主题：【原创】奔向复苏或者奔向危机的2007 -- 葡萄

英国杂志《经济学家》报导，前俄罗斯尤科斯石油公司总裁霍多尔科夫斯基撰写了文章《西伯利亚的来信》。文中发出他的三个狱中预言：预言一：2007年美国单极霸权将终结；预言二：中国将成国际公认世界领袖；预言三：俄罗斯的未来发展不乐观。

霍多尔科夫斯基在文章中说，「2007年将是人类历史发展的重大转捩」，新的世界政治经济秩序正在快速形成，过去15年一直存在的美国独大的单极世界行将结束。霍多尔科夫斯基还说，这个新的世界秩序也不同于苏联解体前的两极对峙模式。

霍多尔科夫斯基在文章中提醒人们注意中国正在成为被国际社会广泛承认的世界领袖，其国际影响力与日俱增。在华盛顿和北京两大势力对峙的形势下还会出现第三种势力，这就是不结盟运动国家组成的联盟。第三种势力既不与美国结盟，也不与中国结盟。这种思想现在正在新德里、德黑兰以及拉丁美洲国家的首都酝酿。

霍多尔科夫斯特别提到了俄罗斯在世界新秩序中的地位。他认为俄罗斯的未来很不乐观，因为「俄罗斯实际上已经错过了后工业化时代的班车」。苏联解体后俄罗斯没有能够融入美国主导的单极世界，现在却天天在体会到中国崛起所带来的巨大压力。霍多尔科夫斯基认为，他的祖国现在所面临的最大威胁是俄罗斯联邦的亚洲部分正在中国化。

霍多尔科夫斯基撰写的文章全文如下：

2007年：美国单极世界走向终结中国成全能型超级大国

2007年将成为人类历史的分水岭，我们都将见证世界新秩序的形成。这个世界新秩序将根本区别于以美国为中心的单极世界，也区别于曾经持续了45年（1945-1990）的雅尔塔秩序。

美国独大的单极世界将会终结，而雅尔塔时代的两极对峙局面也不再可能重现，印度、伊朗和拉美国家组成的第三世界将成为一支不可忽视的力量。美国如果入侵伊朗将会加速我所预言的世界新秩序的形成，也将推动中国更快地成为超级大国，展露其大国战略和野心，还将催化发展中国家建立新的世界中心的进程。

中国最终将展露其统治整个东半球、建立一个政治、经济、军事超级大国的野心。中国崛起的标帜已开始显露，最明显的就是最近发生的朝鲜核危机，中国开始让世界明白：解决朝鲜核问题的主导权在北京，世界其它国家必须接受中国同意的解决方案，中国不再是一个地区大国，而是一个世界超级大国。

中国不是以政治和军事实力而是用经济实力向世界证明其超级大国地位，中国有操控世界市场的能力，他们的制造能力可以生产世界上所有的商品，被称之为「世界工厂」，中国还有庞大的外汇储备量，其中主要是美元。美国、西欧、俄罗斯在经济领域现在已经开始感觉到自己已经成了中华人民共和国的「人质。」

能源问题：俄西伯利亚难免中国化未来将爆发新殖民战争

俄罗斯联邦亚洲部分的中国化现在已经成为我们威胁我国安全的战略问题。

俄罗斯现在的处境相当困难，错过了后工业后时代的末班车。俄罗斯没有能够融入美国主导的西方世界，现在还时时从中国这边感受到巨大压力。中国对人烟稀少的西伯利亚很感兴趣，那里有着丰富的资源。俄罗斯联邦亚洲部分正在加速中国化，今天贝加尔湖以东人们不管是在交通运输方面，还是在信息流通方面，与中国发生联系的频率和深度都超过了他们与莫斯科的联系。因此，这些地区被中国化是不可避免的趋势。

在世界新秩序中能源政策极为关键。石油价格的攀升刺激了更多的资金投入到石油生产行业。各种石油替代能源的研究方兴未艾。由于第三世界国家工业化的蓬勃发展，世界对石油和新能源、资源的需求将更大，世界各国在能源领域的竞争将更趋激烈，未来将爆发新的殖民战争－－和以往时代不同，这一次是为了能源。

[SIZE=3]Letter from Siberia[/SIZE]

From The World in 2007 print edition

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a former Russian oil tycoon now serving a nine-year jail sentence for fraud and tax evasion, sees the emergence of a new world order

In all likelihood, 2007 will turn out to be truly a watershed year in recent human history—the year in which we will see an acceleration in the formation of a new world order. At the very least, not only will the categorical need for such a world order become universally recognised, but its general features will become apparent as well. This world order will differ fundamentally from the United States-centred world in which we have been living for nearly 20 years; however, it will not much resemble the bipolar post-Yalta world (1945-90) either.

China will at last clearly stake its claim to the role and status of a global superpower, the military and economic protector of the eastern hemisphere. The signs of China’s transformation will include its response to new missile launches by North Korea—already China is giving clear signals that the key to a resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue lies in Beijing, and no place else. The rest of the world will have to accept China’s terms for settling the matter and thereby recognise China as not just a regional superpower, but a global one too.

The new world order will mean not only a global status for China, but also the formation of a new non-aligned movement, with Delhi, Tehran and a number of Latin American capitals as its emerging centres. This movement will be amorphous and disjointed, but the mere fact of its existence will ensure that the world can neither remain unipolar nor become bipolar on the Yalta model. A potential American attack on Iran will accelerate the formation of this new world order, because it will force China to declare its strategic ambitions sooner, as well as catalysing the formation of yet more new centres of active anti-American sentiment worldwide.

A rapid Sinification of the Asian part of Russia is already taking place, and represents the main strategic threat to the country’s security

China will assert itself not only as a political and military power, but also as an economic superpower: it will test its wings by manipulating the rest of the world both as the largest producer of all categories of industrial goods, “the world’s factory”, and as the largest holder of the world’s reserve currency, the dollar. The United States, western Europe and Russia will start to feel like economic hostages of the People’s Republic.

The formation of the new world order will mean a slowing down of the process of globalisation in its current form. On the one hand, globalisation has brought the world a great deal of technological benefit; on the other, it has led to large-scale violations of the rights of individuals and of societies—from nations to civilisations. This assault of unification, which ignores the deep differences between people and their fundamental needs and ways of interacting with the world around them, has given rise to the anti-globalisation revolt, which is itself a driving force for the formation of the new world order.

Russia finds itself in a particularly difficult situation. It has essentially abandoned the industrial economy, but has not achieved a post-industrial one. It has abandoned many of the things that have made it unique historically, but has not sufficiently fitted into the America-centred world either. It is feeling remarkably strong pressure from China, which is interested in the sparsely populated vastness of Siberia, so rich in natural resources. A rapid Sinification of the Asian part of Russia is already taking place, and represents the main strategic threat to the country’s security. Even today, the logistical interaction and human contact between the areas to the east of Lake Baikal and the countries of Asia, especially China, are comparable with or even exceed such ties with Moscow, while Sinification is seen as something inevitable.

Fuel for thought

Energy policy will be a key factor in the new world order. The new generally accepted “fair price” for oil of $40-60 per barrel will stimulate serious capital investment in alternative, “borderline cost-efficient” fuels. Among these are GTL—gas-to-liquid—which renders small gas and gas-condensate fields located far from consumers economically viable; technologies for turning coal into motor fuels and for gasification of coal underground, which will give many old coal-producing regions a new lease of life; and, on the American continent, huge reserves of underground heat sources may be deserving of a serious look.

But even if work begins in all these directions, as well as towards improving energy efficiency in industry and homes and the use of various small-scale alternative sources of energy, we cannot forget that the economies of developing countries will continue to grow, meaning there will not be any reduction in energy prices in the near and medium term. The year ahead will show which strategy the developed countries are going to choose to work their way out of their looming energy crisis.

1. Reindustrialisation based on a “new competitiveness” deriving from an energy-efficiency advantage over the industry of China and other developing countries.

2. New colonial wars—this time for energy resources.

3. New leadership: abandonment of the model of increasing material consumption in favour of improvement in the quality of life, an increase in the intellectual component of the consumer basket.

Strategically speaking, only the third way holds promise for the future. Human nature is extremely conservative, and there is of course a strong desire to postpone making such a radical decision. But this is not possible—the decision will be made in 2007. Whether we are aware of it or not, the direction for the next decade or more is going to be decisively set.