主题：【原创】揭穿一个流传已久的谎话帖，关于美国持枪自由 -- zhang11

To clarify that its ruling does not invalidate a broad range of existing firearm laws, the Court said:[149]

Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.[150]

The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Stevens, stated that:

The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment protects a “collective right” or an “individual right.” Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us anything about the scope of that right.[151]

从18世纪到现在这是第一次由最高法院对第二修正案做出解释

Interpreting the Second Amendment

* United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) - A post Civil War era case relating to the Ku Klux Klan depriving freed slaves basic rights such as freedom of assembly and to bear arms. The court ruled the First and Second Amendments "was not intended to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their own citizens" and "has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government," respectively. In summary, it ruled the federal government could not file charges against citizens in federal court regarding violations of other citizens' constitutional rights. It was up to the states to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens when their rights were abridged by other citizens.

* Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) - One of only two post-Civil War 19th Century U.S. Supreme Court cases to address the Second amendment, the sole other one being the above-mentioned United States v. Cruikshank. This second post-Civil War era case related to the meaning of the Second Amendment rights relating to militias and individuals. The court ruled the Second Amendment right was a right of individuals, not militias, and was not a right to form or belong to a militia, but related to an individual right to bear arms for the good of the United States, who could serve as members of a militia upon being called up by the Government in time of collective need. In essence, it declared, although individuals have the right to keep and bear arms, a state law prohibiting common citizens from forming personal military organizations, and drilling or parading, is still constitutional because prohibiting such personal military formations and parades does not limit a personal right to keep and bear arms:

"We think it clear that there are no sections under consideration, which only forbid bodies of men to associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law, do not infringe the right of the people to keep and bear arms."

The Court also noted that the Second Amendment only restrained the federal government from regulating gun ownership, not the individual states:

"The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed, but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes to what is called in City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. [116 U.S. 252, 102] 139, the 'powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what was perhaps more properly called internal police,' 'not surrendered or restrained' by the constitution of the United States."

* United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) - The court stated in part:

"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense... The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. 'A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline.' And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time."'

* District of Columbia v. Heller - The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, by a vote of 5-4, holding:

"The Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed."[1]

我不知道是否有在不改变法律的情况下最高法院的法官改变以前的最高法院法官裁决的例子

The decision completely overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) and partially overruled McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003).[4]

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held the Michigan Campaign Finance act which prohibited corporations from using treasury money to support or oppose candidates in elections did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)[1], is a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, often referred to as the McCain–Feingold Act.