾经跟父亲提起过:既然当时九兵团那么严重的减员,那么疲惫,而我见到的材料说当时陆一师等单位还颇可一战,那他们再压过来反攻,你们不就玄了?父亲很肯定的说:他们绝不可能那么打.这是基于己于他当时在战地的现场感觉.

我没有可能拥有那种第一手的现场感,只好从文档资料里找感觉.有关的正史资料大家都很熟悉，各自主观看问题的角度不同，解读就很不一样，讨论得已很多了。在美的河友比如本人，读到过的有关通俗历史书籍很不少，往往洋溢着对于陆战队的赞美之词，其实有颇浓重的宣传味儿，看的时候是得长个心眼的。这些感觉类似我们的稗官野史，多半出于当年连排级军官之手，或者热心军史以及人物传记写手的采编。最近O.P.Smith的孙女写了本爷爷的战斗历程，浓墨重彩专章讲述长津湖，引用了当时Smith给陆战队司令的信以及其他的私信(她有条件翻看爷爷的私人档案)，很有意思，颇可一观，约三十块钱左右，在亚马孙卖得还不错。

而陆战队的公关与文宣是非常之棒的。当然另一方面是他们当年确实比较硬气，打起仗来比同样条件下的陆军部队顽强得多。这样的结果，是陆战队无数次顶住了被海军吞掉的命运，成为全球军队里陆战队独立成为一个军种的唯一例子。看征兵广告，陆战队的那个好似电玩游戏里的古老骑士，军礼服纤尘不染，目光坚定帅气，30秒广告的结束镜头，是擘出闪亮军刀，秀在面前，画外音“JOIN THE MARINE!"--可以令后生小子们心跳眼热。

有关陆战队长津湖过5关斩6将的传奇故事里，Major Gen. Smith(陆一师师长)跟Major Gen. Almond的不对付，是颇为著名的。在通俗演义里史密斯是红脸武生，好汉，阿尔蒙德是白鼻子丑角。我找了找，史密斯跟阿尔蒙德分别有个人访谈。把两人自己的话放在一起看，很有意思。我先贴上来，后面再找时间翻译，评注一下：

http://www.chosinreservoir.com/smithinterview.htm

http://www.chosinreservoir.com/almondcomments.htm

http://www.chosinreservoir.com/almondinterview.htm

此二人的回忆,对于重构我所寻找的现场感非常有用.准备择其有意思的段子贴来共享.

这几段是史密斯师长在谈论抢运伤员的时候，狠踩陆军的段子：

What we were working on first were these Army casualties from this over-run Task Force Faith, you see.

(史密斯说)我们先撤的是那个陆军被打垮了的费斯特遣队(31RCT)的伤兵。

Q: They were in bad shape?

他们的状况很糟糕吗?

史密斯：我想有些运出去的伙计伤得并不太重。他们中有些人只不过冻伤了几根手指，类似程度的轻伤而已。这伙小丑们是这么干的：他们会跑到临时机场，弄条毯子，找个担架躺着，再哼哼几声；陆战队员们就会被忽有了把他们抬上飞机。医生找着我，说他气坏了，因为他知道他有很多重伤员需要被空运走，他知道有多少后送了(该送没送的有不少)。好些伤势不重的被送走了。这大概是我们的错吧，因为空军派了个撤退协调官，医生就假设他会把关，让该撤的伤员上飞机，但那不是他的活儿，他就管飞机调度，完全不管谁该上飞机。(医生发飙)这事儿以后，有撤退票的才可以上飞机，没票的谁也不能走，连我都不行。飞走的必须有票证明他确实需要走。

Smith: I'm afraid that some got out that weren't in too bad shape. What these jokers would do, some of them might have frostbitten fingers, something like that. They would go down to the strip and get a blanket and a stretcher and the groan a bit; the corpsmen would come along and put them on a plane. The doctor came to me and he was fit to be tied because he knew how many seriously wounded he had that should be evacuated, and he knew how many had gone out by air, and it just didn't make sense. Somebody was getting out of there who wasn't seriously hurt. It was our fault probably, because the Air Force had sent up what they called an Evacuation Officer, and the doctor assumed that the Evacuation Officer would see that the proper people got aboard the planes, but that was not his function at all; he was just thinking in terms of planes, not on what was flown on the planes. After that I couldn't have gotten aboard a plane without a ticket. Nobody after that got on any plane without a ticket that showed that he was due to get out.

问：有没有陆战队员玩这套把戏?(装重伤员被后送)

Q: Were any of the Marines trying to pull that stuff?

史密斯：我认为没有。他们有医生证明才会撤，而他们是有战斗精神的。我确信陆战队员没有那么干的。那些陆军的伙计真是够折腾人的--他们跟丢了魂一样。我们尽量帮他们的忙。我们得空运进来武器把他们重新武装起来。他们把自己的所有武器都扔了。我让陆军的安德森中校指挥他们。他们不愿意自己搭帐篷--他们觉得该由我们来照顾他们，给他们开饭，给他们支帐篷。

Smith: I don't think so, because they were certified by the doctors and they had spirit. I am sure no Marines. I had quite a time with those Army people - they had no spirit. We tried to help them out as best we could. We had to fly in weapons to re- arm them. They'd thrown away all their weapons. I put LtCol Anderson (of the Army) in command of them. They didn't want to put up tents - they felt it was up to us to take care of them, feed them, and put up tents for them.

我们让他们打消了这个念头(靠陆战队包办照顾他们)。我们后来收编了他们385人(SALVAGED一词刻薄，废物利用的意思)。我估摸着，他们费斯特遣队在那儿有两千八百人。有一些陆军部队留在了下竭隅里，但是费斯特遣队，或者说麦克兰特遣队，麦克兰是他们先前领队的上校，有两千八百人。我们救下了他们大约九百伤员。我们又收编了约385人，所以有约一千两百人阵亡，被俘，或者类似的结局。那385人我们把他们跟留在下竭隅里的陆军人员一起，编成了一个临时营。他们就跟着我们走。我把他们配属利兹伯格(陆战七团团长)，他们可悲催极了。利兹伯格给他们警戒左翼的任务，让他们跟着行军纵队走；当中国军队开火的时候，他们居然穿越行军纵队，跑到另一侧去，没命的逃窜。哦，安德森还算条汉子，他还试着把他们管束住把他们叫回来。利兹伯格不得不派他的一个正规营来顶上逃散的陆军的位置。安德森后来要提请处分溃兵里的一些军官。我听说后来安德森进了东京的一家精神病医院。

We disabused them of that idea. We eventually salvaged 385 of them. As near as I can make out, that Task Force (Faith) had 2,800 men when they went up there. There were a few Army troops that were left in Hagaru-ri but as near as I can make out, 2,800 were in Task Force Faith or in Task Force McLean, the first colonel, and we evacuated 900 of them. We salvaged 385, so there must have been over 1,200 killed, captured, or what have you. The 385 we joined to what Army troops we had in Hagaru-ri and made a provisional battalion. They marched out with us. I attached them to Litzenberg, and they were pitiful. Litzenberg gave them the job of guarding the left flank, to march along the column; and when the Chinese opened up, they simply went through the column to the other side and took off. Well, Anderson was a pretty good fellow; he tried to get them under control and get them back. Litzenberg had to take on of the regular battalions to send up there to take over. Anderson brought charges later against some of the officers. According to the word I got later he was put in a psychiatric hospital in Tokyo.

Q: Anderson was?

Smith: Yes, and they never did anything about his charges. That's the story I got. I forget who told it to me - maybe Litzenberg. But they came on out with us. I am afraid that some of those 900 Army troops which were evacuated shouldn't have gone out, because over in Tokyo GHQ looked over some of those cases that were coming into the hospitals with only minor frostbite. And GHQ sent over a directive, which Adm. Joy never sent to me - sent it to Adm. Joy for the Marine Corps and to the Army for the Army troops - stating that there was a lack of leadership, because there shouldn't have been this frostbite if there had been good leadership. That made me mad as a hatter. Of course, Adm. Joy swept it under the rug. He didn't's send the thing on, but I heard about it and I wrote Gen. Cates. i said, this just didn't make sense at all. "What are you going to do? Here I have just given a silver star to a sergeant who pulled off his mittens in order to heave a grenade and he got frostbitten fingers. Are you going to court-martial that man for not taking proper precautions against frostbite? Are you going to court martial his battalion commander, his regimental commander, his division commander?" Silverthorne wrote me a letter and said, "Don't worry about it." By that time my senior medical officer had been detached and came back to Washington, and he had gone around talking to a few people and saying, "We know the score." The Army was much upset about it, he said, but as far as the Marine Corps was concerned they took things in their stride.

• 有关专业素养的问题,我在隔壁将专帖讨论

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史密斯师长的那种军人的直爽诙谐，令其议论颇有可看性。他这个段子，是人们印象中长津之役里陆战队很NB，陆军很SB这个通俗看法的来源之一。我们从中可以看到，当时美军东线各部的协调有很大的问题，陆战一师与陆军第七师的协同尤其糟。史密斯索性就拒绝了十军团派一个团去解围的指令，理由是他手下的两个团也在受到猛攻。他对麦大帅总部以及阿尔蒙德的指挥意见大了：在战役最激烈的时候，足有两天之久麦帅把十军团指挥官阿尔蒙德跟八军司令官瓦克召集到东京开会，而这两天里，史密斯在火线没有接到任何指令。此时原来的进攻计划自然不执行了，但是没有明确的撤退命令，史密斯也没法指挥所部跑路，只能硬扛着。史密斯的看法是：东京总部的大佬们都吓傻了("they were stunned").

。。。But we got no order from Corps for two days to actually withdraw, so we couldn't do anything but defend, as I couldn't withdraw without permission from higher authorities. On this redeployment of a regiment, I'd already told Litzenberg to use as much of his regiment as he could to try to clear the road back to Hagaru-ri. We didn't know just how much was across it.

Q. Was there any knowledge on the part of the Corps Commander of your predicament-

Smith: Every four hours we sent in a report of what was going on, but apparently they were stunned; they just couldn't make up their minds that the Chinese had attacked in force, you see. They just had to re-orient their thinking. It took them two days before we actually were told to withdraw to Hagaru-ri and advance to the coast - that took them two days to figure out.

他对于阿尔蒙德有一些生动的细节描写与八卦，很有可能是这些议论就是阿尔蒙德名声被败坏的主要源头之一。(史密斯的英文颇为生动有趣，翻译不出那个刻薄味道来，大家凑合看看吧)

The next time Almond came up, was after Litzenberg and Murray had fought their way out, and he came up and gave us all the Distinguished Service Cross, and he was weeping(他--指阿尔蒙德--上来给我们发卓越服务勋章，那时他在哭).I don't know what he was weeping about, whether from the cold or from emotion or what it was(我看不懂他在哭啥子，是天气寒冷冻的呢，是感情失控呢，还是别的啥子). I didn't' t know anything about this in advance. He came up to me and asked me if I'd line up Murray and Litzenberg and myself and Beale. He had one Distinguished Service Cross with him. We suggested that he give the cross to Beale who was the junior. Let him have the cross and we'd get ours some time later. I never did get a citation for that because that's that way they operate in those things. I supposed I would have had to write my own. It came out in Army General Order which simply stated that the decoration was for the Chosin Reservoir.

Q: You have great forbearance. A lesser man would have... Smith: (Laughs) That's what Heinl says! It is true....

Q: Weren't you ever tempted to ...

Smith: Very often, but I held it in. I told Gen. Shepherd some of the trouble. I told Gen. Cates. But I never had any confrontation with Almond. He was trying to get me back in the X Corps after we got out of there. He came to me one day and he said, "I'm going to get you back." I didn't say anything, but I made up my mind that if I could avoid it I wasn't going back. Relations were more or less friendly, but I'd lost confidence in him, that's all.

Q: Had he ever had a combat command before this?

Smith: I talked to one of the newspaper correspondents, and he couldn't understand why on earth they'd ever given him the corps. That was a newspaper correspondent who had been with him in Italy. And in Italy Gen Almond had commanded the 92nd Division which was Negro, and apparently they didn't do too well. He did considerable maneuvering like he tried to do in Korea. this correspondent told me that he maneuvered his outfit so much that he finally was defeated by one German battalion. Now I don't know what the score was. But, apparently, he was imbued with Stonewall Jackson's ideas. He got clobbered three times. He got clobbered at the Chosin Reservoir, and when we went up and attacked on the 21st of February from Wonju, that was his outfit that had been clobbered there. He'd taken a couple of South Korean divisions under his command and tried to effect a double envelopment of the Chinese, and both Korean divisions were clobbered. That's why we went in and went forward from Wonju. He was clobbered a third time - that was just after I left Korea, and I talked to his artillery officer who was a brigadier general, and he said, "Why, everybody told him that he was out on a limb." He had a flank that was open or something, and he said that he had heard the last he wanted to hear about that. The Chinese came around and they had an awful time getting squared away. They did, finally, get all their pieces together, and he Marines helped out a little bit.

Q: It sounds like the world's worst tactician, or at least in Korea.

史密斯师长显然是把长津之战看作比较丢人的败绩，这个从他的这段话可以看出来：“他(指阿尔蒙德)被痛扁了三回。他在长津湖被痛扁。。。”(He got clobbered three times. He got clobbered at the Chosin Reservoir,。。。)

在史密斯本人的陈述里，著名的“反向突击”的NB传说，是这样的：

Q: Knowing of you, your reputation and your career and what you've done during the war, this business of writing an attack order - was that a grandstand play - was this the logical move at this time?

史密斯：没错(这个进攻命令是合乎逻辑的)，你被包围的时候你是无法撤退的。我试图跟人们解释“让撤退见鬼去吧”这句话。被围了你就撤退不了。你只能突围，而当你突围时，那是在进攻。。。

Smith: Sure, you couldn't withdraw when you're surrounded. I've tried to explain that a "retreat hell" business to people. You can't retreat or withdraw when you are surrounded. The only thing you can do is break out, and when you break out, that's an attack. And the only fellow who understood that was S. L. A. Marshall - he understood it thoroughly. He wrote up a top secret report on the 1st Division breakout. A very fine document.

Q: I've never seen that.

Smith: Headquarters Marine Corps has got copies. You might dig it out. It was classified either secret or top secret. I had difficulty getting a copy, but I told Gen. Ridgway, I wrote him a letter saying I understood that Col. S. L. A. Marshall had made this study. He'd made a study of the 2nd Infantry Division and of the 1st Division reacting to the Chinese in the attack, and I said that we would be very glad to get the benefit of his observations on how we conducted the operation. He sent over a copy to me, and, of course, I sent that to FMF and they made more copies and I've got it around some place. He was very complimentary.

毫无疑问，史密斯对自己本人以及陆战一师部队的表现很欣赏。

。。。

阿尔蒙德的访谈录比较干吧，语言不及史密斯的形象生动，全文连接见前贴。大致意思是他本人时常亲临前线，十一月中到达鸭绿江边的前锋所在地，而战地调度七师，三师，陆战一师，南朝鲜军也是中规中矩。史密斯的陆战一师遭遇强敌时，他与麦帅，瓦克及时的在东京总部召开紧急会议，可算指挥若定。说到与史密斯与陆战队，他在肯定他们战斗勇敢的同时，指出史密斯总是执行任务打折扣，客观上行动迟缓，主观上有自作主张的嫌疑。

应该承认,读这些文件,容易受史密斯的影响,他写得很好看,也懂得宣传的技巧:尽量的突出本部队的英雄主义精神和事迹,拿友邻部队的失误与组织涣散的惨状来陪衬自己.他比较直率的承认长津湖战役的败绩,但是通过具体生动的丑化上司阿尔蒙德以及倒霉的陆军战友们,把自己跟陆战队摘了出来,而且成了英雄.

真正是最宝贵的精神财富。

这两天在上海出差，看了央视李鹰制作的《断刀》。片中穿插了不少对38军当年连、营、团级干部以及作战参谋、军医和政治干事等老人们的采访，历史的真实与厚重感扑面而来。

112师335团团长范天恩在生前接受采访时，追忆该团3连在松骨峰与敌殊死血战：“敌人扔那个汽油弹，（战士们）浑身带着火，有十几个带火的人扑向敌人，抱到一块儿烧死。打完了仗，连分开敌人的（尸体)都不行。那掩埋自己的同志，不能和敌人埋在一块儿啊，抠都抠不开，抱的。”

老爷子还以平和的语调讲出一段话，朴素自然却掷地有声：

生活在异国他乡的游子，何谓爱国、如何爱国，似乎颇可商榷。但做为军人子弟，一旦国家有难，需要我们如同父辈一般挺身而出时，我想我会毫不犹豫回国效命的。

一书中，阿尔蒙德是仅次于麦克阿瑟的中国人民的老朋友，指挥作战庸碌浮躁，漏洞百出。美国的军史界很多人看不起阿尔蒙德，倒是对李奇微和沃克颇有赞许；

毫不犹豫回国效命。作为退伍老兵也是能够上重返战场，报效祖国的！

阿尔蒙德与史密斯的关系,通俗军史里讲得很多了.在最新的史密斯孙女所著的传记里,又通过一堆私信里的议论狠狠的扇阿尔蒙德的脸.说实话,本人仔细读完史密斯师长的生动描写,也基本上站在鄙视阿尔蒙德的营垒里.别管陆战队员怎样浴血奋战,十军团全军在兴南港被撵下海,而且直到停战都推不回去,这个是需要问责的.虽然说麦大帅仍然包庇他的参谋长,甚至都让他按时升级三星中将,他的名声在陆战队文宣力量的打击下,还是完蛋了--按史密斯师长的说法,阿尔蒙德在朝鲜战场被志愿军痛扁了三次:第一次在长津湖;第二次企图率领两个南朝鲜师反包围,结果两个南朝鲜师都被击溃;第三次他率部不顾侧翼暴露冒进,他的炮兵司令跟史密斯说"这是为什么啊?!所有的人都提醒他侧翼暴露了,很危险,可是他就是不肯听",结果被中国军队狠狠的穿插了,他们费了好大劲才收拾好残局(史密斯师长又不失时机的加一句:咱们陆战队在收拾败局时又帮了不小的忙).

那么阿尔蒙德真那么烂么?很不好说.他是麦大帅的参谋长,釜山环形防御的组织,仁川登陆,都有阿尔蒙德的大量工作.特别是仁川登陆,是他本人指挥由陆战一师等生力军所编组的十军团,打出的战果让麦大帅的声望如日中天.

之后元山登陆,在玩溜了仁川左勾拳,又打出右勾拳.而这回,直到长津湖之战前,还是颇有看点的,阿尔蒙德本人已飞临鸭绿江边的前锋阵地视察过,麦大帅发话许诺圣诞节可以让孩儿们回家过年.

但是他的右钩拳砸在铁板上了,九兵团的苦战,以及与此同时西线十三兵团对美八军的穿插突击,让他的妙招变成了全线崩溃.从个人层面说,阿尔蒙德就做不成名将,而变作笑柄了.用史密斯师长的话说,就是"他以为他是石墙杰克逊啊?!"

客观的说,阿尔蒙德作为麦大帅的参谋长兼臂膀是立下汗马功劳的,经过长津湖战役为天下笑者,情有可原--志愿军第九兵团的顽强拼搏,直接把他的妙手变成了无理手.战场的比拼,可见双方高下,被推下海的阿尔蒙德,只好作为运筹帏幄克敌制胜这个专业的差等生载入史册.

下面河友JOHN所给的马谡的帽子,很有意思.但是我觉得很难讲,阿尔蒙德的专业水平,在釜山,仁川都有验证.可以说军史特别是通俗军史很讲究成王败寇,因为长津败得太难看,所以人们说起釜山环形防御,就是瓦克将军指挥若定,木有阿尔蒙德参谋长的调度得力;而仁川的战略成功无法指责,人们就挑毛病说阿尔蒙德的十军团追击不够迅速果敢,让金日成跑掉不少溃兵.所谓一丑遮百俊.

看阿尔蒙德的访谈,虽然说跟史密斯师长那个绘声绘色的文笔相比很干巴很不給力,令人不耐烦听他的,但是要是仔细倾听,他也有些道理:他指出史密斯师长此人一贯的过份谨慎,故意拖延,仁川登陆后陆战一师就是不肯快速往前突,是造成整个十军团追击速度问题的原因.而在长津湖,史密斯师长又故伎重演,稳扎稳打,绝不肯跑太快.虽然说他的看法基本没有谁听,但是我们知道九兵团进入战场只比陆战一师早两天,而26军还来不及在打响前抵达合适的位置,这样,若是史密斯师长坚决贯彻阿尔蒙德的决断,不拖延的话,局面又会有所不同.

其实所谓九兵团突然伏击的普遍被接受的说法,也并非毫无疑问.当时中国军队参战已为阿尔蒙徳跟麦大帅他们知晓,只是他们并不把装备低劣,火力很弱的中国军队放在眼里.阿尔蒙德给史密斯师长的著名指令:攻击!别让一伙子中国洗衣佬拖你的后腿!--固然因为战局的发展被耻笑,但是当时他的确是信心满满的来灭你的.假如咱们在严寒与美军的双重打击下垮下去,被赶过江,再封住,阿尔蒙德就不再是马谡,而是真正的名将了.

所以他们在东京开了两天之久的会,面对东西两线的强敌,终于决定撤.这个弯子转得是不容易的.战场上你弱他就强,虽然说实际战场上我们比他们更困难,但是垮下去的是他们.

...

还有个常见的误区,就是一些河友拿当代美军的怕死人怕伤亡来套1950年,那是没道理的.那时的美军还是硬朗而不怕牺牲的.以陆战一师为例,撤走伤员之后,史密斯师长下令不准空运走能战斗的人员(当时有空运力量再运走些人.当然,不可能是全部部队,或者多数),大家齐心协力往外打出去.不仅如此,他还命令把后方兴南港留守及伤愈的八百战士运进来,归还建制,共同战斗.

这厮就是一美军中的“马谡”，对吗？