主题：大投资（一） -- 陈经
三轮剥削，三批人付出了巨大的代价，但是万幸的是这些代价都换来了大发展。大多数老百姓多多少少都喝到了些汤。
真正的杯具是付出了代价，球毛都得不到。
in china under TG, 能量>financial capital by how much? nobody knows, the super smart TG+ forever hardworking Chinese people=an odd couple of working marriage (1+1> 2, like a 化学键 thing or some kind of 愛因斯坦的質能關係, E＝mc2; a marriage as such is basically 时不变, time invariant= 不受外力影响, 系统没有阻力, extremely speaking, but 結合能 in this "1+1>2" system: a big share goes to china political top.
the Chinese odd couple managed to have 1+1> 2, by how much? =in china under TG, 能量>financial capital by how much? nobody knows, but looks like there is a "lot".
这不,狐狸尾巴露出来了
庞氏骗局,就是要用新增资金支付先前的投资者的利息的.而且随着骗局规模的增加,对新增资金的要求越来越高的.六月的钱荒,说明虽然现在的货币供应量很大,但仍旧不足以支付利息,掩盖坏账.
五毛们吃惊,庞氏骗局的说法,是证监会主席肖刚提出来的.
好像是挖坑没填好。是不是政委的理论框架还没构建完整？
个人感觉就3和7讲的比较透。
底特律不只是资不抵债，而是完全无财政收入，城市不断萎缩。
要说比较，拿那九个省市和加州比比较靠谱。都是财政破产。但仍然富的流油。
看看美国，从大萧条以来，基本也是20年左右换一次政策。大投资能再管用十年就不错了，以后的事要后人来分析。
实际上生活质量都在改善。
有的改善快，有的改善慢罢了。
最近20年来，诸位见过谁生活质量较20年前下了？
不要把这种不断改善当做理所当然，也不要说这都是人民勤劳所致跟某党无关。那很无聊。
有没有沉淀下来的，非泡沫的部分，是这两者的本质区别。
三公经费砍掉一半，三农问题就解决了；直属央企上缴利润多10%，破产国企的下岗工人的历史问题也解决了。不过眼看延迟退休一再讨论，看来全民养老金问题已经是挽回不了了，就算开源节流了也要优先填这个窟窿。
目前一些城市的债务问题已经开始显现。审计署对36个地方政府本级2011年以来政府性债务情况抽查结果显示，两年来上述地方政府债务余额增长了12.94%，债务率最高的城市债务余额是当地综合财力的两倍多。与此同时，地方政府还债的重要“靠山”——土地出让金却出现下降。2012年全国土地出让合同价款2.69万亿元，这一数字远低于2011年的3.15万亿元，加之中央政府又从出让收入中提取了水利、教育等基金，使得地方政府掌握的可用资金大幅减少。这一增一减加大了债务风险。
“新区”建设变味，深层原因也在于一些地方对“土地财政”的依赖。近年来，各地土地出让金在地方财政收入中的比重不断提升。2012年，全国土地出让金达2.69万亿元，相当于同期全国地方财政总收入的40%以上，在有些县市， 土地出让金占预算外财政收入比重已超过50%。国土资源部法律中心的一份研究报告指出：“现行财税体制下，中央和地方的财权、事权不相匹配。地方政府在缺乏建设性财政资金的前提下实现工业化和城镇化加速发展，需要依靠经营性用地出让取得资金，以支撑基础设施建设和公共支出。”因此，通过大规模造城来拉动地价，提升城市价值，以获得更多的财政收益，也就成为很多地方的“理性”之选。
资源环境面临的压力同样巨大。一些城市空间无序开发、人口过度集聚，交通拥堵严重，食品(行情 专区)安全事件频发，大气、水、土壤等环境污染加剧。
地方债务风险也不容忽视。“现在很多地方都把促进经济增长的宝押到了新城建设上，利用融资平台举债成为普遍的做法。”李铁说，大部分新城规划都确定了庞大的投资规模，寄希望于未来通过新城开发的土地出让金偿还。国土资源部统计数据显示，截至2012年底，全国84个重点城市处于抵押状态的土地面积为34.87万公顷，抵押贷款总额5.95万亿元，同比分别增长15.7%和23.2%。“这些新城建设，一旦开发主体不到位，地方政府必将面临投资风险问题。”
目前一些城市的债务问题已经开始显现。审计署对36个地方政府本级2011年以来政府性债务情况抽查结果显示，两年来上述地方政府债务余额增长了12.94%，债务率最高的城市债务余额是当地综合(行情 专区)财力的两倍多。与此同时，地方政府还债的重要“靠山”——土地出让金却出现下降。2012年全国土地出让合同价款2.69万亿元，这一数字远低于2011年的3.15万亿元，加之中央政府又从出让收入中提取了水利、教育等基金，使得地方政府掌握的可用资金大幅减少。这一增一减加大了债务风险。
as my guess:
刀刃=1, 自己的队伍;
刀刃 =2, folks like 华为
我从92年就开始接触华为，华为的情况我还是很清楚的， [ 老成都 ]
http://www.ccthere.com/article/3906214
as to those 三农, 破产国企的下岗工人,
TG calculates that they will support TG, like 淮海战役是小车推出来, Chinese people will still do that, more or less, in a more twisted way of working with TG together as an odd couple ;
3. globally, TG thinks TG as a 执政党 is much better than those white 执政党, those white 执政党 don't really know what they are doing, in TG's eye, and TG has 制度优势, and "most" Chinese people somehow buys that theory;
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Paul Krugman - New York Times Blog
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August 18, 2013, 3:06 pm 28 Comments
The New Growth Fizzle
A sort of side-thought inspired by Brad DeLong on the end of Malthusian economics and all that, plus what looks like deja vu all over again on the payoff or lack thereof to Big Data: whatever happened to New Growth Theory?
For a while, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, theories of growth with endogenous technological change were widely heralded as the Next Big Thing in economics. Textbooks were restructured to put long-run growth up front, with business cycles (who cared about those anymore?) crammed into a chapter or two at the end. David Warsh wrote a book touting NGT as the most fundamental development since Adam Smith, casting Paul Romer as a heroic figure leading economics into a brave new world.
And here we are, a couple of decades on, and the whole thing seems to have fizzled out. Romer has had a very interesting and productive life, but not at all the kind of role Warsh imagined. The reasons some countries grow more successfully than others remain fairly mysterious, with most discussions ending, as Robert Solow remarked long ago, in a “blaze of amateur sociology”. And whaddya know, business cycles turn out still to be important.
My own sense is that NGT never really had the elements needed to turn it into an intellectual success story; too much of it involved making assumptions about how unmeasurable things affected other unmeasurable things. It took off, briefly, partly because the subject is so important, and people wanted to be able to say something about it; meanwhile, business-cycle macro was then, as it is now, a deeply disputatious area riven by politics, and people were eager to talk about something else. In short, it was an intellectual bubble that eventually deflated of its own accord.
But it’s still amazing, for someone who remembers the excitement of the time, how completely it has all vanished from the economics landscape.